Decision on Eliminating Convergence Bidding at the Interties Greg - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Decision on Eliminating Convergence Bidding at the Interties Greg - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Decision on Eliminating Convergence Bidding at the Interties Greg Cook Director, Market & Infrastructure Policy Board of Governors Meeting General Session August 25-26, 2011 Convergence bidding implemented in February to provide market


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Decision on Eliminating Convergence Bidding at the Interties

Greg Cook Director, Market & Infrastructure Policy Board of Governors Meeting General Session August 25-26, 2011

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Convergence bidding implemented in February to provide market efficiency benefits.

  • Minimize differences between day-ahead and real-time

prices – Lower costs due to more efficient day-ahead commitment – Improve grid operations

  • Mitigate supplier market power
  • Provide suppliers the ability to hedge against generator
  • utages

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Convergence bidding on the interties is not driving the intended market efficiencies.

  • The structure of the real-time market provides incentives for

inefficient convergence bidding on interties. – Intertie convergence bids cleared at hour ahead scheduling process prices – Internal convergence bids cleared at real-time dispatch prices – Hour ahead scheduling process prices systematically lower than day-ahead and real-time prices

  • Results in incentives for virtual supply bids on the interties that

diverge day-ahead and real-time prices and increase uplift costs.

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SLIDE 4

Convergence bidding on the interties is undermining the market efficiency benefits of the convergence bidding design.

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Price

R T

  • 1. RT > DA, virtual demand is expected
  • 2. HASP < DA, INTERTIE virtual supply is expected
  • 3. HASP < RTD, 1 and 2 balanced is profitable

R T D H A S P

  • 1. RT > DA, INTERNAL virtual demand is expected

D A

DA: Day Ahead RT: Real Time HASP: Hour Ahead Scheduling Process RTD: Real Time Dispatch

Virtual Supply Virtual Demand Off Peak - 10 day moving average

  • 1. RT > DA, INTERNAL virtual demand is expected
  • 2. HASP < DA, INTERTIE virtual supply is expected

$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16 $18 $20 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN Offset (Millions)

Real Time Imbalance Energy Offset (Total)

SC Balanced Virtual Residual Virtual All Others

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SLIDE 5

Hour ahead scheduling process prices consistently lower than day-ahead and real-time prices.

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Off Peak Average Price

$- $5.00 $10.00 $15.00 $20.00 $25.00 $30.00 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul IFM HASP RTD

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There is high virtual demand at the internal nodes and high virtual supply at the interties.

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Virtual Supply Virtual Demand

Off Peak 10 Day Moving Average

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Several alternatives were considered to resolve stakeholder concerns with convergence bidding on the interties:

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Real-time imbalance energy offset

  • Prohibit balanced virtual positions
  • Settle imports and exports at real-time price
  • Align virtual bid liquidation and settlement
  • Settlement rule to return revenue from balanced positions

Intertie price inconsistencies

  • Price the two intertie constraints
  • Pay as-bid
  • Pay as-bid or better
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SLIDE 8

Some stakeholders argue that convergence bidding on the interties provides market benefits.

  • Lower cost to import renewables by enabling transmission

to be procured after hour ahead scheduling process

– Strategy not being used – Day-ahead physical schedule provides the same benefit

  • Virtual supply on interties reduces day-ahead prices which

benefits load serving entities

  • Hedging against outages of physical imports

– This hedge seldom used – Hour ahead scheduling process prices have little price volatility risk

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Stakeholders are sharply divided on the proposal.

  • Strong support from load serving entities
  • Strong opposition from marketers
  • Agreement that two settlement timeframes for real-time

market must be resolved

  • Disagreement on whether convergence bidding should be

removed while real-time market issues are resolved

Slide 9

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Management requests Board approval to remove convergence bidding from interties.

  • Convergence bidding on the interties should be eliminated

until real-time market design issues are resolved

  • Limited benefits of convergence bidding on the interties

exceeded by costs due to real-time market issues

  • Eliminates issue of prices inconsistent with bids on interties
  • Comprehensive market redesign stakeholder initiative

underway to address ISO market issues

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