DDoS Security Testing MIKE BERKELAAR & AZAD KAMALI (UVA) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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DDoS Security Testing MIKE BERKELAAR & AZAD KAMALI (UVA) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

DDoS Security Testing MIKE BERKELAAR & AZAD KAMALI (UVA) SUPERVISOR: PIETER WESTEIN (DELOITTE) SUMMER 2014 A (D)DoS Attack Is an attempt to make a service/resource unable to operate as intended Called Distributed , when more


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DDoS Security Testing

MIKE BERKELAAR & AZAD KAMALI (UVA) SUPERVISOR: PIETER WESTEIN (DELOITTE) SUMMER 2014

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SLIDE 2

A (D)DoS Attack

  • Is an attempt to make a service/resource unable to operate as intended
  • Called “Distributed”, when more than one attackers are involved
  • Comes from no where!
  • Distributed
  • Spoofed sources
  • Hard to differentiate from legitimate usage

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Types of DoS

  • Disrupting Services
  • Configuration Information (DNS Poisoning)
  • State Information (disassociation in Wi-Fi)
  • Cutting Communication Path
  • (Over)Consuming Valuable Resources
  • Bandwidth
  • Processing Time
  • We will be focusing on the 2nd category

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SLIDE 4

Defensive Measures

  • Have more resources than attacker(s) (easy to say!)
  • Make use of some in-line filtering devices
  • Be prepared
  • Monitor behaviors
  • Dump logs and USE them
  • Test your infrastructure
  • What would it do under pressure?

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SLIDE 5

Research Question

  • How can various DoS attacks be simulated in a controlled way?
  • Which DoS attacks can be simulated in a potentially controlled way?
  • Which parameters should be used in order to have a controlled attack?
  • Which metrics should be monitored to measure the effects of a DoS
  • Use-case
  • Test effects of potential DDoS attacks
  • Identify bottlenecks

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SLIDE 6

Attack Layers

  • Network Layer
  • Targeting Bandwidth of target and all nodes in the path to it
  • Ping of death
  • Amplification attacks
  • Application Layer
  • Targeting Application specific aspects and/or TCP stack of OS
  • Massive (fake) HTTP requests
  • Heavy queries against Database servers
  • SYN Attack

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SLIDE 7

When is the attack successful?

  • When target is slowed down?
  • When it is out for a while?
  • When it is completely unavailable?

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SLIDE 8

Basic Idea

  • Based on feedback loops
  • Start a potential attack
  • Monitor the affects on target (get feedback)
  • Stop the attack at a certain point

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SLIDE 9

Architecture

  • Separation of monitoring and attacking
  • Distributed execution
  • Performance
  • Monitoring consensus
  • Extendable with various DoS attacks

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Master Attack instructions Monitoring traffic Monitoring agents Attack agents Target Monitoring feedback Attack traffic

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SLIDE 10

Monitoring parts

  • Resources
  • Remaining TCP queue space
  • System resource utilization
  • Data Gathering
  • Resource status gathering via
  • SNMP
  • WMI
  • Other local daemons
  • RTT ( ICMP, HTTP )
  • Timeouts ( ICMP, HTTP )

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SLIDE 11

Attack monitoring

  • Monitoring (un)availability is a concern
  • Monitoring accuracy may be off

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Attack monitoring

  • Reactive
  • Monitor if a defined threshold is reached
  • ‘Damage’ may have been done already
  • Proactive
  • Watching trends could allow for predictions
  • Obvious choice if applicable
  • Deal with noise and variance

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SLIDE 13

Threshold Selection

  • Different expectations
  • Performance Degradation
  • Partial unavailability
  • Complete unavailability
  • Thresholds used in our tests:
  • 1 % random packet loss
  • 10 x response time regression

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SLIDE 14

Proof of concept

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  • Python implementation of framework
  • DDoS simulations
  • Traffic flood
  • Application level DoS
  • SYN flood
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SLIDE 15

Traffic flood

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  • Exhaust network capacity
  • Monitoring acts as a part of the attack
  • Probes for link capacity with ICMP packets
  • Hands off confirmed 'capacity' to attack-agents
  • Sliding rate as a percentage of the total attack rate
  • Approximation of packet loss based on monitoring results
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SLIDE 16

Traffic flood handoff

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SLIDE 17

Traffic flood

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SLIDE 18

Application layer DoS

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  • Resource intensive script requested over HTTP
  • Monitor HTTP response time
  • Values increase with attack rate
  • Prediction of attack headroom based on response time slope
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SLIDE 19

Application layer DoS

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Conclusion

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  • DDoS attacks are controllable, depending on:
  • The definition of when a DDoS causes ‘damage’
  • The monitoring capabilities an attack class allows
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SLIDE 21

Demo

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  • Controlled traffic flood demo