CSCI 3210: Computational Game Theory Cascading Behavior in - - PDF document

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CSCI 3210: Computational Game Theory Cascading Behavior in - - PDF document

11/17/19 CSCI 3210: Computational Game Theory Cascading Behavior in Networks Ref: [AGT] Ch 24 Mohammad T . Irfan Email: mirfan@bowdoin.edu Web: www.bowdoin.edu/~mirfan Course Website: www.bowdoin.edu/~mirfan/CSCI-3210.html Cascading


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CSCI 3210: Computational Game Theory

Mohammad T . Irfan Email: mirfan@bowdoin.edu Web: www.bowdoin.edu/~mirfan Course Website: www.bowdoin.edu/~mirfan/CSCI-3210.html

Cascading Behavior in Networks

Ref: [AGT] Ch 24

Cascading behavior

u Analogy: epidemic u Starts with a few sick

people

u Propagates

2

Alice

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Diffusion of innovations

u Studied in sociology since 1940s u Examples

u Indirect/informational effects

u Adoption of new medical or agricultural innovations u Photos/video going viral u Sudden success of new products u Rise of celebrities

u Direct-benefit effects

u Technology adoption– Xbox/PS4, phone, fax, email,

  • nline social networking apps

Viral Facebook posts (2013)

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#TheDress

(February 2015)

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Questions

u What is the process by which these happen?

u Models u Depart from one-shot game setting

u Who are the most influential entities?

u Algorithms

8

Modeling cascades

Threshold models

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Contagion Model

u Stephen Morris (2000)

Dynamic process

u Initial adopters: A set of nodes adopting B at

the start

u Time steps 1, 2, 3, ... u At each time step

u Every node simultaneously updates their behavior

in response to the current behaviors of neighbors u 2 versions

u Nonpregressive: Nodes may switch between A & B u Progressive: Once switch to B, stay at B

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Complete cascade

u Complete cascade: everyone gets

"converted"

u Initial adopters are called contagious set

u Depends on

u Initial adopters u Network structure u Threshold q

u Contagious threshold: Max q s.t. there is a finite

contagious set

Examples

u Infinite line graph with q = 1/2 u … – A – A – A – B – A – A – A – …

Vs

u … – A – A – B – B – B – A – A – …

Oscillations Complete cascade with contagious threshold = 1/2

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Complete contagion with q = 1/2

2 main results

u Setting: graph has countably infinite nodes,

with finite maximum degree

  • 1. Progressive and nonprogressive versions are

equivalent w.r.t. a finite contagious set

  • 2. Contagious threshold q cannot be > ½ for

any (infinite) graph

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More General Models

Linear threshold model General threshold model Cascade model

Linear threshold model

u Granovetter (1978) u Kempe, Kleinberg, Tardos (2003)

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Linear threshold model

u Actions of node i, xi is 0 for old

behavior A and 1 for new behavior B

u Threshold of each node i, bi

u Assume: bi is chosen randomly

between 0 and 1 u Influence level from j to i, wji

u Assume: wji >= 0 and

u Decision rule

u Adopt B iff

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wji

wjix j ≥ bi

j∈N (i)

j bi i

wji ≤1

j∈N (i)

General threshold model

u The influence on a node is any general

function of its neighbors

u Assume: this function is (weakly) monotonous

u Influence can't decrease as more people adopt B

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j

gi(x N (i)) ≥ bi ?

bi i

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Dynamics

u Starts with the initial adopters of B u Progressive: no switching back to A u Time steps: 1, 2, 3, ...

(same as before)

Cascade model

u Probabilistic model u Dynamics

u For any edge u à v s.t. xu = 1, xv = 0

u u is given one chance to convert v u u's success probability is a function of u, v, and Fv

u Fv is set of neighbors of v that have already tried and

failed u Equivalent to the general threshold model!

(Kempe et al., 2005)

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Independent Cascade Model (ICM)

u u's success probability is a function of

u and v only

u Independent of other nodes

Influence Maximization

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Influence maximization problem

u Posed by Domingos and Richardson [2001] u Kleinberg et al’s formulation [2003]: u Input

u Graph instance and cascade model u Integer (budget) k >= 1 u Function f(S), giving the expected number of

nodes converted by initial adopters S. u We want to

u Find a set S of k nodes such that f(S) is maximized

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Kleinberg et al’s formulation

u NP-hard to find the optimal set S u NP-hard to approximate

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Special case

u The function f is submodular

u Shows the property of

diminishing marginal return u Greedy hill-climbing search gives

0.63 approximation (Nemhauser+, 1978)

u Greedily selecting k nodes will lead to

0.63 times the maximum spread u Greedy algorithm:

u For iteration 1 to k:

u Pick the node that increases f the most

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|S| f(S)

Larger set Smalle r set

Wish list beyond linear threshold model (LTM)

u Non-probabilistic model, instantiated using data u Something is more general

u Allows switching back and forth u Allows negative influences

(Why is negative influence troublesome in LTM?)

u Threshold values not required to be in [0, 1]

u A model focused on outcome (LTM focuses on process) u Most influential nodes problem should be w.r.t. a

desirable outcome

u Must ensure stable outcomes (LTM allows unstable

initial adopters)

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Linear Influence Game (LIG) Model

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