CSC2556 Lecture 8
Fair Division 3: Rent Division
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CSC2556 Lecture 8 Fair Division 3: Rent Division CSC2556 - Nisarg - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
CSC2556 Lecture 8 Fair Division 3: Rent Division CSC2556 - Nisarg Shah 1 Rent Division An apartment with roommates & rooms Roommates have preferences over the rooms Total rent is Goal: Find an allocation of
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β’ Label vertices {1,2,3} β’ Main vertices are different β’ Vertices between main vertices
β’ Any Sperner labeling contains at
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β’ Represent possible partitions
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β’ Which room do you prefer if the rent division is given by
β’ βMiserly roommatesβ assumption
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β’ But at slightly different rent divisions. β’ Approximately envy-free.
β’ In the limit, we obtain an envy-free allocation.
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β’ Value of roommate π for room π = π€π,π β’ Rent for room π = ππ β’ Utility to agent π for getting room π = π€π,π β ππ
β’ Total rent: π = Οπ ππ β’ Envy-freeness: π€π,π΅π β ππ΅π β₯ π€π,π΅π β ππ΅π
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β’ Weβll skip this proof.
β’ Implied by β1st fundamental theorem of welfare economicsβ β’ As a consequence, (π΅, π) is Pareto optimal. β’ Easy proof!
β²
β’ Further, π€π,π΅π β ππ΅π = π€π,π΅π
β² β ππ΅π β² for every agent π
β’ Implied by β2nd fundamental theorem of welfare economicsβ β’ Easy proof!
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β’ One-shot preference elicitation
β’ Easy to explain the fairness guarantee
Spliddit
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β’ Allows arbitrary preferences subject to a simple assumption β’ Easy queries: βWhich room do you prefer at these prices?β
The New York Times