CSC2556 Lecture 8 Fair Division 3: Rent Division CSC2556 - Nisarg - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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CSC2556 Lecture 8 Fair Division 3: Rent Division CSC2556 - Nisarg - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CSC2556 Lecture 8 Fair Division 3: Rent Division CSC2556 - Nisarg Shah 1 Rent Division An apartment with roommates & rooms Roommates have preferences over the rooms Total rent is Goal: Find an allocation of


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SLIDE 1

CSC2556 Lecture 8

Fair Division 3: Rent Division

CSC2556 - Nisarg Shah 1

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SLIDE 2

Rent Division

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  • An apartment with π‘œ roommates & π‘œ rooms
  • Roommates have preferences over the rooms
  • Total rent is 𝑆
  • Goal: Find an allocation of rooms to roommates &

a division of the total rent that is envy-free.

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SLIDE 3

Sperner’s Lemma

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  • Triangle π‘ˆ partitioned into

elementary triangles

  • Sperner Labeling:

➒ Label vertices {1,2,3} ➒ Main vertices are different ➒ Vertices between main vertices

𝑗 and π‘˜ are each labeled 𝑗 or π‘˜

  • Lemma:

➒ Any Sperner labeling contains at

least one β€œfully labeled” (1-2-3) elementary triangle.

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SLIDE 4

Sperner’s Lemma

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  • Doors: 1-2 edges
  • Rooms: elementary triangles
  • Claim: #doors on the

boundary of T is odd

  • Claim: A fully labeled (123)

room has 1 door. Every other room has 0 or 2 doors.

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SLIDE 5

Sperner’s Lemma

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  • Start at a door on boundary,

and walk through it

  • Either found a fully labeled

room, or it has another door

  • No room visited twice
  • Eventually, find a fully labeled

room or back out through another door on boundary

  • But #doors on boundary is
  • dd. ∎
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SLIDE 6

Fair Rent Division

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  • Three housemates A, B, C
  • Goal: Divide total rent between three

rooms so that at those rents, each person wants a different room.

  • Without loss of generality,

say the total rent is 1.

➒ Represent possible partitions

  • f rent as a triangle.
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SLIDE 7

Fair Rent Division

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  • β€œTriangulate” and assign β€œownership” of each

vertex to A, B, or C so that each elementary triangle is an ABC triangle

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SLIDE 8

Fair Rent Division

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  • Ask the owner of each vertex 𝑀:

➒ Which room do you prefer if the rent division is given by

the coordinates of 𝑀?

  • Gives us a 1-2-3 labeling of the triangulation.
  • Assumption: Each roommate prefers any free room
  • ver any paid room.

➒ β€œMiserly roommates” assumption

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SLIDE 9

Fair Rent Division

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  • This dictates the choice of rooms on the edges of π‘ˆ
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SLIDE 10

Fair Rent Division

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  • Sperner’s Lemma: There must be a 1-2-3 triangle.
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SLIDE 11

Fair Rent Division

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  • The three roommates prefer different rooms…

➒ But at slightly different rent divisions. ➒ Approximately envy-free.

  • By making the triangulations finer, we can increase

accuracy.

➒ In the limit, we obtain an envy-free allocation.

  • This technique generalizes to more roommates

[Su 1999].

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SLIDE 12

Quasi-Linear Utilities

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  • A different model:

➒ Value of roommate 𝑗 for room 𝑠 = 𝑀𝑗,𝑠 ➒ Rent for room 𝑠 = π‘žπ‘  ➒ Utility to agent 𝑗 for getting room 𝑠 = 𝑀𝑗,𝑠 βˆ’ π‘žπ‘ 

  • We need to find an assignment 𝐡 of rooms to

roommates and a price vector π‘ž such that

➒ Total rent: 𝑆 = σ𝑠 π‘žπ‘  ➒ Envy-freeness: 𝑀𝑗,𝐡𝑗 βˆ’ π‘žπ΅π‘— β‰₯ 𝑀𝑗,π΅π‘˜ βˆ’ π‘žπ΅π‘˜

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SLIDE 13

Quasi-Linear Utilities

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  • Theorem: An envy-free (𝐡, π‘ž) always exists!

➒ We’ll skip this proof.

  • Theorem: If (𝐡, π‘ž) is envy-free, σ𝑗 𝑀𝑗,𝐡𝑗 is maximized.

➒ Implied by β€œ1st fundamental theorem of welfare economics” ➒ As a consequence, (𝐡, π‘ž) is Pareto optimal. ➒ Easy proof!

  • Theorem: If (𝐡, π‘ž) is envy-free and 𝐡′ maximizes σ𝑗 𝑀𝑗,𝐡𝑗

β€²

then (𝐡′, π‘ž) is envy-free.

➒ Further, 𝑀𝑗,𝐡𝑗 βˆ’ π‘žπ΅π‘— = 𝑀𝑗,𝐡𝑗

β€² βˆ’ π‘žπ΅π‘— β€² for every agent 𝑗

➒ Implied by β€œ2nd fundamental theorem of welfare economics” ➒ Easy proof!

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SLIDE 14

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SLIDE 15

Which Model Is Better?

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  • Advantage of quasi-linear utilities:

➒ One-shot preference elicitation

  • Players directly report their values for the different rooms

➒ Easy to explain the fairness guarantee

Spliddit

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SLIDE 16

Which Model Is Better?

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  • Advantage of miserly roommates model:

➒ Allows arbitrary preferences subject to a simple assumption ➒ Easy queries: β€œWhich room do you prefer at these prices?”

The New York Times