CryptDB Protecting Confidentiality with Encrypted Query Processing - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CryptDB Protecting Confidentiality with Encrypted Query Processing Katarzyna Baranowska University of Warsaw January 21, 2012

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Why secure data? Medical data Contact data Payment Personal evaluation and recommendations Company data

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Posible threats

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Posible threats

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Posible threats

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Posible threats

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Other solutions Encrypt and decrypt data at users side

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Other solutions Encrypt and decrypt data at users side Needs moving application logic to users

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Other solutions Encrypt and decrypt data at users side Needs moving application logic to users Not effective if apllication computes over large amount of data

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Other solutions Encrypt and decrypt data at users side Needs moving application logic to users Not effective if apllication computes over large amount of data Use fully homomorphic encryption, which allows servers to compute functions over encrypted data

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Other solutions Encrypt and decrypt data at users side Needs moving application logic to users Not effective if apllication computes over large amount of data Use fully homomorphic encryption, which allows servers to compute functions over encrypted data Very slow

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Other solutions Encrypt and decrypt data at users side Needs moving application logic to users Not effective if apllication computes over large amount of data Use fully homomorphic encryption, which allows servers to compute functions over encrypted data Very slow Very expensive

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB solution

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB solution Threat 1

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB solution Threat 1 SQL-aware encryption strategy (symmertic keys)

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB solution Threat 1 SQL-aware encryption strategy (symmertic keys) Adjustable query-based encryption (onions of encryption)

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB solution Threat 1 SQL-aware encryption strategy (symmertic keys) Adjustable query-based encryption (onions of encryption) Threat 2

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB solution Threat 1 SQL-aware encryption strategy (symmertic keys) Adjustable query-based encryption (onions of encryption) Threat 2 Chaining encryption keys to user passwords

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Dealing with curious DBA

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Dealing with curious DBA

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Dealing with curious DBA UPDATE Table1 SET C2-Ord = DECRYPT RND(K, C2-ORD, C2-IV)

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV DET (deterministic): AES-CMC, Blowfish without IV

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV DET (deterministic): AES-CMC, Blowfish without IV JOIN : keyed cryptographic hash, with the additional property that hashes can be adjusted to change their keys without access to the plaintext (JOIN-ADJ)

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV DET (deterministic): AES-CMC, Blowfish without IV JOIN : keyed cryptographic hash, with the additional property that hashes can be adjusted to change their keys without access to the plaintext (JOIN-ADJ) OPE (order-preserving encryption): random mapping that preserves order, never before implemented

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV DET (deterministic): AES-CMC, Blowfish without IV JOIN : keyed cryptographic hash, with the additional property that hashes can be adjusted to change their keys without access to the plaintext (JOIN-ADJ) OPE (order-preserving encryption): random mapping that preserves order, never before implemented OPE-JOIN: must be known a priori, but is rare (50 out of 128,840 columns)

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV DET (deterministic): AES-CMC, Blowfish without IV JOIN : keyed cryptographic hash, with the additional property that hashes can be adjusted to change their keys without access to the plaintext (JOIN-ADJ) OPE (order-preserving encryption): random mapping that preserves order, never before implemented OPE-JOIN: must be known a priori, but is rare (50 out of 128,840 columns) HOM (homomorphic encryption): Paillier cryptosystem for summation

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms RND (random): AES-CBC, Blowfish (for integers) with IV DET (deterministic): AES-CMC, Blowfish without IV JOIN : keyed cryptographic hash, with the additional property that hashes can be adjusted to change their keys without access to the plaintext (JOIN-ADJ) OPE (order-preserving encryption): random mapping that preserves order, never before implemented OPE-JOIN: must be known a priori, but is rare (50 out of 128,840 columns) HOM (homomorphic encryption): Paillier cryptosystem for summation SEARCH (word search): protocol of Song et al.

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Used alorithms OPE can be speeded up by caching frequently used constants over diffrent keys HOM encryption can be speeded up by precomputing Paillier r n randomness

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing Training mode

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing Training mode Onion re-encryption

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing Training mode Onion re-encryption Performance Optimizations

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing Training mode Onion re-encryption Performance Optimizations Developer Annotations

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing Training mode Onion re-encryption Performance Optimizations Developer Annotations Known query set

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB features Security improvements Minimum onion layers In-proxy processing Training mode Onion re-encryption Performance Optimizations Developer Annotations Known query set Precomputing and caching for OPE and HOM

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation CryptDB structure

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Environment used for tests

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Environment used for tests

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Throughput 1

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Throughput 2

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Throughput 2 SUM (2x less) and UPDATE (1.6 less) requires HOM additions at server

Threats Threat 1 Speed Evaluation Threat 2 More Evaluation Processing times Proxy* - without precomputing and caching optimization