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COVID-19 Testing Task Force
May 27, 2020
Christopher Ball, PhD, Chief, Idaho Bureau of Laboratories
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COVID-19 Testing Task Force May 27, 2020 Christopher Ball, PhD, - - PDF document
1 COVID-19 Testing Task Force May 27, 2020 Christopher Ball, PhD, Chief, Idaho Bureau of Laboratories 1 2 Overview 1. Executive summary 2. Testing capacity estimates 3. Recommendations for molecular testing 4. Weekly molecular testing
May 27, 2020
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health prevention strategies and risk mitigation efforts.
and a reopened economy. 3. Access to testing and investment in local testing capacity must be significantly increased to safely reopen and maintain the state economy.
prioritized expansion pansion of molecular
sting (combined with tracing and other prevention strategies) now and limited use of serologic (antibody) testing.
strategies required to effectively mitigate COVID-19 transmission risk.
Full Executive Summary: Testing for SARS‐CoV2, the agent of COVID‐19, is not a strategy that stands alone, but it is critically important since it is directly related to other elements of a comprehensive strategy. For example, improved education will increase the identification of confirmed cases as symptomatic and knowledgeable individuals will seek testing; at the same time, the testing event can become a prime
ideally lead to tracking of other exposures; tracking of exposure creates the need for expanded testing. The Governor’s shelter‐in‐place order has slowed the COVID‐19 epidemic in Idaho and has given us time to prepare for a well‐informed reopening of the economy. Continuing the current order vs reopening the economy have often been presented as either/or scenarios: either we continue and stop the spread of disease or we reopen and allow it to continue. This is faulty logic. We need to both control the spread of disease and reopen the economy. This is imperative not only from an economic perspective, but also from a public health perspective. We are already seeing patients with chronic conditions delay necessary care. Moreover, in past economic recessions or depressions, we have seen surges in suicide, substance use, 3
and worsening in chronic health conditions, likely related to the direct relationship between economic downturn and social determinants of health. With a well‐ designed and robust plan, we can achieve both a reduction in spread and a reopening of the economy. Doing so must include education, targeted testing, tracing, supported isolation, robust data intelligence, and predictive modeling. This executive summary will briefly speak to each of these elements. The remainder of the Task Force’s recommendations will be focused on the details of testing. Testing availability in Idaho has been inadequate to meet our collective needs. While healthcare providers have begun now to secure adequate testing for their own populations, the availability and access to testing must be significantly increased to support a well‐designed reopening of the state. We must understand current testing capabilities, identify gaps between current and ideal state, and prioritize the closure
this work must pivot to the “how,” which should include public‐private partnerships to effectively meet the needs. Testing can be PCR‐based or serologic, and it could be applied in a targeted way or a universal way. We recommend a phased expansion of targeted PCR testing (combined with tracing) and more limited use of serologic testing. We also recommend that platforms be limited to those tests with adequately high test‐ performance characteristics. At this time, serologic approaches to testing are rapidly developing, and are best applied to populations of people. Recently released federal guidelines have encouraged the use of such tests within communities and other subpopulations in order to assess the numbers of people previously infected. Current disease knowledge and serologic test capabilities are not adequate to allow this sort of testing to inform decisions for individuals. Tracing of contacts of positive cases is a critical success factor that must be implemented with this disease, given the large percentage of people who will be asymptomatic, but still infectious. This tracing presumes that we would have the ability to recommend and incentive quarantine for at least short periods of time and during the period of greatest infectivity. While there are digital apps that can facilitate this work, Idaho’s rural nature and broadband limits will make manual contact tracing programs a foundational component of the solution. Supported isolation of positive cases will be an additional critical success factor when combined with testing. Those who are asked to quarantine must be supported with policies that will allow this to occur. These policies must protect the individual from an economic and employment perspective. Moreover, for vulnerable populations such as the homeless or housing‐insecure, additional resources will be required to support effective efforts at quarantine. We cannot effectively fight an enemy we cannot see. And we must understand the enemy on a case‐by‐case basis as well as more globally. The expansion of testing is critical to creating this visibility. But without a comprehensive and agile data and 3
analytics system to support the creation of a comprehensive picture, we will still be fighting in the dark. For this reason, we recommend the substantial enhancement
which must be armed with both short‐term tactical and long‐term strategic forecasting capabilities. Lines of communication between frontline healthcare providers, either individual entities or as part of a system, must remain wide open, bidirectional, and must continue to inform the state’s decisions in response to the pandemic. While testing and data analysis of these results will be very useful in informing decisions, the State
We recommend a continued role for a clinically led group supporting the state’s response to the pandemic, including the need for regular reporting on capacity for care. Finally, a robust approach to educating the public, businesses, industry, schools, and others must be accomplished to support the above. In fact, much of the above will also support the opportunity to provide education. In addition to more broadly applied public service announcements, the testing episode, itself, provides a potential excellent opportunity to provide education at a time when we have the attention of the person. Similarly, as businesses roll out policies to support social distancing, cleaning, or testing, the application of broader education about the disease, how it is spread, and the need for continued vigilance will be valuable. Our nation and our state can successfully achieve both control of the COVID‐19 pandemic in our area as well as a successful staged reopening of our economy. Achieving this will require an approach that is founded in good scientific and clinical data, and must include education, targeted testing, tracing, supported isolation, robust data intelligence, and predictive modeling. 3
Mo Molecular ( cular (PCR CR & Antige gen) n)
CoV & SARS-Cov-2
Ser Serology (Anti (Antibody)
Cov-2
NOT infer immunity to infection
fully understood
*Data as of 9:00am ‐ 5‐13‐20
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Molecular T Molecular Tests sts
specific 1. Clinical evaluation of patients 2. Discontinuation of Isolation 3. Allow a diagnostic procedure 4. Begin or modify treatment 5. Qualify for clinical trial Ser Serology T Test sts
1. Hospitalized, symptomatic for 10+ days, AND PCR or Antigen negative 2. Previously undiagnosed COVID-19 like respiratory infection after December 2019
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was ~7,500 tests per week (in-house ~5,400; send out 2100).
tests per week (in house ~18,000; send out ~5,000).
2% of the Idaho population every month we would need to perform ~8,000 tests per week
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Table estimates from May 3‐9, 2020 *Electronic Lab Reports
Minidoka Memorial currently testing using the Abbott System. 7 other sites planning to add serology in the future. PHD 1, 2, 6, & 7.
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populations with common needs:
populations
group events
required tests) and Priority 5 is the lowest testing need (highest potential number of tests) 8
Priority 4 &5 ~65,000 Priority 3 ~43,000 Priority 2 ~26,000 Priority 1 ~16,900
Priority testing projections are additive 9
combination there are 6 pieces
per week
(symptomatic healthcare worker) – Testing Priority 1
workers and first responders
per week
testing lab
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Sym Symptomatic Indi Indivi vidu duals
Hospitalized patients Healthcare workers First responders Residents in long‐term care facilities with symptoms, or who are close contacts of a confirmed case or part of an outbreak investigation Patients 65 years of age and older with symptoms Patients with underlying conditions with symptoms Inmates and staff of correctional facilities Symptomatic residents and staff of residential care facilities Residents and staff of homeless and other group shelters Other vulnerable populations in crowded living conditions Critical infrastructure workers with symptoms Congregate essential business workers Essential workers Contacts of confirmed cases Contacts of probable cases Prioritize by exposure assessment
Asym Asympt ptomatic I
viduals
Long‐term care facilities Correctional facilities Residential care facilities Homeless shelters Other congregate housing of vulnerable populations Asymptomatic contacts as part of a cluster investigation Asymptomatic contacts of confirmed cases Broaden testing outreach in community when cases have
groups disproportionately affected by adverse COVID‐19
Americans, Hispanics and Latinos, Native American Tribes) Patients before potential aerosol‐generating procedure
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evergreen document that will require periodic updates following initial adoption
and available via data dashboard
implementation as requested by the Coronavirus workgroup 16
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