Corinna Elsenbroich ESSA Barcelona, September 2014 Storyline - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Corinna Elsenbroich ESSA Barcelona, September 2014 Storyline - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Simulating Extortees: Group Structures and Reasoning Modes Corinna Elsenbroich ESSA Barcelona, September 2014 Storyline Collectives, Dilemmas and Extortion Rackets A little model of Mafiosi and Fakers Collective responses to

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SLIDE 1

Simulating Extortees:

Group Structures and Reasoning Modes

Corinna Elsenbroich

  • ESSA

Barcelona, September 2014

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SLIDE 2

Storyline

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  • Collectives, Dilemmas and Extortion Rackets
  • A little model of Mafiosi and Fakers
  • Collective responses to individualist problems
  • Conclusions and future work
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SLIDE 3

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Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 4

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Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 5

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Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 6

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Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 7

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Public Services Public Goods

Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 8

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Public Services Public Goods

Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 9

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Public Services Public Goods Everywhere

Collectives (and their Tragedies)

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SLIDE 10

Extortion Rackets

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  • Extortion is the demand for money on threat of punishment
  • Extortion is practiced mostly by criminal organisations, Mafia

type organisations

  • Extortion usually involves a long term relationship between

perpetrator and victim

  • The decision matrix of extortion reads like a PD
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SLIDE 11
  • Extortion is the demand for money on threat of punishment
  • Extortion is practiced mostly by criminal organisations, Mafia

type organisations

  • Extortion usually involves a long term relationship between

perpetrator and victim

  • The decision matrix of extortion reads like a PD

Extortion Rackets

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T,S R,R S,T P,P

victim extorter

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SLIDE 12

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  • 80% of shops in Sicily pay the Pizzo
  • Italian Mafia is Italy’s biggest business with £116bn (7% of GDP)
  • Extortion racketeering exists on all 6 continents
  • Extortion rackets go global (Russian Mafia, Chinese Mafia,

Italian Mafia)

Extortion Rackets

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SLIDE 13

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SLIDE 14

Mafiosi and Fakers

  • Entrepreneurs
  • Extorters: Mafiosi or Fakers
  • Mafiosi extort and punish, Fakers only extort, never punish
  • Entrepreneurs decide to pay or not depending on experience

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  • Income, Pizzo, Punishment Cost, Damages (kept constant)
  • Extorter Radius
  • Neighbourhood Radius
  • Number of Entrepreneurs
  • Number of Extorters
  • Ratio of Mafiosi and Fakers
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SLIDE 15

Individualist Decision Making

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punishment-probability * possible-damage < pizzo

If . . . . . . refuse payment.

(minimal) social influence

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SLIDE 16

Individualist Decision Making

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punishment-probability * possible-damage < pizzo

If . . . . . . refuse payment.

(minimal) social influence

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SLIDE 17

Analysis

  • Two Scenarios
  • Pure Mafia over 1, 10 and 20 Extorters
  • Mafia and Fakers over 3:7, 5:5 and 7:3 Ratios
  • Extorter and Neighbourhood Radius on
  • Punishments
  • Levels of Resistance

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SLIDE 18

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fakers Mafia entrepreneurs extorter radius

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SLIDE 19

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SLIDE 20

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SLIDE 21

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SLIDE 22

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SLIDE 23

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SLIDE 24

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SLIDE 25

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SLIDE 26

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SLIDE 27

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SLIDE 28

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In Detail . . .

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SLIDE 29

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SLIDE 30

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SLIDE 31

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SLIDE 32

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SLIDE 33

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SLIDE 34

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SLIDE 35

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SLIDE 36

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film

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SLIDE 37

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Only when fakers get in on the reputation of the Mafia can they get in

  • n the action.
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SLIDE 38

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Results of the Faker Game

Comparison

  • Resistance
  • Fakers increase resistance
  • neighbourhood radius

decreases resistance and punishments

  • extorter radius increases

resistance

  • Punishments
  • Fakers increase

punishments

  • neighbourhood radius

decreases punishment

  • extorter radius increases

punishments

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SLIDE 39

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  • Seen a model interaction between extorter and victim (2 person PD)
  • Also an interaction between the victims:
  • For each individual victim it is better to pay and not be punished
  • For all it would be better if nobody paid and everyone would denounce
  • Classic n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma

Extortion Rackets as Tragedies

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SLIDE 40

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  • Altruism
  • Norms
  • Regulation
  • Institutions

Traditional Solutions to N-PD

T,S R,R S,T P,P

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SLIDE 41

35

  • Altruism
  • Norms
  • Regulation
  • Institutions

Traditional Solutions to N-PD

T,S R,R S,T P,P

}

artificially constraining choice

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SLIDE 42

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  • Altruism
  • Norms
  • Regulation
  • Institutions

Traditional Solutions to N-PD Novel Solution

  • Changing the Game
  • Team Reasoning

T,S R,R S,T P,P T,S P,P S,T R,R

}

artificially constraining choice

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SLIDE 43

35

  • Altruism
  • Norms
  • Regulation
  • Institutions

Traditional Solutions to N-PD Novel Solution

  • Changing the Game
  • Team Reasoning

T,S R,R S,T P,P T,S P,P S,T R,R

}

artificially constraining choice

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SLIDE 44

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How can looking at a situation differently change the world?

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SLIDE 45

37 pay e x t

  • r

t , p u n i s h

Extorters Entrepreneurs

Extending the Model

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SLIDE 46

37 pay e x t

  • r

t , p u n i s h

Extorters Entrepreneurs

conceptual change

Extending the Model

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SLIDE 47

37 pay e x t

  • r

t , p u n i s h

Extorters Entrepreneurs Collective (e.g. Addio Pizzo)

understand

  • neself as

a member

conceptual change

Extending the Model

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SLIDE 48

37 pay e x t

  • r

t , p u n i s h

Extorters Entrepreneurs Collective (e.g. Addio Pizzo)

understand

  • neself as

a member stop paying

conceptual change

Extending the Model

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SLIDE 49
  • Income, Pizzo, Punishment Cost, Damages (kept constant)
  • Extorter Radius
  • Neighbourhood Radius
  • Group Radius
  • Number of Entrepreneurs
  • Ratio of Collectivists and Individualists
  • Number of Extorters
  • Ratio of Mafiosi and Fakers

Mafiosi and Fakers

  • Entrepreneurs: Collectivists or Individualists
  • Extorters: Mafiosi or Fakers
  • Mafiosi extort and punish, Fakers only extort, never punish
  • Entrepreneurs decide to pay or not depending on experience

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SLIDE 50

Collective Decision Making

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T,S R,R S,T P,P T,S P,P S,T R,R group payment solidarity component

punishment-probability * possible-damage < group-wealth + group-pizzo

If . . . . . . refuse payment.

(minimal) social influence

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SLIDE 51

Collective Decision Making

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T,S R,R S,T P,P T,S P,P S,T R,R group payment solidarity component

punishment-probability * possible-damage < group-wealth + group-pizzo

If . . . . . . refuse payment.

(minimal) social influence

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SLIDE 52

Analysis

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  • Two Scenarios
  • Pure Mafia over 1, 10 and 20 Extorters
  • Mafia and Fakers over 3:7, 5:5 and 7:3 Ratios
  • Number of Collectivists over 0, 50 and 100%
  • Punishments
  • Levels of Resistance
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SLIDE 53

0 Collectivists 0 Collectivists 200 Collectivists 200 Collectivists 400 Collectivists 400 Collectivists

Comparison

  • Pure Scenario
  • collectivists have little

impact on Mafia

  • punishments increase

(27/46/55)

  • individualists better off

than collectivists in mixed case

  • Mixed Scenario
  • collectivists detrimental

for Mafia

  • punishments increased

(5/19/20)

  • resistance starts earlier

the more collect

  • resistance levels more

consistent

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SLIDE 54

Extorter Radius, Resistance and Levels of Collectivism

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Comparison

  • Pure Mafia
  • Resistance is high for

single Mafioso

  • It even increases for

increasing collectivity

  • More Mafioso reduce

the level of resistance dramatically

  • Collectivism makes little

change

  • Mixed Scenario
  • fakers increase the

levels of resistance

  • For this scenario

increasing collectivism has a detrimental effect for extorters

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SLIDE 55

43

Group Radius, Resistance and Levels of Collectivism

Comparison

  • Pure Mafia
  • Collectivism decreases

the strong influence of the neighbourhood radius

  • Mixed Scenario
  • fakers increase the

number of punishments

  • Overall levels of

punishment still very low

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SLIDE 56

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Extorter Radius, Punishments and Levels of Collectivism

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Comparison

  • Pure Mafia
  • punishments are high

for single extorter who cannot rely on other agents.

  • punishments decrease

for more Mafiosi (reputation sharing)

  • punishment also

reduces for higher levels of collectivists

  • Mixed Scenario
  • fakers increase the

number of punishments

  • Overall levels of

punishment still very low

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SLIDE 57

Police

Simulation Narratives

We wanted to see the influence of punishment on acquiescence. Interpret a decreasing extorter radius as the police effectively moving in and fakers as Mafiosi under close surveillance.

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SLIDE 58

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10 Mafia Extorters 5 Mafia 5 Fakers 5 Mafia 5 Fakers 10 Mafia Extorters

Individualists Increasing Collectivists

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SLIDE 59

47 47 47

Groups Radius, Punishments and Levels of Collectivism

Comparison

  • Pure Mafia
  • very little change to the

levels of punishment

  • punishments very very

low in all cases

  • Mixed Scenario
  • fakers increase the

number of punishments

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SLIDE 60

Conclusions

  • Simple models investigating some fundamental dynamics

(deterrence/resistance)

  • Individualist and collective model
  • Pure Mafia and Mafia Faker Scenario
  • Collectivists lead to higher resistance in the mixed scenarios
  • In pure Mafia scenario it does not really help, however

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SLIDE 61

Future Work

  • Social Structures
  • Current networks versus transitive groups
  • Dynamic Collectives
  • people changing their disposition depending on

circumstances

  • Other implementations of collective decision making
  • Currently very simple implementation - many others possible
  • Generalise the model of “Collective Decision Making”

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SLIDE 62

Thanks!

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