Constructions of feebly secure cryptographic primitives
Olga Melanich
Steklov Institute of Mathematics at St. Petersburg
3.10.2009
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Constructions of feebly secure cryptographic primitives Olga - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Constructions of feebly secure cryptographic primitives Olga Melanich Steklov Institute of Mathematics at St. Petersburg 3.10.2009 1 / 12 Basic definitions Notation B n , m = { f : B n B m } , where B = { 0 , 1 } . 2 / 12 Basic
Steklov Institute of Mathematics at St. Petersburg
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c:∀x c(x)=f (x) C(c).
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c:∀x c(x)=f (x) C(c).
n
) C(fn) .
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c:∀x c(x)=f (x) C(c).
n
) C(fn) .
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n
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n
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
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n
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
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1 Gate elimination. 2 Lower bounds (Lamagna and Savage).
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 5 / 12
1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 5 / 12
1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
3
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
3
3 C(f −1
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
3
3 C(f −1
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
1
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
3
3 C(f −1
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
1
2
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
3
3 C(f −1
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
1
2
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
3
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
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1 C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 C(fn) ≥ n + 1. 1
2
3
3 C(f −1
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
1
2
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
3
n
2(n − 1)⌋.
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1 n − 1 ≤ C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 8 / 12
1 n − 1 ≤ C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 2n − 3 ≤ C(f −1
n
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1 n − 1 ≤ C(fn) ≤ n + 1. 2 2n − 3 ≤ C(f −1
n
3
2n−3 n+1 ≤ MF(fn) ≤ 2n−2 n−1 .
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n
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n
1 Consider optimal circuit for f −1
n
2 Step: substitute in place of yi (i = n) value from {0, 1, yn, yn ⊕ 1} that
3 Repeat n − 2 times. 9 / 12
n
1 Consider optimal circuit for f −1
n
2 Step: substitute in place of yi (i = n) value from {0, 1, yn, yn ⊕ 1} that
3 Repeat n − 2 times.
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n
4 inputs, one can substitute in
n
4 residuary inputs.
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n
4 inputs, one can substitute in
n
4 residuary inputs.
1 yi enters some other gate and i = n. 2 Neither yi nor yj enters any other gate and i, j = n. 3 j = n, yi doesn’t enter any other gate and g is non-linear. 4 j = n, yi doesn’t enter any other gate and g is linear. 10 / 12
n
4 inputs, one can substitute in
n
4 residuary inputs.
1 yi enters some other gate and i = n. 2 Neither yi nor yj enters any other gate and i, j = n. 3 j = n, yi doesn’t enter any other gate and g is non-linear. 4 j = n, yi doesn’t enter any other gate and g is linear.
1
2
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n
4 inputs, one can substitute in
n
4 residuary inputs.
1 yi enters some other gate and i = n. 2 Neither yi nor yj enters any other gate and i, j = n. 3 j = n, yi doesn’t enter any other gate and g is non-linear. 4 j = n, yi doesn’t enter any other gate and g is linear.
1
2
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1 to improve the order of security; 2 to devise other feebly secure cryptographic primitives. 12 / 12
1 to improve the order of security; 2 to devise other feebly secure cryptographic primitives.
1 Linear feebly trapdoor construction (based on Hiltgen’s
2 Quadratic feebly trapdoor construction (based on function of
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