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but risks on horizon Last year saw first budget surplus since 2007 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Ireland: Growth momentum but risks on horizon Last year saw first budget surplus since 2007 May 2019 Index Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 22: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 40: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 59: Property


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SLIDE 1

Ireland: Growth momentum but risks on horizon

Last year saw first budget surplus since 2007 May 2019

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SLIDE 2

2

Index

Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 22: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 40: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 59: Property Page 68: Other Data Page 78: Annex (GDP distortions explainer)

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SLIDE 3

Labour market getting tighter as debt sustainability improves

Summary

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SLIDE 4
  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 2008 2011 2014 2017 Non-Construction Employment Construction Employment Total Employment vs 2008 peak

4

Domestic economy growing: averaging 4.5 per cent in 2014-18

Dramatic drop in unemployment rate Employment (000s) well above 2008 peak True growth healthy

* Underlying series is modified final domestic demand (excludes inventories)

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% GDP Underlying* 16.0 5.4 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

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SLIDE 5

5

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 € Billions Debt Prefunded Expected Remaining 2019 issuance Debt Profile

Primary surplus, improving debt dynamics and cash balances provide protection

Ireland is improving its debt dynamics by the month Debt-to-GNI* (105% 2018f, from 166%) Debt-to-GG Revenue (255% 2018f, from 353%) Average interest rate (2.6% 2018f, from 5.1%) Debt-to-GDP^ (64% 2018f, from 120%) Cash-balance provides near-term protection (€bn) Five years of primary surplus (€bn)

^ due to GDP distortions, Debt to GDP is not representative for Ireland, we suggest using other measures listed.

Gap year helpful

  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019f GG Balance Primary Balance

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SLIDE 6

6

Main risks are external and outside Ireland’s control

Growth

Eur Euro Area and and UK K ha have slo lowed: the these se acc account for

  • r hal

half f of

  • f

Ireland’s exports Easier monetary policy: “lower for

  • r lon

longer” is good news for Irela eland, gi given hi higher deb debt

US

Ireland is still a “high beta” bet

  • n
  • n the

the US S ec economy, in n par parti ticular r its its ICT sec ector US S is is in in the the la late stag age of

  • f its

its ec economic cy cycl cle , whi , which rai aise ses s qu questions s for

  • r Irela

eland

Brexit

“Hard” Brexit could reduce Irish gr growth by y 4-6 % % poi points ts cum cumulati tively y over r tw two yea ears Em Empl ployment migh ight t be be up up to

  • 3.5%

.5% le less ss tha than in in a a be benign sce cenari rio acc according to

  • Do

DoF/ESRI

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SLIDE 7

7

€5.5bn issued in 2019 so far; well positioned given prefunding and maturity lengthening

Pre-funded

Curr Current t cash ash bal balances s ea easi sily cover r 2019 2019 red edempti tions The he rem emainder r of

  • f €14

14-18bn in in exp xpected fun unding in in 2019 to

  • fun

und 2020 rede edempti tions

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties in in Eur Europe NTM NTMA has has us used QE QE per period to

  • le

lengthen maturi riti ties, s, lo lower r in interest t cos

  • sts

ts an and rep epay its its IMF deb debt ea earl rly

A+/A2/A+

Rati tings s from mai ain ag agencies Ireland’s debt sustainability is im improving, g, whi hich sug uggests ts tha that t rati tings s may ris rise to

  • dou

double-A A terri erritory furt urther r barr barring sho hocks

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SLIDE 8

Best measures - labour market and GNI* - show Ireland’s economy is in rude health

Section 1: Macro

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SLIDE 9

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

9

  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Thousands Non-Construction Employment Construction Employment Total Employment vs 2008 peak

Labour market best illustrates Ireland’s growth story – 115K non-construction jobs added on net vs. 2008 peak

Unemployment rate: down to 5.4% in April 2019 from peak of 16% Total employment back above previous peak as 115K non-construction jobs added on net

Unemployment above 2002-06 average

Source: CSO

2.3m people employed

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SLIDE 10

10

High-skill employment has grown sharply Substantial rise in full-time employment

High-skill and full-time employment were both expanding strongly for a long period, before recent deceleration

Source: Eurostat; CSO High Skill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals

  • 10.0%
  • 8.0%
  • 6.0%
  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 High Skill Other Employment Growth

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Full-time Emp (Y-o-Y) Employment (Y-o-Y)

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SLIDE 11

11

Participation rate hovering around 62%

58% 59% 60% 61% 62% 63% 64% 65% 66% 67% 68% 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016

  • Part. rate down as construction jobs lost and

younger people stay in education longer

Labour participation has not yet fully recovered – young reaching labour force later

Source: CSO

Rate inflated pre-crisis by migrant construction workers

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 2007Q4 2018Q4

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SLIDE 12
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018 Hours worked Hourly wage Employment Other Compensation COE growth (y-o-y)

12

Wage growth a driver for increase in compensation of employees… … but disparities remain across sectors

Wages growth evident in 2018 but uneven across sectors

Source: CSO

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% IT Transport/Storage Construction Fin, Insurance & RE Education Admin & Support Accom & Food Total Arts & Rec Prof, science & tech Wholesale/Retail Industry Health Public admin 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y 2018 average annual earnings (€000, RHS)

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SLIDE 13

13

GNI* was €181bn in 2017; 9.4% higher than in 2007 (current prices) GNI* growth rate averaged 7.5% 2013-2017 (current prices)

GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI*

Source: CSO Note: See annex for discussion on the GDP distortions from 2015 onwards

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 GDP Growth GNI* Growth 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI* GNI* is 62% of GDP

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SLIDE 14

14

Domestic demand grew strongly in 2018 Ireland’s PMIs are still expanding but down from the heights of 2016

Short-term indicators robust if a little less hot

Source: CSO; Markit, Bloomberg, Investec Note MDD measure used here private consumption, government consumption, building investment, elements of machinery & equipment investment, elements of intangible asset investment, value of physical changes in stock. See annex for more detail.

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Modified Dom. Demand (Real) Modified Dom. Demand (Nominal) 40 45 50 55 60 65 Services Manufacturing Composite

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SLIDE 15

15

  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Credit advanced to Business (y-o-y) Lending for house purchase (y-o-y) 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20% 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 Other Building Investment Dwellings and improvements Building Investment (% of MDD)

Lending for house purchase only edging into positive territory recently

Crucially the recovery has not been driven by credit so far

Economic growth 2013-18

Source: CBI; CSO Note: Credit to business series excludes financial intermediation and property related credit Note Modified investment excludes impact of imports of intangible and aircraft leasing assets

Building investment % of domestic demand is growing – led by non-residential

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SLIDE 16

16

Consumer spending growth fuelled by rising incomes rather than recourse to debt

Private consumption expanded by 3% in 2018 Services driving latest growth in spending

Source: CSO; Eurostat

45 55 65 75 85 95 105

  • 6%
  • 3%

0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Consumption Growth (4Q Y-o-Y) Consumption (€bns, RHS)

  • 6%
  • 3%

0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Services Durables Non-Durables Consumption

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SLIDE 17

17

Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% Household Debt (% of Disposable income) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 Debt (€Bns) Disposable Income (€Bns) Debt-to-Income Ratio (%) 2008 2013 2018

Debt to after-tax income* improving (123%) but among highest in Europe

Private debt remains elevated but stock has fallen by a third in a decade

Source: Eurostat (Q4 2018) Source: CBI (Q3 2018 data used) *Measure excludes “other liabilities” from household debt.

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SLIDE 18

18

Gross household saving rate lower than peak but healthy 8-11% Interest burden down to only 4% of disposable income from peak of 11%

Saving rate lower in recent years, facilitating consumption and slower pace of deleveraging

Source: Eurostat, ONS, CSO ; CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 % of Disposable Income (4Q MA) Ireland EU-28 EA-19 UK 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 % of f di disp sposable le Inc ncome Ireland EA-19 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands

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SLIDE 19

19

Inflation (%) in Ireland lower than EA due mostly to sterling weakness post-Brexit vote

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 4 HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area "Core" Ireland "Core" EA

Wage growth a natural consequence of improving labour conditions (1999-2021)

y = -0.7199x + 0.0933 R² = 0.7576

  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 2% 5% 8% 11% 14% 17% Nominal wage growth per head Unemployment Rate

Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland’s Phillips Curve may be “kinked”

Source: CSO, NTMA analysis *red dots are Budget 2019 forecasts (2018-2020); Non-Agriculture employment /wage data Source: CSO, Eurostat

2019 Brexit Vote

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SLIDE 20

20

External environment a bit more helpful for Ireland in 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019f EA Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Less accommodative Less accommodative US Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative but tightening Further tightening Curve inversion, but ST U-turn US growth Stimulative Less stimulative Stimulative Stimulative due to fiscal package Neutral 2nd derivative Oil price Falling Falling Rising Falling No change yoy UK growth Stimulative Less favourable; Brexit impact Growth slowing Growth slowing Brexit crunch Euro Growth Stimulative Stimulative Stimulative Slowing growth Set to improve? Euro currency Very Helpful Helpful Headwind Neutral No chg. v £ weaker v $

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SLIDE 21

21

Goods exports outside MNC-dominated sectors were weak in 2018 (y-o-y change) Ireland’s exports are dominated by pharma and technology (2018 data)

Export growth has slowed in recent quarters

Source: CSO Note: Nominal values used. Excludes contract manufacturing

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Exports Chemical Products and Computer Services Exports ex. Chem & Comp All other exports, 46% Chemical products, 27% Computer Services, 27%

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SLIDE 22

Ireland is fully funded for 2019 having recorded a small budget surplus in 2018

Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding

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SLIDE 23

23

€5.5bn issued in 2019 so far; well positioned given prefunding and maturity lengthening

Pre-funded

Curr Current t cash ash bal balances s ea easi sily cover r 2019 2019 red edempti tions The he rem emainder r of

  • f €14

14-18bn in in exp xpected fun unding in in 2019 to

  • fun

und 2020 rede edempti tions

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties in in Eur Europe NTM NTMA has has us used QE QE per period to

  • le

lengthen maturi riti ties, s, lo lower r in interest t cos

  • sts

ts an and rep epay its its IMF loa loans s ea earl rly

A+/A2/A+

Rati tings s from mai ain ag agencies s Ireland’s debt sustainability is im improving, g, whi hich sug uggests ts tha that t rati tings s may ris rise to

  • dou

double-A A terri erritory furt urther r barr barring sho hocks

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SLIDE 24

24

Maturity profile: IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs have reduced refinancing risk; Green diversifies investor base

Source: NTMA Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extension that will bring their weighted-average maturity from 12.5 years to 19.5 years. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Billions € Bond (Fixed & ILB) Bilateral EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate) Green

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SLIDE 25

25

The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile

…Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt …

Source: NTMA; ECB *excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these loans is still similar

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-53 € Billions Debt Prefunded Long-term Extensions since 2014 Debt Profile 10.1 10.1 9.6 8.2 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.4 6.9 6.5 6.5 6.2 2 4 6 8 10 12 Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity

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SLIDE 26

26

NTMA issued €60bn MLT debt since 2015; 13.3 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 1.1% Interest costs forecasted pre-QE to be c.€10bn; likely to be below €5bn in ‘19

Funding strategy has lowered the State’s interest burden

Source: NTMA, CSO, Department of Finance Other issuance includes inflation linked bonds, private placement and amortising bonds

5Y 8Y 5Y 10Y 10Y 16Y 7Y 30Y 10Y 5Y 20Y 10Y 12Y 15Y 10Y 5.5 3.9 2.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 3 6 9 12 15 18 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 YTD € Billions Other Auction Syndication Weighted Average Yield % (RHS) 2 4 6 8 10 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 GG interest (€bns) SPU 2014 Estimates 2019-2021 Latest Estimates

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SLIDE 27

27

The State is funded three to four quarters in advance

  • The next redemption is in June (€7.1bn).
  • In January 2019, the NTMA issued a 10

year benchmark bond. It raised €4bn at 1.123% yield.

  • In 2018, the NTMA issued three new

bonds by syndication.

  • A 10 year benchmark bond raised

€4bn at a yield of 0.944%.

  • A 15 year benchmark bond raised

€4bn at a yield of 1.319%.

  • In October, Ireland issued its first

Sovereign Green Bond. It raised €3bn for12y money at 1.399%.

Source: NTMA

  • EBR is the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (DOF estimate)
  • Outflows, long term paper and end-year cash position are estimates for illustrative purposes.
  • Cash balances excludes non-liquid asset classes such as Housing Finance Agency (HFA) Guaranteed Notes.
  • Other outflows includes bond buybacks, switches, and contingencies.
  • Other funding includes Retail (State Savings).
  • Rounding may occur.

€15.3 Cash €13.1 Cash

EBR €2.1

Other €3.6 Bond €13.1 Long term Paper €16 Bonds €17.1 UK €1.6 UK €1.9 Other, €5.0 €- €4 €8 €12 €16 €20 €24 Y/E 2018 Outflow Funding (€14-18bn) Y/E 2019 2020 Outflow

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SLIDE 28

28

Ireland roughly split 80/20 on non-resident versus resident holdings (End ‘18) “Sticky” sources - official loans, Eurosystem, retail - make up over 50% of Irish debt

Diverse holders of Irish debt – sticky sources account for

  • ver 50%

Source: CSO, Eurostat, CBI, ECB, NTMA Analysis IGBs excludes those held by Eurosystem. Eurosystem holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of

  • FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA. Other debt Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-

related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

33% 7%, Resident 2% 23% 10%, Resident 24% IGBs - Private Non Resident IGBs - Private Resident Short term Eurosystem Retail Other Debt (incl. Official) 50 100 150 200 250

IGBs - Private Non Resident IGBs - Private Resident Short term Eurosystem Retail Other Debt (incl. Official) Total Debt (€bns)

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SLIDE 29

29

Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications

Source: NTMA

35.2% 40.4% 12.0% 12.4% Fund/Asset Manager Banks/Central Banks Pensions/Insurance Other Ireland, 10.6% UK, 30.4% 8.5% Cont. Europe, 38.2% 9.8% 2.5% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Asia & Other

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SLIDE 30

30

US yield curve has inverted (albeit only slightly so far): will history repeat? In Euro Area, PSPP re-investment continuing as ECB eases with TLTROs

Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: rates may remain low but end of ECB bond buying could expose credit spread

Source: DataStream *S *Shaded area reas indicate re recessionary periods in the US US

  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 US 10 year bond yield minus 3m Treasury bill yield 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 € Billions PSPP IGB purchases (RHS) Cumulative Purchases (LHS)

Re- investment spread out

slide-31
SLIDE 31
  • 9.1%
  • 8.3%
  • 6.4%
  • 3.7%
  • 1.2% -0.7% -0.3%

0.0%

  • 12.3%
  • 11.5%
  • 8.4%
  • 4.8%
  • 2.0%
  • 1.0% -0.5%

0.0%

  • 14%
  • 12%
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f GGB (% of GDP) GGB (% of GNI*)

31

  • Gen. Govt. Balance from -12% to

surplus (ex-banking recap) in 7 yrs Revenue surge has helped Ireland balance the books since 2015 (€bn)

Ireland provisionally recorded a full budget surplus for first time in 11 years in 2018

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

Surplus is back due to CT windfall

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f 2021f € Billions GG Expenditure (ex-banking recap) GG Revenue GG Revenue 10yr rolling average

slide-32
SLIDE 32
  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 Romania Spain France Italy UK Belgium Poland Latvia Finland Portugal EU28 EA Slovakia Bulgaria Austria Ireland (GNI*) Denmark Croatia Slovenia Estonia Lithuania Greece Sweden Netherlands Malta Luxembourg Czech Rep Germany Cyprus

32

In recent years Ireland has run primary surpluses that reduced debt ratios 2018 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP); Ireland middle of the pack in Europe

Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run consistent GGB surplus

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, EU Commission forecasts, NTMA calculation Note: Debt Stabilising primary balance is the primary balance it is necessary to run in a year to keep the debt-to-GNI* ratio from rising given the average interest rate and growth in that year.

  • 30%
  • 25%
  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% Primary Balance (% of GNI*) Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI*)

~

  • 40%
slide-33
SLIDE 33

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019f Debt-to-GNI* Debt-to-GDP

33

Gross Government debt forecasted to be 64% of GDP at end-2018; 105% of GNI*; reality somewhere in between

Debt-to-GNI* ratio is high but has declined quickly

Source: CSO; Department of Finance 37% 67% 80% 87% 90% 86% 66% 65% 60% 56% 24% 19% 31% 32% 29%

18% 11% 9% 9% 9%

62% 86% 111% 120% 120% 104% 77% 73% 68% 65% 61% 56% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Net Debt/GDP Cash Balances/EDP assets GG Debt/GDP

slide-34
SLIDE 34

34

Alternative debt service metrics must also be used for Ireland e.g. General Government debt to GG Revenue

Source: Eurostat, CSO; Department of Finance

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020F Ireland Spain Italy Belgium EA-19

slide-35
SLIDE 35

35

It’s best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics

2018 GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % GG debt to GDP % Greece 378.8% 6.7% 181.1% Italy 284.5% 7.9% 132.2% Portugal 279.2% 7.9% 121.5% Cyprus 256.8% 6.7% 102.5% Ireland 251.4% 6.4% 64.8% Spain 249.8% 6.2% 97.1% UK 218.3% 6.2% 86.8% Belgium 197.4% 4.6% 102.0% EA19 184.0% 4.0% 85.1% France 183.9% 3.5% 98.4% EU28 177.8% 4.1% 80.0% Slovenia 162.8% 4.6% 70.1% Austria 151.8% 3.3% 73.8% Germany 133.7% 2.0% 60.9% Slovakia 122.6% 3.2% 48.9%

Source: Eurostat, Department of Finance * 2018 Interest % of GG Revenue would be closer to 6% excluding the interest paid to CBI (of which 80% is returned to the State) , much of which accrues because of the holdings of the CBI’s legacy holding of Irish FRNs ** 107% Debt to GNI* ratio in 2018

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SLIDE 36

36

Snowball Effect (i-g) in Ireland’s favour given lower average interest rate

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% GG Revenue Growth (g) Average Interest Rate (i)

slide-37
SLIDE 37

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f Corporation Tax (€bns, RHS) Corporation Tax (% of tax revenue) Corporation Tax (% of GG Revenue) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f Income Tax Capital Gains + Stamp Duty Corporation Tax

37

Corporation tax receipts have more than doubled in four years Income tax base intact (% tax revenue) - not comparable to narrowing of base pre-crisis

Corporation tax revenue keeps surprising positively, but each year the concentration risk increases

Since 2014 c.40% of CT paid by 10 companies

Source: Department of Finance

slide-38
SLIDE 38

38

Ireland issued 2031 Sovereign Green Bond in Oct. 2018

€3bn

Fin inal or

  • rde

der bo book of

  • f €11.3

.3bn 95% % to

  • no

non-Iri rish sh in investors UK K 23%; %; Germ ermany/Austr tria an and France 19% % ea each; Nor Nordics s 12%; %; Be Benelux 11%

1.3 .399%

2031 maturi rity ty pric riced at t MS+ S+12 bp bps

New demand

Incr ncreased dem demand from the the thr three es establish shed cen centr tres s for

  • r

gr green in investment t France 19%, %, the the Ne Neth therl rlands s 9% 9% an and No Nordics s 12% %

Source: NTMA Further details are available at ntma.ie

  • Green Bond Framework aligned with the ICMA Green Bond Principles (see slide 76)
  • 1 in 5 euros in the National Development Plan to be spent on green projects (see slide 77)
slide-39
SLIDE 39

39

€ Bill illion 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018

Currency y and d de depos

  • sit

its (main inly ly retail il de debt) t) 21.3 21.6 21.6 Securit itie ies oth ther than an sh shar ares,

  • exc. financia

ial l de derivativ ives 124.2 130.7 134.2

  • Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)

2.4 2.9 3.1

  • Long-term (MLT bonds)

121.8 127.8 131.1 Loa Loans 55.2 49.0 50.3

  • Short-term

0.7 0.5 0.6

  • Long-term

(official funding) 54.6 48.5 49.7 General Gov

  • vernment

t Debt 200.7 201.3 206.2 ED EDP de debt t ins nstrument assets ts 24.9 27.3 28.6 Net Net Gov

  • vernment

t de debt t 175.8 174.0 177.6

Ireland: “A” grade from all major credit rating agencies; Net debt level is a positive for Ireland relative to peers

Source: NTMA, CSO

Ra Rating g Ag Agency Lon Long- term Sho Short- term Outl utlook/ Trend Da Date of

  • f

las last ch change Standard & Poor's A+ A-1 Stable June 2015 Fitch Ratings A+ F1+ Stable Dec 2017 Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Sept 2017 DBRS A(high) R-1 (middle) Stable March 2016 R&I A a-1 Stable Jan. 2017

slide-40
SLIDE 40

Extension delays any impact on Ireland, while “Hard” Brexit is still the fear

Section 3: Brexit

slide-41
SLIDE 41

41

Brexit Path is unclear – “Hard” Brexit might be less likely but is not entirely ruled out

  • Less trade given lower demand from UK/ tariffs
  • Higher import prices possible in long-term: tariffs

may outweigh FX benefit. Non-tariffs costs could also be significant.

  • Regions suffer (agriculture, tourism), while Dublin

may benefit (via FDI that leaves Britain)

  • Banking sector likely to suffer because
  • f its UK operations
  • Political economy (border, ally on direction of EU

economic policy)

  • Increased FDI, as multinationals avoid turmoil
  • Financial services (passporting)
  • Other multinationals - especially

IT and business services

  • Commercial property occupancy could rise; there

may also be an influx of well paid workers

  • ECB and fiscal response in Europe
  • Some trade offsets
  • Irish companies may steal EU market share

from British ones

Cons Pros

slide-42
SLIDE 42

42

Whichever type of Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

Irish rish/U /UK tr trad ade li link nkages s will ill suf uffer r fol

  • llowing Br

Brexit

  • The UK is the second largest single-country

export destination for Ireland’s goods and the largest for its services

  • At the same time, Ireland imports 20-25%
  • f its goods from the UK. Consumer goods,

capital equipment and inputs into the export process will become cheaper thanks to FX. The here is is sign ignificant em employment t rela elated to Ireland’s trade with the UK

  • The UK might only account for 15% of

Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that, when you consider the employment related to those exports SM SMEs Es ac account for

  • r over

r 55% % of

  • f IE

E exp xports rts to

  • UK.

K. The hey ar are e li likely y to

  • be

be mor

  • re affected tha

than la larger r com

  • mpanies

s by y the the in intr troducti tion of

  • f tari

ariffs s and and barr barriers s to

  • tr

trad ade

Source: CSO 2017 * UK data includes Northern Ireland NTMA calculations; Data does not include contract manufacturing

Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2017) Tot

  • tal

(20 2017) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.7 16.9 11.6 27.0 18.3 25.0 UK* 11.4 21.9 16.4 9.3 15.1 13.7 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 39.0 37.9 29.9 25.7 32.8 27.4 China 3.9 5.9 2.5 1.5 3.2 2.8 Other 18.0 17.4 39.5 36.6 30.5 31.1

slide-43
SLIDE 43

43

UK is 13-14% of goods exports but very important partner in many small sectors UK is 16% of services exports but not the majority trading partner in any segment

Breakdown of exports to the UK: important trade partner especially so in smaller sectors (agri-food products)

Meat Dairy

Medicinal and pharmaceutical products

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% UK trade % of segment exports UK trade as % of total goods exports Red Box includes many small export sectors that UK is significant % of Computer Services

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% UK trade % of segment exports UK trade as % of total services exports

Source: CSO goods 2017 data, services 2016 data The size of bubble relates to the sector’s importance to Ireland’s exports

slide-44
SLIDE 44

44

Forecast vs. no Brexit baseline Short term (2 years) Medium term (5 years) Long term (10-15 years) Department of Finance (ESRI)

  • 2.4%
  • 3.3%
  • 5.0%

Copenhagen Economics

  • 2.0 to 2.5%
  • 4.5%
  • 7.0%

(of which -4.9% is due to regulatory divergence) Central Bank of Ireland

  • 4.0%
  • 6.0%

Bank of England “disruptive” (implied)

  • 5.0%
  • 6.2%
  • 6.2%

Bank of England “disorderly” (implied)

  • 6.3%
  • 8.2%
  • 8.2%

UK Treasury range (implied)

  • 5.0 to 7.2%

Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story – return to WTO rules would be really negative for Ireland

Source: ESRI, Copenhagen, Bank of England, UK treasury Implied uses the impact on UK GDP and an elasticity measure of 0.8 to calculate the impact on Irish Growth

slide-45
SLIDE 45

45

  • Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.

The chief areas of interest are  Financial services  Business services  IT/ new media.

  • Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,

Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.

  • Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the
  • utcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK

(City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more

  • pportunities in time.

FDI: Ireland may benefit Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland

Many financial institutions have already announced that they will expand or set up in Dublin after Brexit

slide-46
SLIDE 46

Ireland’s long run future looks bright thanks to its favourable demographics

Section 4: Long term fundamentals

slide-47
SLIDE 47

47

Ireland’s GNI* per capita hit 2007 levels and compares favourably to EA

Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland’s structural growth drivers have reasserted

Source: CSO, Eurostat

Gross National Income* at current prices (1995=100)

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 "Celtic Tiger" 1994-2001 Credit/Prop erty Bubble Bubble Burst

Recovery

  • 5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GDP)

slide-48
SLIDE 48

48

20 40 60 80 World USA Sweden China Ireland UK Denmark Canada Finland Belgium France Germany Greece Portugal Italy Spain Japan 2015 Old Age Dependency Ratio 2045

Ireland’s population profile healthier than the EU average

Ireland’s population was 4.86m in 2018 –

  • ver 200,000 more than 2011 Census

Ireland’s population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts

Source: Eurostat (2018) CSO; UN population projections

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% <1 yr 5 101520253035404550556065707580859095 Ireland Germany EU28 25% of Ireland’s population aged 17 or below versus 19% for EU % of population in age cohort

slide-49
SLIDE 49

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 10% 15% 20% 25% % of population >64 years of age % of population < 15 years of age Other Germany Ireland Spain France Italy Best position is top right

49

Regional data show Ireland’s mix of young and old among the best in EU Ireland’s Working-Age Population expected to grow in coming years (2019-2028)

Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look great

Source: Oxford Economics forecasts Source: Eurostat; Regional NUTS2 basis Note: Each dot is a NUTS2 region in the EU. Y-axis is inverted

  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% Japan Germany China Euro area Italy EU Austria Spain Netherlands France Belgium Denmark UK Ireland US India

slide-50
SLIDE 50

50

  • 120
  • 100
  • 80
  • 60
  • 40
  • 20

20 40 60 80 Third level Other Education Net Migration 2009-2013 2014-2018

Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland “Reverse Brain Drain”

Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland

Source: CSO

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%

  • 100
  • 50

50 100 150 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) Net Migration (000s) Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS)

slide-51
SLIDE 51

51

Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth

Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations , * Contract manufacturing proxy

  • 10.00
10.00 30.00 50.00 70.00 90.00 110.00 130.00 150.00

90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Contract Manufacturing* Services Goods ex. CM Exports Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2017) Tot

  • tal

(20 2017) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.7 16.9 11.6 27.0 18.3 25.0 UK* 11.4 21.9 16.4 9.3 15.1 13.7 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 39.0 37.9 29.9 25.7 32.8 27.4 China 3.9 5.9 2.5 1.5 3.2 2.8 Other 18.0 17.4 39.5 36.6 30.5 31.1

slide-52
SLIDE 52

52

Ireland’s goods exports respond vigorously to euro movements – in both directions

  • A 1% depreciation of the euro increases

Irish goods exports to the US by 1%

  • The equivalent response for exports to the

UK is 1.1% and to the rest of world is 0.8%. Brexit has the opposite effect on Irish exports.

  • The EUR/USD exchange rate has a positive effect

(elasticity of 0.4) on Irish goods exports to the euro area, due to Ireland-based multinational companies’ exports to EA for onward sale to the rest of the world

  • The elasticity of total goods exports

excluding pharma to the exchange rate >1

Source: CSO; NTMA empirical analysis Note: All coefficients significant at 99% level; not affected by contract

  • manufacturing. Time period is 1998 to 2016 Q2. For longer time periods, the

UK elasticity is smaller (closer to 0.4-0.5 for 1981 onwards).

Response (% chg.) of Irish goods exports to 1% depreciation of the euro

1.00 1.11 0.41 0.83 1.08 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 US UK EA ROW EXP EXL PHA

slide-53
SLIDE 53

53

Average FDI inflow in $ per capita, 2012–17

Crucially, openness to overseas capital has played a big part in Ireland’s economic development

Source: Unctad (UN) database, Eurostat Note: High tech = High-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive high-technology services

Ireland has attracted high-quality jobs

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 Denmark Greece Germany Poland Austria Latvia Italy Croatia Slovenia Estonia Portugal France Spain Sweden UK Finland Belgium Cyprus NL Ireland Malta LX 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 % of employment in High Tech Sectors (5Y Average)

slide-54
SLIDE 54

54

All this leads to mixture of highly productive and labour intensive sectors in Ireland

Source: CSO , NTMA calculations, 2018 data

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 GVA (€bns) Employment (% of Total, RHS) LI Highly productive Labour Intensive HP

slide-55
SLIDE 55

90 95 100 105 110 115 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% Unemployment

  • Comp. of Emp. per

employee growth Annual Averages (1999-2007) 2019f

55

Nominal Labour Cost Ratio – IE vs Euro Area Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth less than half

Ireland is pretty competitive now; we need to avoid repeat

  • f the mid-2000s

Ireland competitive versus euro area

Source: CSO, Eurostat, NTMA calculations Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis *Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs

2019 forecast

slide-56
SLIDE 56

56

Selected Countries Global Rank Index Score (0-100)

Sweden 1 85.6 Denmark 2 84.2 Finland 3 84.0 Norway 4 83.9 Czech Republic 5 81.9 Germany 6 81.7 France 10 80.3 Belgium 12 80.0 United Kingdom 16 78.3 Ireland 19 77.9 Spain 25 76.8 Portugal 28 75.6 Italy 30 75.5 Luxembourg 33 75.0 Greece 38 72.9 United States 42 72.4

Ireland’s strong fundamentals highlighted by performance

  • n United Nations sustainability index

Source: United Nations SDG project

Ireland Global rank Vs. Regional Average

Subjective Wellbeing (2016) 13/133 Environmental Performance Index (2016) 19/155 Human Development Index (2016) 8/157 Global Competitiveness Index (2016/17) 21/134 Global Peace Index (2016) 12/149

slide-57
SLIDE 57

57

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions Ireland Actual Figure Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100) OECD Average

Overall

  • 87.5

75.8 Corruption Perception Index (0-100) 73.0 79.4 73.5 Government Efficiency (1-7) 4.8 74.8 52.8 Homicides (per 100,000 people) 1.1 97.8 96.1 Prison population (per 100,000 people) 80.0 87.8 74.6 Property Rights (1-7) 6.1 94.8 73.1 Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%) 75.0 73.7 67.4

Ireland is close to OECD norms on social issues Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency

Ireland is a good place to live and do business

Source: United Nations SDG project

50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Gender Equality Decent work and economic growth Reduced Inequalities Sustainable Cities and Communities Ireland (World leader = 100) OECD Average

slide-58
SLIDE 58

58

  • Ireland agreed two Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives

(ATADs) with our fellow EU Member States in 2016 and 2017. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives represent binding commitments to implement 3 significant BEPS recommendations into Irish law as well as two additional anti-avoidance measures.

  • Three out of five required components of the

ATADs are now in effect as of 1st Jan 2019: Controlled-Foreign Company (CFC) rules, Exit Tax and General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAAR).

  • We continue to engage positively at both EU and

OECD level on tax issues.

  • Ireland has been a strong supporter of the BEPS

process since inception.

  • Removal of known tax avoidance structures such

as the “Double Irish”, “the Single Malt” and “stateless companies”.

  • Ireland is best in class on tax transparency and

exchange of information. Ireland is one of only 23 jurisdictions to have been found to be fully compliant with new international best practice by the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information.

  • Ireland introduced Country by Country Reporting

in 2015. Ireland also ratified the BEPS multilateral instrument in domestic legislation which will update the majority of Ireland’s tax treaties to be BEPS compliant. Ireland’s part in OECD (BEPS) corporate tax reform Ireland’s role in EU actions on corporate tax reform

Ireland reformed its corporate tax code to meet global standards; the 12.5% rate is fixed Government policy

slide-59
SLIDE 59

Residential property prices have risen thanks to lack of supply and capital inflows

Section 5: Property

slide-60
SLIDE 60

60

House prices rising strongly but some way off peak Office leads commercial property (peak = 100)

Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012; Commercial cooled in 2018

Source: CSO; IPD

20 40 60 80 100 120 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 Retail Office Industrial 20 40 60 80 100 120 National

  • Excl. Dublin

Dublin

slide-61
SLIDE 61

61

Housing supply still below demand; price inflation has moderated as supply slowly catching up

New dwellings* make up 80% of housing completions: some debate about the rest Housing Completions above 22,000 in 2018 but still low historically (000s)

* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections

  • f old houses or connections from “ghost estates” overstate the annual run rate of new building.

Source: DoHPCLG, CSO, NTMA Calculations

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 2018 Nationally Dublin

  • ex. Dublin

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 New dwelling completion Unfinished Reconnection Non-Domestic All connections

slide-62
SLIDE 62

62

Demand has picked up since 2015; Credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important

Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s) Non-mortgage transactions still important but closer to 40% of total

Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register Source: BPFI *4 quarter sum used

20 40 60 80 100 120 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser First Time Buyers

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q2 2015 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Q4 2017 Q2 2018 Q4 2018 Thousands Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS)

slide-63
SLIDE 63

63

Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012 but levelled off in 2018

Source: CSO;

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %)

slide-64
SLIDE 64
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 4Q Sum of Transactions Y-o-Y Change (RHS)

64

  • First time buyers (FTBs) can borrow 90% of the

value of a home (10% minimum deposit). Five per cent of the total new lending to FTBs will be allowed above the 90% LTV limit.

  • For second and subsequent buyers (SSBs), banks

must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent LTV to no more than 20 per cent of new lending to SSBs.

  • Bank must restrict lending for primary dwelling

purchase above 3.5 times LTI to no more than 20 per cent of that aggregate value for FTBs and 10 per cent for SSBs.

  • Banks have to limit Buy-to-Let loans (BTL) above

70 per cent LTV to 10 per cent of all BTL loans. CBI’s amended macro-prudential rules Transaction growth has slowed since macro- prudential rules introduced

CBI’s macro-prudential rules increase resilience of banking and household sector

Introduced in 2015

Source: Residential Property Price Register

slide-65
SLIDE 65
  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% SD NW BG UK DN FR IE ES LX NL FN OE EA BD PT GR IT

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% SD BG NW OE NL DN FR ES LX IE EA PT UK FN IT BD GR

65

Irish house price valuation metrics continue to rise but remain below 2008 levels

Source: OECD, NTMA Workings Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.

Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q3 2018, red dot represent Q1 2008) Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q3 2018, red dot represent Q1 2008)

slide-66
SLIDE 66

Worries about contingent liabilities no longer; Ireland now has legacy assets

Section 6: Other data

slide-67
SLIDE 67

Ireland has legacy banking-related assets

  • Ba

Banki king

  • Banks continue to be profitable; income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
  • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the

slow judicial process in accessing collateral.

  • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) was completed in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer

to be used for debt reduction.

  • NA

NAMA

  • NAMA has repaid 100% of its senior debt; it forecasts a profit of €3.5bn subject to market conditions.
  • This is expected to be returned to the Exchequer in the next few years – beginning in 2020.
  • IBR

BRC

  • Liquidation of the IBRC has returned €1.1bn to the Irish Exchequer.
  • The Exchequer received €870m in 2016-18 with the final payment c.€215m in early 2019.

67

slide-68
SLIDE 68

68

All three pillar banks profitable given enhanced margins

Allied Irish Bank Bank of Ireland Permanent TSB

Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB Profit measures are before exceptional items

State Ownership 71% owned 14% owned 75% owned

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 2012201320142015201620172018 Net Interest Margin % 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 2012201320142015201620172018 Net Interest Margin % 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% Net Interest Margin %

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 2012201320142015201620172018 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

slide-69
SLIDE 69

69

Domestic bank cost base reduced over time

… and IE banks* below to EU average Cost income ratios improve dramatically…

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA * EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks

Staffing (000s) shrunk by c.50% post crisis

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% LV SK ES PL DK GR PT NL HU SI GB FI IS IE IT EU AT LU BE FR CY DE

26 16 5 10 11 2 10 20 30 AIB BOI PTSB 2008 2018 123% 88% 144% 53% 65% 64% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% AIB BOI PTSB 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

slide-70
SLIDE 70

70

CET 1 capital ratios (End 2018) Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books slimmed down

Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated

Source: Published bank accounts

Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios.

Source: Published bank accounts

21.1% 17.5% 15.0% 13.4% 14.7% 12.2% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI PTSB

  • 20

40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) AIB BOI Dec-10 Dec-18

slide-71
SLIDE 71

71

Non-performing loans sold during 2018 as asset quality continues to improve at three pillar banks

No Non-performin ing exp xposures % of f tot total l loan

  • ans1 (los

loss pr prov

  • visio

ion % of NP NPE) Dec-17 17 Dec-18 18 Book k (€bn) bn) BOI

Irish Residential Mortgages 11.0(24) 9.5(21) 23.7 UK Residential Mortgages 1.9(14) 2.3(15) 21.7 Irish SMEs 15.4(46) 11.2(49) 7.6 UK SMEs 8.6(42) 6.1(53) 1.6 Corporate 3.0(69) 2.6(60) 10.3 CRE - Investment 17.9(43) 10.7(44) 7.7 CRE - Land/Development 39.4(55) 14.0(54) 0.6 Consumer Loans 2.1(98) 2.1(140) 5.1 8.3( 3(36 36) 6.3( 3(35 35) 78.4

AIB

Residential Mortgages 14 10.1 (20) 32.3 SMEs/Corporate 11 5.2 (36) 19.6 CRE 33 18.0 (29) 7.9 Consumer Loans 18 11.1 (50) 3.1 16 16 9.6 62.9

PTSB

Residential Mortgages 21.7(44) 8.8(39) 12.4 Buy-to-let Mortgages 21.8(64) 12.9(113) 4.0 Commercial 30.3(104) 33.3(76) 0.2 Consumer Loans 15.4(92) 7.5(112) 0.3 21.7( 7(50) 0) 10.0( 0(64) 4) 16.9

Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 18)

Consumer CRE Corporate/ SME Mortgage

All 3 Pillar banks (€bn) Dec-17 Dec-18 Total Loans 162.4 158.2 Non-performing Exposures 22.0 12.7 (NPE as % of Total) 13.5% 8.0% Provisions 7.3 4.4 (Provisions as % of book) 4.4% 2.8% (Provisions as % of Impaired) 33.2% 34.6%

Source: Published bank accounts 1 Non-performing exposures include impaired loans, loans past due greater than 90 days but not impaired, and Forborne Collateral Realisations

60% 10% 5% 25%

slide-72
SLIDE 72

72

Ireland’s interest rates on lending for house purchase the highest in euro area Rates on SME loans* over euro area average

Profitability aided by higher interest rates than EA peers

Source: ECB *SME loans proxy of loans <1year and <€1m to Non-Financial Corporates

% % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Max Min Ireland Euro Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Max Min Ireland Euro Area

slide-73
SLIDE 73

73

20 40 60 80 100 120 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 0910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Over 90 days >720 days* 361-720 days 181-360 days 90-180 days

Irish residential mortgage arrears are still improving; but there are complications unrelated to the economy

  • Non-bank entities now hold 12 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 8.1 per cent are held by regulated retail credit

firms, with the remaining 3.5 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Unregulated loan owners hold 22 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days

Mortgage arrears (90+ days) Repossessions**

Source: CBI

PDH Arrears (by thousands)

* Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years. ** Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%

34123412341234123412341234123412341234 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

PDH + BTL (by balance) PDH + BTL (by number) 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 13 14 15 16 17 18 PDH BTL % of MA90+ (RHS)

slide-74
SLIDE 74

74

NAMA: All original senior debt has been repaid; likely to deliver surplus of around €3.5bn from 2020 onwards

  • NAMA’s operating performance is strong
  • Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par
  • f loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  • NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
  • It

t has has rep epaid 100% % of

  • f €30.2b

.2bn of

  • f orig
  • riginal sen

enior de debt

  • NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course,

subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020.

  • NA

NAMA cou

  • uld deli

deliver r a a surp urplus s for

  • r Irish

rish taxp xpayers s of

  • f ab

about €3.5b .5bn, , acc according to

  • its

its management t tea eam - if if curr current t mar arket t con

  • ndit

itions s rem emain favourable.

  • NA

NAMA in init itiati tive to

  • de

develop up up to

  • 20,00

,000 ho housi sing uni units s by y 2020 – sub ubject t to

  • com
  • mmercial via

viability ty.

 Progress has been strong so far with 9,700 units completed from 2014 – 2018;  Another 3,000 under construction or have had funding approved;  A further 6,400 have planning permission granted.

More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie

slide-75
SLIDE 75

75

The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans

  • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This

figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.

  • Thi

his s case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its corporate tax rate”.

  • App

pple is is ap appealing the the ruli ruling, g, as as is is the the Iris rish Govern rnment.

  • t. This process could be lengthy. Pending the
  • utcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest into an escrow fund.
  • Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services

to hold and administer the fund.

  • Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management

International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.

  • As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the

the NTM NTMA has has mad ade no no al allowance for

  • r these

these funds. s.

slide-76
SLIDE 76

76

Irish Sovereign Green Bond Framework aligned with the ICMA Green Bond Principles

Use of Proceeds Project Evaluation and Selection Process Management of Proceeds

Sustainable Water, Clean Transportation, Energy Efficiency, Climate Change Adaptation & others Working Group established by Government: NTMA, DPER, DCCAE & DFIN Pending its allocation to Eligible Green Projects, Ireland will temporarily hold proceeds in its Central Fund.

Reporting

Annual Allocation Report & Biennial Eligible Green Project Impact Report

Source: NTMA Further details are available at ntma.ie

slide-77
SLIDE 77

77

Government’s NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO2 emissions by at least 80% by 2050

Sustainable Mobility €8.6 billion Sustainable Management

  • f Water and

Environmental Resources €6.8 billion Transition to a Low carbon and Climate Resilient Society €7.6 billion

Total:€23 billion (13%

  • f GNI*)

Source: National Development Plan 2018-2027

1 in 5 euros in the NDP to be spent on green projects

Further details are available at ntma.ie

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SLIDE 78

Explanatory charts about the distortions to Ireland’s National Accounts

Annex

slide-79
SLIDE 79
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Modified Domestic Demand External Channel Change in Inventories GDP

79

Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance

Substantial activity from multinationals from 2015 onwards distorted the national accounts

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

slide-80
SLIDE 80

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 19971999200120032005200720092011201320152017 Nominal GDP (€bns) Nominal GNP (€bns)

80

Reclassification of several companies and “onshoring”

  • f IP led to step change in GDP & capital stock

Source: CSO; Department of Finance *due to confidentiality some sector data for 2015 has been restricted

c.35% increase in nominal GDP in 2015

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 €billions

  • Trans. equip. and Intangibles*

Transport equipment Intangible fixed assets Other Assets

slide-81
SLIDE 81

81

The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports

Source: CSO

  • The capital stock expanded in 2015

by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:

  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • The transfer of whole entities and assets of this

size is not something seen before in Ireland.

  • Goods produced by the additional capital

were mainly exported. Complicating matters, the goods were produced through “contract manufacturing” (explained in detail overleaf).

  • Little or no employment in Ireland results from this

contract manufacturing.

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Net Exports Investment Distortions Modified Domestic Demand GDP

slide-82
SLIDE 82

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National accounts exports Trade data exports

82

Contract manufacturing (CM) overstates the extent of goods export growth in the last three years

  • Contract manufacturing (CM) occurs where a

company in Ireland engages another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf.

  • Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer

supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the overseas contractor never takes

  • wnership of the product. When the product is

sold abroad, a change of economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold.

  • This export is recorded in Ireland’s statistics even

tho though it it was as ne never r pr produced in in Irela eland.

  • Previously, CM did not have a significant net

impact on GDP as the company would send royalties back to where the intellectual property (IP) was “owned” – it was a royalty import. Now that the IP is here, Ireland’s GDP is artificially inflated.

Source: CSO, NTMA Calculations

c. c. €70 70 bn bn

Contract manufacturing proxy*

*Contract manufacturing proxy is calculated as the difference between the monthly International trade exports statistics and the National Accounts/BOP measure for goods exports. The monthly data is based on the actual volume of goods flowing through Ireland’s various ports/airports whereas the national accounts/BOP makes adjustments for, among other items, contract manufacturing.

slide-83
SLIDE 83

83

Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland

  • Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to

MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.

  • Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years

with this investment impacting the real economy.

  • However the recent sharp increase in intangibles

investment overstates Ireland’s position and should be discounted accordingly.

  • Building investment grew by 15.7% y-o-y in 2018

versus 2017 highlighting pent up demand for housing. Investment (4Q sum, €bns)

Source: CSO,

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Building Investment Other Investment Distortions Modified GFCF Total GFCF

slide-84
SLIDE 84

84

GNI* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP

  • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true”

growth of Ireland’s income due to MNCs.

  • Reasons for 2015-17 MNC distortions:
  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors,

GNI* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

  • GNI* only available in nominal terms at present.
  • In time, GNI* will be published on a constant

price basis.

National Account – Current Prices (Euro, y-o-y growth rates) 2015 2016 2017 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 262.4bn (34.4%) 273.2bn (4.1%) 294.1bn (7.6%) minus Net Factor Income from rest of the world = Gross National Product (GNP) 200.4bn (22.2%) 222.2bn (10.8%) 233.1bn (4.9%) add EU subsidies minus EU taxes 1.2bn 1.0bn 1.1bn = Gross National Income (GNI) 201.7bn (22.3%) 223.2bn (10.7%) 234.2bn (5.0%) minus retained earnings of re- domiciled firms

  • 4.6bn
  • 5.8bn
  • 4.6bn

minus depreciation on foreign

  • wned IP assets
  • 31.0bn
  • 36.7bn
  • 43.1bn

minus depreciation on aircraft leasing

  • 4.6bn
  • 4.9bn
  • 5.1bn

= GNI* 161.4bn (8.6%) 175.8bn (9.0%) 181.2bn (3.0%)

Source: CSO

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SLIDE 85

85

Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – which ignores exports - is best cyclical indicator

  • GNI* is useful but not timely. MDD is released on

a quarterly and real basis.

  • MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also
  • mits aircraft leasing and IP imports from

investment to give a modified measure of domestic demand.

  • The measure includes:
  • private consumption
  • government consumption
  • building investment
  • elements of machinery & equipment

investment

  • elements of intangible asset investment
  • value of physical changes in stock
  • This measure pegs real growth at 3.3% in 2018.

Since 2014, annual growth has averaged just under 5% when looking at MDD.

Source: CSO, four quarter sum growth rate used to strip out substantial quarterly volatility. Note MDD includes inventories. Large inventories in Q4 2016 added a further degree of volatility into MDD data.

  • 20.0%
  • 15.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Modified Dom. Demand (Real) Modified Dom. Demand (Nominal)

slide-86
SLIDE 86
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% Current Account (% of GNI*) Modified Current Account (% of GNI*)

86

The current account (CA) is distorted heavily by actions of MNEs – CSO has modified CA to be consistent with GNI*

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland’s current account data. MNC’s action distort metrics heavily.

Ireland is living within its means

slide-87
SLIDE 87

87

Disclaimer

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying

  • slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information
  • provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past
  • r future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.