Bayesian Post-Election Audits
Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen
Viterbi Professor of EECS MIT, Cambridge, MA {rivest,ehshen}@mit.edu
EVT/WOTE 2012 2012-08-07
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Bayesian Post-Election Audits Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Bayesian Post-Election Audits Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen Viterbi Professor of EECS MIT, Cambridge, MA {rivest,ehshen}@mit.edu EVT/WOTE 2012 2012-08-07 1 Outline Post-Election Audits Bayesian Ballot-Polling Bayesian Comparison Audits
Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen
Viterbi Professor of EECS MIT, Cambridge, MA {rivest,ehshen}@mit.edu
EVT/WOTE 2012 2012-08-07
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Post-Election Audits Bayesian Ballot-Polling Bayesian Comparison Audits Experimental Results Lessons and Open Questions
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◮ Confirm to a high degree of confidence that
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◮ Confirm to a high degree of confidence that
◮ Convince the losers they really lost!
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◮ Sequential decision-making (Wald). ◮ Examine paper ballots one at a time, in
◮ Determine actual type of each ballot (as
◮ At each stage, decide whether to
◮ Stop: Reported outcome looks OK. ◮ Continue: more auditing needed.
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
◮ Comparison audit: also look at their reported
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
◮ Comparison audit: also look at their reported
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
◮ Comparison audit: also look at their reported
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
◮ Comparison audit: also look at their reported
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◮ Ballot-polling audit: look at only the actual
◮ Comparison audit: also look at their reported
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◮ Assume you audit randomly chosen ballots,
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◮ Assume you audit randomly chosen ballots,
◮ Suppose I give you a “magic box” that at any
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◮ Assume you audit randomly chosen ballots,
◮ Suppose I give you a “magic box” that at any
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◮ Assume you audit randomly chosen ballots,
◮ Suppose I give you a “magic box” that at any
◮ Then you can stop audit if/when the reported
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◮ Suppose you are auditing an election
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◮ Suppose you are auditing an election
◮ You draw a random sample (without
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◮ Suppose you are auditing an election
◮ You draw a random sample (without
◮ Both ballots are for A:
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◮ Suppose you are auditing an election
◮ You draw a random sample (without
◮ Both ballots are for A:
◮ Q: What is the probability that A won?
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◮ To make Q well-posed, need a model (a
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◮ To make Q well-posed, need a model (a
◮ A noninformative prior gives each outcome
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◮ To make Q well-posed, need a model (a
◮ A noninformative prior gives each outcome
◮ With this prior and sample, A wins with
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◮ To make Q well-posed, need a model (a
◮ A noninformative prior gives each outcome
◮ With this prior and sample, A wins with
◮ If your error limit is 5%, stop auditing!
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5 5 · 4 4 4 5 · 3 4 3 5 · 2 4 2 5 · 1 4
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5 5 · 4 4 4 5 · 3 4 3 5 · 2 4 2 5 · 1 4
10 60 6 60 3 60 1 60
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5 5 · 4 4 4 5 · 3 4 3 5 · 2 4 2 5 · 1 4
10 60 6 60 3 60 1 60
10 20 6 20 3 20 1 20
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5 5 · 4 4 4 5 · 3 4 3 5 · 2 4 2 5 · 1 4
10 60 6 60 3 60 1 60
10 20 6 20 3 20 1 20
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10 20, 6 20, 3 20, 1 20)
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10 20, 6 20, 3 20, 1 20)
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Winning probabilities vs. sample size in a Bayes audit
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Sample size Winning probability Candidate 1 Candidate 2 Candidate 3
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◮ plurality ◮ IRV ◮ Borda ◮ Schulze
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◮ Same idea, but have one urn for each
◮ Much more efficient!! (But needs way of
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◮ Ballot-polling. ◮ Two candidates (plus write-ins). ◮ 2011 votes cast: 1353 for Lewis, 742 for
◮ Stark’s ballot-polling audit with 10% risk limit
◮ A Bayes ballot-polling audit with ǫ = 0.10
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◮ Comparison audit. ◮ Yes/No proposition. ◮ 3152 votes cast: 1728 Yes, 1392 No, 32
◮ Stark’s comparison audit with 10% risk limit
◮ A Bayes ballot-polling audit with ǫ = 0.10
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◮ We conjecture that a Bayes audit is in fact
◮ The Bayes audit admits the use of other
◮ The Bayes audit admits the use of multiple
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◮ High efficiency (few ballots get audited). ◮ Small/controllable miscertification rates
◮ Simple in structure / easy to implement. ◮ Handles ballot-polling audits, comparison
◮ No MOV computation required to start. ◮ Admits flexible (multiple) choice(s) of prior. ◮ Can be stopped early with meaningful
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◮ Only works (so far) for single-ballot audits. ◮ Unclear relationship to risk-limiting audits. ◮ Results depend on choice(s) for prior. ◮ Need program to compute winning
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http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/bayes/
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