attacking a big data developer
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Attacking a Big Data Developer Dr. Olaf Flebbe of t oflebbe.de - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Attacking a Big Data Developer Dr. Olaf Flebbe of t oflebbe.de ApacheCon Bigdata Europe 16.Nov.2016 Seville About me PhD in computational physics Former projects: Minix68k (68k FP Emulation), Linux libm.so.5 (High Precision FP), perl and


  1. Attacking a Big Data Developer Dr. Olaf Flebbe of ät oflebbe.de ApacheCon Bigdata Europe 16.Nov.2016 Seville

  2. About me PhD in computational physics Former projects: Minix68k (68k FP Emulation), Linux libm.so.5 (High Precision FP), perl and python for epoc, flightgear, msktutil… PMC of Apache Bigtop (Chief Software Architect at a European Software Integrator/Big Data)

  3. Security The Internet is not a safe space any more Attackers are using increasingly complex attacks in order to penetrate enterprises There is no well established awareness for Developers can be a attack vector! Developers may create malicious artifacts by reusing insecure components.

  4. Developer Attack Vector Any user of a software component which uses an insecure build process can be harmed and may create software artifacts which can penetrate its customer Method for investigation: Compile a large code base Looking for possible attack vectors

  5. Method Catching complete network traffic when compiling a Big Data Distribution Create in depth package analysis of the traffic with an sophisticated network security monitor Store the representation in a NoSQL store Query

  6. Toolset

  7. Big Data Distro :aass.. =XS22nai,>__. . =n-- +!!!""^-- .vX> . .)e<o;. ._v2`-{S> . ..<de~..;)Sa, .._aoX}:===>=-?Xo>, . . . .__aaoZe!`=><i=s+s;~*XXos,,_ . . . ...........______=iisaaoXXZY!"~._v(=d=:nc-1s,-~?SX#Xouass,,_____.:.......... =XXoXXXSXXXXXXXXZUZXX21?!"^-.._au*`=u2` ]X>.+*a>,.-"!Y1XSSX##ZZXXXXXXXXXXXoXXc .{XXXXXX2*?!!"!"^~--- ...__aa2!^- =dX( .+XXc. ~!1nas,,.---~~^""!"!!!?YSXXXXX2+ -"YSXXXo=. ._=sssaaav1!!~- ._aXXe` )SXo>. -~"?Yoouass_s,, _vXXXX2}~ -{XXZoai%%*XXSSSX>.. .<uXXX2~ . {XXXXs,. . .=dXXXZX2lii%uXXXXe- .<XXXXX%- -<XXXXX1|==%vdXXXXXo;:. ._vXXXXXXos_=i|*XXXXX> -<XXXXX` =SXXXZc ..nXXX2> ---=2XXX2^-"|||}"--~{ZXXX1-- .:XXXXo; . )XXXX2` . =XXXXZc nXXXX> =XXXXe..__s=>_...)XXXX1 . .:SXXXo; .)XXXX2.. <SXXXXc . .nXXXS> =XXXXosummmmBmma,)ZXXX1 :XXXX2; )XXXXX. .<XXXXX( :nXXXS; <XXXXXm#mmmWmmmmmoZXXX1 ..3XXXo;. . )XXXXX; . nXXXXX;. :XXXXX; .=XXXXXmmmBmmmWmB#XXXXX1 . .nXXXX> :XXXXXc . . =oZXXXe; .<XXXX2` . )XXXXZmBmBmWmmmW#2XXXX1 . .vXXXXc vXXXXo; +Y3S2Xz__...vXXXXe . .)ZXXXZmmWmBmmBBm#XXXXXo.. {XXXXz:.___vSS2Y1= . ---+"""*!!*Y1s|=_==uXSSSXZUXUXUXUXUXS2XX2n|_=||%Y*??!"""^~--- .--- - ---------------- - - -. .o. oooo oooooooooo. o8o . .888. `888 `888' `Y8b `"' .o8 .8"888. oo.ooooo. .oooo. .ooooo. 888 .oo. .ooooo. 888 888oooo .oooooooo.o888oo .ooooo. oo.ooooo. .8' `888. 888' `88b`P )88b d88' `"Y8 888P"Y88b d88' `88b 888oooo888'`888 888' `88b 888 d88' `88b 888' `88b .88ooo8888. 888 888 .oP"888 888 888 888 888ooo888 888 `88b 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 .8' `888. 888 888d8( 888 888 .o8 888 888 888 .o 888 .88P 888 `88bod8P' 888 .888 888 888 888 o88o o8888o 888bod8P'`Y888""8o`Y8bod8P'o888o o888o`Y8bod8P' o888bood8P' o888o`8oooooo. "888"`Y8bod8P' 888bod8P' 888 d" YD 888 o888o "Y88888P' o888o

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  9. Bigtop Apache Bigtop is the „Debian“ of the Big Data Distributions reused by Google for their Managed Hadoop Service reused within Cloudera and Hortonworks used by Canonicals Hadoop Offering reused by the ODPI.org

  10. Some components of Apache Bigtop

  11. Components Compile Environment (based on docker) Convenience artifacts (i.e. repositories for Centos7, Centos6, Debian 8, Ubuntu 16.04, Ubuntu 14.04, Fedora 20, opensuse 42.1) Deployment Templates (puppet) Orchestration with Juju Charms Automatic Testing Environment And … non intel architectures (ppc64le, aarch64)

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  13. Bro Bro: The Network Security Monitor www.bro.org Flexible, High performance, Stateful in depth Analysis Analyse HTTP , HTTPS Certificate Chains, Fingerprinting of Downloads, Analyse DNS Requests and Answers

  14. Elastic Search, Kibana The ELK Stack, built on Apache Lucene Simple NoSQL RESTful Database with a powerful Analysis Tool

  15. Setup

  16. Docker Container tcpdump -i eth0 Apache Bigtop eth0 Network Trace Internet

  17. Analytic Toolchain github: dockerhub: 
 danielguerra69/bro-debian-elasticsearch (pull request pending, regarding checksums)

  18. Docker Container Bro Docker 
 Docker Container Docker Container compose Elastic Search Index Config Docker Container Docker Container Kibana Kibana Config

  19. 1969 Network Docker Container Trace Bro Docker Container Elastic Search 5601 Docker Container Kibana

  20. Docker / Docker Compose Orchestration on a single node of Bro Elastic Search (Cluster) Kibana Index Generation in Elastic Dashboard and Query generation in Kibana Many thanks to danielguerra/bro-debian-elasticsearch on github/ dockerhub!

  21. Workflow Compile in Docker container bigtop/slaves:trunk-debian-8 add tcpdump tcpdump -i eth0 -s 0 -w FILE & ./gradlew pkg See https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/BIGTOP/ How+to+build+Bigtop-trunk

  22. Recapulate http:// vs https://

  23. https:// Use of TLS for establish a secure channel Authentication of connection Need to check the certificate chain back to a trusted „root“ cert. Everything needed integrated into maven 3.3.x (Upgrade!)

  24. http:// Data may be modified in between Data are not authenticated Data may be sent from a different server contraproductive to add http://repo.maven.org to <repositories/>!

  25. ^

  26. Use of TLS Version 
 (Sidetrack) Only TLS 1.2 is considered secure services.gradle.org on TLS 1.1 Many TLS 1.1 connections

  27. Abondoned Projects DNS NXDOMAIN Answer

  28. Abondoned Projects Code trying to download from a non resolving address java.net (Oracle) codehaus.org (Individual) What if a malicious guy is allocating these domains ? Asking the WHOIS entry of codehaus.org for comment

  29. WHOIS Owner of codehaus.org Hi, Yes it is a risk I am aware of - at this stage I'll be keeping hold of the domain names indefinitely. If that position ever changes I'll keep Apache in mind as a potential benevolent owner. Cheers, Ben Walding

  30. Apache Mission Statement: TPKDTNFY!

  31. Shady sites personal home pages

  32. Shady sites HBase used people.apache.org Rescue: Has been cleaned up in current master, without my intervention. THANKS!

  33. Shady resources Things not to download by a compile job. Never, ever!

  34. Shady resources The „official“ Maven Junction plugin is downloading junction.exe (a copy of a non free too from sysinternals now microsoft) It is supposed to create a symlink in NTFS (Windows Filesystem) Doing „ln -s“ on unix WTF ?

  35. Company Headquarter

  36. HTTPS to the rescue?

  37. A real threat ? Apache Flink < 1.2 Contacted Flink PMC on 11th Sep FLINK-4732 Adresses this issue New Apache Flink release fixes this issue Special thanks to the whole Apache Flink PMC!

  38. Attacking Men in the middle (MITM) Attack Intercepting http traffic Demo with ettercap: ARP Poisoning DNS Attack (SSL Forging)

  39. Demo of Apache Flink Exploit for Windows Forge maven to download and run calc.exe rather junction.exe

  40. Attack details Need priviledged network position (for instance in the same subnet as victim) Prepare webserver for offering attacking packages, configuring DNS forgery to point to attacking machine. 
 (Disabling off SSL forgery) Starting ettercap, create ARP Spoofing, default router is host1 dev host2 profit.

  41. A statement of the authors: Hi Olaf The project is actually abandoned and no-longer supported. BTW today there is a better way todo all this directly in java. Files.createSymbolicLink(newLink, target); Your suggestions ? Vlad Skarzhevsky

  42. Even „normal“ maven plugins are dangerous: Hacking maven-compile or plexus-compile For instance flume (Update: current flume is fixed and upstream to Apache Bigtop)

  43. Fixing zookeeper ant/ivy based source Contacted via security@zookeeper.apache.org Fixed in ZOOKEEPER-2594 Was using abandoned repositories and non TLS- Sources Special thanks to Patrick Hunt!

  44. Trying to fix tomcat NSIS (Windows Installer) sourceforge.net only supports non TLS downloads. Sidetracked: http://www.apache.org/dyn/closer.lua Only a few of the mirrors support TLS How to automatically prove the trust?

  45. Do No Trust … Verify Either bundle GPG Keys or Checksums. TBD

  46. Best practices for Devs Migrate at least to Maven 3.3.x It uses and validates TLS Connections! TLS Connection to repo.maven.org is built in Check KEYS or Checksums with official website

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