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An International Monetary System Built on Sound Policy Rules John B. Taylor Presentation at the Bank of Greece May 24, 2016 Many Calls for International Monetary Reform Jaime Caruana: global instability shows need for reform Paul


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An International Monetary System Built on Sound Policy Rules

John B. Taylor Presentation at the Bank of Greece May 24, 2016

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Many Calls for International Monetary Reform

  • Jaime Caruana: global instability shows need for reform
  • Paul Volcker: “the absence of an official, rules-based,

cooperatively managed monetary system has not been a great success.”

  • Raghu Rajan:“what we need are monetary rules that

prevent a central bank’s domestic mandate from trumping a country’s international responsibility.”

  • Helena Rey and IMF: we need macro prudential policies
  • r even capital controls (aka capital flow management) to

slow down the flow of capital

  • This proposal: A rules-based international monetary

system built on policy rules in each country

– Research (old and new) shows it will work well even with capital mobility and flexible exchange rates

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Research

  • Economic research

– rules-based monetary policy leads to good macroeconomic economic performance – in the national economy – and in the global economy

  • Empirical multi-country monetary models with

– highly integrated international capital markets – no-arbitrage conditions in the term-structure – forward-looking expectations – price and wage rigidities

  • Sometimes called “new Keynesian”
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σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

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A B

σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

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A B A B

σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

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A B A B

σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

C

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A B A B

σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

C C

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A B A B

σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

C

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A B A B

σy σp σp σy Country 1 Country 2

C D

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Corroboration

  • Central banks moved toward more transparent rules-

based policies in 1980s, 1990s

– including through a focus on price stability

  • Detected by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, and later

confirmed by others

  • Dramatic improvement compared with 1970s when

policy was highly discretionary and unfocused.

  • Mervyn King called it the NICE period
  • But also a near internationally cooperative equilibrium

(NICE)

  • So Twice-NICE or NICE-squared.
  • Many emerging market countries joined

– Including through Inflation targeting – Performance improved & contributed to global stability

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Then The Crisis

  • The end of NICE in both senses of the word.
  • Great Recession & Not-So-Great Recovery
  • Concerns about international spillover effects
  • Emerging market countries impacted
  • Developed countries—Japan—express concerns

about exchange rates.

  • Small open economies take unusual actions
  • Increased volatility
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Policy Changes and the Crisis

  • Evidence of monetary policy swinging away from

rule-like policies

  • Detected by many (Kahn, Ahrend)

– A decade ago—before the financial crisis—too low too long – Causality versus correlation

  • Econometric and historical evidence of effects

– Econometrics: Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, Papell, Prodan – History: Meltzer

  • “Global Great Deviation” Hofmann & Bogdanova
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From “Has the Fed Gotten Tougher on Inflation?” The FRBSF Weekly Letter, March 31, 1995, by John P Judd and Bharat Trehan of the San Francisco Fed

1987-92 1993-94 1965-79

Monetary policy gets more predictable, inflation targets, rules-based

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Chart from Fed, St. Louis Review, William Poole (Jan/Feb 2007) Showing Shift Back Toward Discretion

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Source: Taylor (2007)

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18

500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14

Reserve Balances at the Fed

Billions of dollars With liquidity support only QE1 QE2 QE3 9/11 Year

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  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Percent

Great Moderation

Growth rate of real GDP

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Housing Investment versus Deviations from Policy Rule in Europe During 2001-6

Source: OECD

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Source: BIS, Shin

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.

(post-2006)

C

S.D. Variance Period Output Inf. Sum Output Inf. Sum 1965.1 - 1983.4 3.6 2.4 6.0 13.0 5.8 18.8 1984.1 - 2006.4 1.5 0.8 2.3 2.3 0.6 2.9 2007.1 - 2012.3 5.4 0.8 6.2 29.2 0.6 29.8

Source: Update of Ben Bernanke (2004) “The Great Moderation”

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Source: Mervyn King’s Stamp Lecture (2012)

Alternative View: Curve Shifted for Other Reasons

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The Global Benefits of Rules-Based Monetary Policy

  • Move to a more rules-based policy in 1980s led to

better national/international performance in the 1980s, 1990s and until recently (NICE2)

  • The spread and amplification of policy deviations

from rules-based policy in recent years are drivers

  • f current instabilities (not so NICE)
  • Rules-based national policies could create

another nearly international cooperative

  • equilibrium. (another NICE)
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Empirical Evidence on Global Effects

  • econometric models of spillover effects of policy

deviations

  • regressions showing policy contagion and the

multiplier effects of such contagion

  • the spread of unconventional monetary policy as

weapons in currency wars

  • the impact of policy deviations on other policies

that detract from economic performance

  • direct evidence that global economic instability

has increased.

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Empirical Evidence on Global Effects

  • econometric models of spillover effects of policy

deviations

  • regressions showing policy contagion and the

multiplier effects of such contagion

  • the spread of unconventional monetary policy as

weapons in currency wars

  • the impact of policy deviations on other policies

that detract from economic performance

  • direct evidence that global economic instability

has increased.

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Empirical Evidence

  • Central bank reaction functions with foreign

policy deviations

– Large and significant reaction coefficients

  • Colin Gray (2012)
  • Sebastian Edwards (2015)
  • Agustin Carstens (2015)
  • Examining actual central bank decisions…
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A cut in the Norges bank policy rate (black line to red line)…

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From 1-10

….because of interest rates were cut abroad.

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A rise on the Norges Bank policy rate (from black to red…

3 6 9 Mar-06 Mar-07 Mar-08 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 3 6 9

Source: Norges Bank

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…because interest rates were increased abroad.

  • 2
  • 1.5
  • 1
  • 0.5

0.5 1 1.5 2 08 Q3 09 Q1 09 Q3 10 Q1 10 Q3 11 Q1 11 Q3

  • 2
  • 1.5
  • 1
  • 0.5

0.5 1 1.5 2

Higher demand in Norway Higher inflation in Norway Higher interest rates abroad and developments in the foreign exchange market Lower growth abroad Higher risk premium in the money market

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From MPR 1/10

Key policy rate compared simple monetary policy rule with and without external interest rates

Taylor Rule Key Policy Rate Rule with external interest rates Growth rule

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Empirical Evidence on Global Effects

  • econometric models of spillover effects of policy

deviations

  • regressions showing policy contagion and the

multiplier effects of such contagion

  • the spread of unconventional monetary policy as

weapons in currency wars

  • the impact of policy deviations on other policies

that detract from economic performance

  • direct evidence that global economic instability

has increased.

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70 80 90 100 110 120 130 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Yen Dollar Exchange Rate

  • - Abe Election

yen per dollar

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1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 J a n A p r J u l O c t J a n A p r J u l O c t J a n A p r J u l O c t J a n A p r J u l O c t J a n 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Euro dollar exchange rate

dollars per euro

  • - August 2014
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Empirical Evidence on Global Effects

  • econometric models of spillover effects of policy

deviations

  • regressions showing policy contagion and the

multiplier effects of such contagion

  • the spread of unconventional monetary policy as

weapons in currency wars

  • the impact of policy deviations on other policies

that detract from economic performance

  • direct evidence that global economic instability

has increased.

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Other Policy Impacts That May Detract From Economic Performance

  • Capital Controls: aimed at containing volatile shifts in the

demand for local currency and mitigating risks

– However, capital controls create distortions, lead to instability. – IMF now suggests it, calling it “capital flow management”

  • Currency Intervention: countries try to prevent unwanted

changes in exchange rates--an alternative or supplement to deviations of interest rates from normal policy.

  • Macro-Prudential Policies: another consequence of policy

deviations from abroad.

– To be sure, a regulatory regime aimed at containing risk taking is entirely appropriate, but that entails getting the levels right, not manipulating them as a substitute for overall monetary policy.

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Empirical Evidence on Global Effects

  • econometric models of spillover effects of policy

deviations

  • regressions showing policy contagion and the

multiplier effects of such contagion

  • the spread of unconventional monetary policy as

weapons in currency wars

  • the impact of policy deviations on other policies

that detract from economic performance

  • direct evidence that global economic instability

has increased.

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Emerging market capital flows, weekly, Jan 2001–Sept 2015

Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research, Bank of Mexico

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Standard deviation in post Plaza-Louvre period is 5.7 % and increases to 8.2 % in recent years.

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Calls for a New Approach

With “memories of a more orderly, rule- based world” Paul Volcker (June, 2014) asks: “What is the approach (or presumably combination of approaches) that can better reconcile reasonably free and open markets with independent national policies, maintaining in the process the stability in markets and economies that is in the common interest?”

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Proposal

  • Each country reports and commits to its monetary

strategy and thus helps build the foundation of the international monetary system

– Analogies with other agreements: 1945, 1973, 1985 – Avoid encroaching on other countries monetary rules – Emerging market countries are all in. – The IMF or BIS could help monitor.

  • Barriers to implementing may be low.

– Major central banks have goals and discuss policy rules – Wide-spread view that international reform is needed

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No threat to national/international central bank independence

  • Job of each central bank is to formulate and

describe its strategy.

  • Parties to the agreement would not have a say

in strategies of other banks

  • Strategies could be changed if the world

changed or in an emergency

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Key Feature

  • Each country would

– choose its own independent monetary strategy, – avoid interfering with the principles of free and

  • pen markets, and

– contribute to the common good of global stability and growth.

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References

  • Taylor (2016a) “The Federal Reserve in a Globalized

World Economy,” in The Federal Reserve’s Role in the Global Economy, M. Bordo and M. Wynne (Eds.)

  • Taylor (2016b), “A Rules-Based International Monetary

System for the Future,” International Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Plaza Accord after Thirty Years, C. F. Bergsten and R. Green (Eds.)

  • Awarded 2016 Economics in Central Banking Award
  • Taylor (2016c), “Rethinking the International Monetary

System,” The Cato Journal

  • Taylor, (1985), “International Coordination in the

Design of Macroeconomic Policy Rules,” European Economic Review

  • Carlozzi and Taylor (1985), “International Capital

Mobility and the Coordination of Monetary Rules” in Exchange Rate Management Under Uncertainty, J. Bhandhari (Ed.)