An Empirical Study of Borda Manipulation Jessica Davies, Univ. of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

an empirical study of borda manipulation
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

An Empirical Study of Borda Manipulation Jessica Davies, Univ. of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

An Empirical Study of Borda Manipulation Jessica Davies, Univ. of Toronto George Katsirelos, Univ. Lille-Nord Nina Narodytska, UNSW & NICTA Toby Walsh, UNSW & NICTA Motivation One of the last open questions in manipulation


slide-1
SLIDE 1

An Empirical Study of Borda Manipulation

Jessica Davies, Univ. of Toronto George Katsirelos, Univ. Lille-Nord Nina Narodytska, UNSW & NICTA Toby Walsh, UNSW & NICTA

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Motivation

  • One of the “last” open questions in

manipulation

– What is the computational complexity of manipulating Borda?

  • Computational social choice can borrow

heuristics from scheduling

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Borda

  • Score based voting

rule

– ith candidate gets score m-i

  • Due to Llull (13thC),

Jean Charles de Borda (1770), ..

  • Used in anger

– Eurovision, Robocup, MVP in baseball, several

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Borda

  • Score based voting rule

– ith candidate gets score m-i

  • Due to Llull (13thC), Jean

Charles de Borda (1770), ..

  • Used in anger

– Eurovision, Robocup, MVP in baseball, several Pacific Islands, ...

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Borda

  • Score based voting rule

– ith candidate gets score m-i

  • Due to Llull (13thC), Jean

Charles de Borda (1770), ..

  • Used in anger

– Eurovision, Robocup, MVP in baseball, several Pacific Islands, ...

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Manipulating Borda

  • [Xia, Conitzer, Procaccia EC 2010]

“The exact complexity of the problem [coalition manipulation with unweighted votes] is now known with respect to almost all of the prominent voting rules, with the glaring exception of Borda”

  • Some evidence to suggest it may be

suspectible

– Theoretical, empirical, historical

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Manipulating Borda

  • Theoretical

– Problem has an FPTAS, greedy heuristic needs at most one extra manipulator

  • Empirical

– Strategic voting was seen in 1991 presidential candidate elections for the Republic of Kiribati

  • Historical

– Borda appears to have recognized its manipulabilty: “My scheme is intended only for honest men”

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Manipulating Borda

  • Recast as bin packing

– Bins=candidates – Weights=scores – Put max. score in bin you want to win,

  • ther bins need to

be no bigger – Each bin contains same number of items

A B C D

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Manipulating Borda

  • Recast as bin packing

– Bins=candidates – Weights=scores – Put max. score in bin you want to win,

  • ther bins need to

be no bigger – Each bin contains same number of items

A B C D

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Manipulating Borda

  • Recast as bin packing

– Bins=candidates – Weights=scores – Put max. score in bin you want to win,

  • ther bins need to

be no bigger – Each bin contains same number of items

A B C D

slide-11
SLIDE 11

“Layer” constraints irrelevant!

  • Thm: if there exists a bin packing

containing k copies of 0,..,m-1 then there exists a bin packing in which each layer contains 0,..,m-1

– Proof: Complex induction on number of rows (=manipulators). Calls upon Hall's matching theorem

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Borda manipulation=bin packing

  • Compute manipulation with bin packing

heuristics

– Constraint that bins contains equal number

  • f items makes it equivalent to

multiprocessor scheduling with unit execution time and varying memory footprint

t=2 t=3 t=4 t=1 memory time

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Existing GREEDY heuristic

  • [Zuckerman, Procaccia & Rosenschein

SODA 2008]

– Manipulators fill bins in turn, putting largest weight in smallest bin – Uses at most one extra manipulator than

  • ptimum
slide-14
SLIDE 14

First new heuristic

We don't have to consider manipulators in turn (see previous theorem)

HEUR1 Order n(m-1) scores

m-1,m-1,..,m-1,m-2,m-2,..

Repeat

– Put largest score in bin with most space

Similar to [Krause et al, JACM 1975] for multiprocessor scheduling

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Theoretical properties

  • Good news

Thm: Infinite class of problems on which HEUR1 finds optimal 2-manipulation on which GREEDY finds 3-manipulation

  • Bad news

Thm: Infinite class of problems on which GREEDY finds optimal manipulation but HEUR1 requires O(n) extra manipulators

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Second new heuristic

We don't have to consider manipulators in turn but we should consider #items in each bin

HEUR2 Order n(m-1) scores

m-1,m-1,..,m-1,m-2,m-2,..

Repeat – Put largest (possible) score in bin where space available/items missing is largest

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Theoretical properties

  • Good news

Thm: Infinite class of problems on which HEUR2 finds optimal 2-manipulation

  • n which GREEDY finds 3-

manipulation

  • Bad news

Thm: Exist problems on which GREEDY finds optimal manipulation but HEUR2 does not

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Empirical performance

  • Same experimental setup as [Walsh,

ECAI 2010]

– Uniform random elections (IC) – Urn model (Poly-Eggenberger)

  • Found optimal manipulation as CSP

problem

– Remember: not known if this is NP-hard!

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Empirical performance

  • Success rate at finding optimal manipulation

– Random elections GREEDY: 75%, HEUR1: 83%, HEUR2: 99% HEUR2 never beaten by GREEDY – Urn elections GREEDY: 74%, HEUR1: 42%, HEUR2: 99.7% HEUR2 beaten in 1 out of >30,000 problems by GREEDY

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Conclusions

  • Borda appears easy to manipulate

– Simple greedy heuristics often find optimal manipulations – It pays not to construct manipulation voter by voter

  • Open questions

– What is the exact computational complexity of Borda manipulation? – Are these results useful for other scoring rules?