Reprinted with permission of The Marvland Bar Journal, published by the Maryland Bar Association
Do Your Best with "Best Efforts:" Using Open
Contract Terms
A
s the Court of Special Appeals recently noted in 8621 Limited Partnership v. LDG, Inc., 169 Md. App. 214, 228 (20061, there is a class of "open" con- tract terms that leave much in the way of interpretation before those terms can be applied. Such terms are used or implied where one party promises to try to achieve a certain result but will not or cannot guaran- tee success, or where the steps need- ed to obtain the result cannot be detailed precisely in advance. Promises to use "best efforts" or to make "reasonable efforts" to accom- plish a stated gda~ are common examples of such an open contract
- term. Because these terms have no
precise definition, however, an unwitting party may bind itself to more work than it planned, or could pay for less "effort" from the other party than it expected. The result, for the unwary, may be a trial before a judge or jury over the meaning of an amorphous contract provision, with any ambiguities only com- pounded where the contract's sub- ject matter is particularly specialized
- r technical.
This article briefly discusses the Maryland courts' efforts to apply such contract provisions, and sets out some considerations that might reduce such uncertainty when an open contract term is necessary or useful. Giving Content To "Best" or "Reasonable" Efforts. Maryland courts have encountered express contractual terms such as "best efforts" or "reasonable efforts" in a number of contexts. In the earliest, Ralph Cover v. Iohn C. Taliaferro, 142
- Md. 586 (1923), a business promoter
promised to use "reasonable efforts" to obtain investors in a new compa- ny to sell improved canning machin- ery. More recently, Schackow v. Medical-Legal Consulting Serv., Inc., 46
- Md. App. 179 (1980), considered
whether a consulting service had used "best efforts" in assisting an attorney to prepare a medical mal- practice case. In G. Heileman Brewing
- Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746
(1987), a distributor promised to use its best efforts to comply with mar- keting plans to distribute beer. Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals applied a "best efforts" clause in First Union Nat'l Bank v. Steele Software Sys., Inc., 154 Md.
- App. 97,175 (2003), in which a bank
promised to use its "best efforts" in referring business to a company pro- viding loan settlement services. The Maryland courts have also found implied duties to use "reason- able efforts" in several circum-
- stances. The most common situation
is where performance of a contract is preconditioned upon one party's efforts to seek a government approval or obtain appropriate financing. See, e.g., Informed Physician Servs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., 350 Md. 308, 332-33 (1998). A homeowner, for example, may be required to use "reasonable efforts" to obtain a loan, if the contract is conditioned upon
- btaining financing, or a seller may
be required to use reasonable efforts . to seek a zoning change if that is required before a sale may close. In terms of content, the Maryland courts have found that a promise to exercise best or reasonable efforts, whether express or implied, contains two separate requirements of "good faith" and "reasonable diligence" in pursuing the stated goal. These two aspects were developed by drawing analogies to the law of negligence. See 8621 Limited Partnership v. LDG, Inc., supra. This formulation, howev- er, may not get one very far. A lack
- f good faith is a subjective issue that
can be very difficult to prove, and substituting "reasonable diligence" for "reasonable effort" does not bring one any closer to determining either the quality or quantity of effort necessary to be "reasonable."
March 2007 MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL
49