2020 Vision For Web Privacy Eric Chan-Tin Assistant Professor - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

2020 vision for web privacy
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2020 Vision For Web Privacy Eric Chan-Tin Assistant Professor - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

2020 Vision For Web Privacy Eric Chan-Tin Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science Loyola University Chicago SNTA20 Keynote What does Privacy mean to you? What does Privacy mean to you? Personal What you buy What you


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2020 Vision For Web Privacy

Eric Chan-Tin Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science Loyola University Chicago SNTA’20 Keynote

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What does Privacy mean to you?

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What does Privacy mean to you?

  • Personal

– What you buy – What you do – Where you work/live – Name, social security

number, phone number, DoB

– Who you talk to

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What does Privacy mean to you?

  • Personal

– What you buy – What you do – Where you work/live – Name, social security

number, phone number, DoB

– Who you talk to

  • Web

– What you buy – What you do – Where you are – Computer and browser

information

– Who you communicate with

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Privacy in Hindsight

  • Webcam/Babycam hack stories
  • Target predicting girl was pregnant (2012)
  • OPM, Equifax, Target, Marriott, etc.
  • Advertisement
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Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

  • Name
  • Address
  • Zip code
  • Gender
  • Race
  • Date of birth
  • Web cookie
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What is Privacy?

  • Not necessarily just your name
  • Can infer type of person you are based on what

you do

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What is Privacy?

  • Not necessarily just your name
  • Can infer type of person you are based on what

you do

  • Can link what you do

– E.g. works at a university and likes sports

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Web Privacy

Pictures from ACLU.org and thejournal.com

ADVERTISEMENT

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Why?

  • Over $100 billion in 2018 [CNBC]
  • Censorship
  • Collect data for use in the future
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So what? Is that a bad thing?

  • I got nothing to hide
  • I trust the government
  • It’s “just” advertisements
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So what? Is that a bad thing?

  • I have got nothing to hide
  • I trust the government
  • It’s “just” advertisements
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How to?

  • IP address
  • Web cookie
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How to?

  • IP address
  • Web cookie
  • DHCP or change

location

  • Delete cookies
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How to?

  • IP address
  • Web cookie
  • Evercookie

– Restores cookie using

flash storage, local storage, session storage, etc.

  • DHCP or change

location

  • Delete cookies
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Changing this information (e.g. useragent) could make you more unique

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  • K. Mowery and H. Shacham. Pixel Perfect: Fingerprinting Canvas in HTML5. IEEE W2SP 2012.
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Tracking using Latency

  • Javascript code on attacker.com (maybe served as an ad to victim.com)
  • Timing attack to see if user visited example.org and is logged into

example.org

– In cache or not

  • T. Van Goethem, W. Joosen, and N. Nikiforakis. The Clock is Still Ticking: Timing Attacks in the Modern Web. ACM CCS 2015
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Others

  • List of webbrowser extensions makes you unique

(Xhound)

  • Accessibility features
  • Mobile tracking
  • Cross-device tracking
  • ...
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What can you do?

  • Do Not Track
  • Install tracking-blocker tools
  • Use a private browser
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  • A. Vastel, P. Laperdrix, W. Rudametkin, and R. Rouvoy. FP-scanner: the privacy implications of browser fingerprint inconsistencies. USENIX Security 2018.
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“Legitimate” Uses

  • Banks to detect fraudulent logins
  • Games to detect cheaters
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How Prevalent?

  • Long tail
  • Becoming more common in most popular

websites

  • Some sites use different tracking tools
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Browser Fingerprinting

  • Here to stay
  • You SHOULD be concerned about your privacy
  • What if the tracking dataset gets leaked?
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Network Traffic Analysis

  • Assume that all communications are encrypted
  • Assume that the eavesdropper is not the server

nor the client

  • What do you see?
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Metadata

  • Number of messages
  • Size of each message
  • Direction of the message
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  • J. Yu and E. Chan-Tin. Identifying Webbrowsers in Encrypted Communications. ACM WPES 2014.
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Website Fingerprinting

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Closed World

  • 90+% accuracy
  • Predicting the correct website out of possible

1,000 websites

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Open World

  • 90+% accuracy
  • High TPR, low FPR
  • ~100 “monitored, sensitive” websites

– E.g. facebook, wikipedia, attacker.com, etc

  • ~1 million unmonitored websites
  • Predicting whether network traffic is part of the monitored list or not

– Binary classification

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Future Privacy Impacts

  • Track any citizen
  • Predict who you are

– Eliminate password authentication

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New Privacy laws

  • GDPR (May 2018)
  • California Consumer Privacy Act (Jan. 2020)
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Societal/Human Impacts

  • Find and track bad

actors

  • Fraud prevention
  • Domestic partner

surveillance

  • Political/Religious/

Ethnic/Personal surveillance

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Picture from CNN.com

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Arms Race

  • Prevention vs Detection
  • Tradeoff between privacy and “security”/“safety”
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Are you sure you have nothing to hide?

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Are you sure you have nothing to hide?

  • Make your choice of tech
  • Regulations
  • Be careful what you “wish for”
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Collaborators

  • Yanmin Gong
  • Jinoh Kim
  • Shelia Kennison
  • Jiangmin Yu
  • Tao Chen
  • Weiqi Cui
  • Anthony Sierra
  • Christian Fields
  • Julianna Chen
  • Spencer Johnston
  • John Mikos
  • Daisy Reyes
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Acknowledgments

  • This material is based upon work supported by the

NSF under Grant No. IIS-1659645 and DGE- 1919004

  • Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or

recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation

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Thank You!

chantin@cs.luc.edu Post on the Slack channel