10 th National Investigations Symposium Stream D: Risks for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

10th National Investigations Symposium

Stream D: Risks for Investigation Agencies

Blind spots: Investigating so as to detect infiltration

Dr Russell G Smith Principal Criminologist

Outline

Acknowledgments

• Based on AIC Trends and

Issues papers 444 & 473

The argument

• An emerging corruption risk entails organised crime groups seeking to

recruit new members from amongst the law-abiding community

• If investigators can identify recruitment activities early, the resulting

corrupt conduct and associated harms may be minimised

Presentation outline

• Recruitment pathways – for recruiters and recruitees
• Identifying suitable targets for recruitment
• Cornish’s ‘crime scripts’ analysis of how recruitment occurs
• The methods of recruitment
• Intervening in recruitment pathways to prevent corruption

Recruitment pathways

Recruitment strategies

• Identification of suitable targets (recruiters and recruitees)
• Engagement with individuals who can be trusted
• Successful selection of skilled and cooperative individuals

Recruitment pathways

Recruitment strategies

• Identification of suitable targets (recruiters and recruitees)
• Engagement with individuals who can be trusted
• Successful selection of skilled and cooperative individuals

Recruiter pathways

• Organised crime groups seeking new workers for:

– skill-sets to assist with criminal activities (e.g. drugs, card fraud) – access to strategic law enforcement information – laundering the proceeds of crime – high risk activities involving weapons, explosives or likely arrest

Recruitment of drug couriers

Ron – Drugs Manager

“Ron was in his mid-fifties, and had been retired from his job in law enforcement for a decade when he first became involved in the drug

• trade. Ron managed an operation based upon couriers importing cocaine

into the UK from Granada, and his role was to recruit and manage the

• couriers. He frequented a local casino where he spotted potential couriers

from amongst the casino’s clientele, tending to target white, middle-aged men, low on money, and ‘who needed a holiday’. Ron made all the travel arrangements, purchased the airline tickets, provided the suitcase, and handed over the spending money. . . The couriers would have their holiday and return with an identical suitcase containing cocaine. On the successful arrival of a consignment into the UK, Ron would collect the case from the courier at the airport and hand the drugs over to his bosses, who would be waiting in a nearby carpark. The boss would pay Ron £12,000 in cash which was £7,000 for the courier (who had also had a two-week holiday) and £5,000 for Ron”.

Matrix Knowledge Group 2007, in Hobbs (2013: 242)

Recruitment pathways

Recruitment strategies

• Identification of suitable targets (recruiters and recruitees)
• Engagement with individuals who can be trusted
• Successful selection of skilled and cooperative individuals

Recruiter pathways

• Organised crime groups seeking new workers for:

– skill-sets to assist with criminal activities (e.g. drugs, card fraud) – access to strategic law enforcement information – laundering the proceeds of crime – high risk activities involving weapons, explosives or likely arrest

Recruitee pathways

• Non-criminals seeking participation in organised crime due to:

– need for funds to satisfy debts or lifestyle expenditure – desire to enhance financial or social standing – interest in risk-taking activities, or with pathological motivations

Recruitment pathways of recruitees

Billy – Car dealer – turned drug boss

“Billy was a successful car dealer and nightclub owner, and had also made money from an expanding property portfolio before he was introduced to a group of drug importers who were contemplating how to invest their profits. Attracted by the prospect of easy money, Billy fed these profits through his car dealership, and progressed to become a ‘middle man’, seeking out buyers for importers. Eventually, he ran the enterprise, becoming embroiled with the day-to-day workings of a large

• peration consisting of storers, mixers, testers, and legitimate

professionals, many of whom were paid a salary. Billy also courted the friendship of police officers who, in exchange for free drinks, would provide him with information and carry out background checks on business associates and employees”.

Matrix Knowledge Group 2007, in Hobbs (2013: 241)

Identifying suitable targets for recruitment

Recruiters – Identifying interested individuals

• Potential criminals (e.g. skilled; ex-military; drug mules & youth)
• Legitimate workforce (e.g. lawyers, accountants, IT security workers)
• Criminal justice system (e.g. prisoners, other recidivist offenders)
• Public sector employees (e.g. police, customs, intel, prison officers)

Recruitment of an intelligence operative

New South Wales Crime Commission drug crime handler

• Former Assistant Director Investigations at the NSW Crime Commission
• Had debts incurred from a mortgage, wife’s addiction & lifestyle costs

Informant

• International drug trafficker connected to a Dutch illicit drug syndicate
• Established a relationship with handler to obtain official intelligence on the

importation of 300kg pseudoephedrine concealed in a container of rice

NSWCC covert investigation

• Informant gave evidence of the handler providing law enforcement intelligence
• n the interception by Customs of the drugs shipment
• Search of the handler’s computer revealed confidential police intelligence

Criminal proceedings

• Sentenced: 22 years’ imprisonment, 16 years non-parole in December 2011 for

conspiracy in connection with the supply of controlled drugs Source: [2011] NSW Supreme Court 1422

Identifying suitable targets for recruitment

Recruiters – Identifying interested individuals

• Potential criminals (e.g. skilled; ex-military; drug mules & youth)
• Legitimate workforce (e.g. lawyers, accountants, IT security workers)
• Criminal justice system (e.g. prisoners, other recidivist offenders)
• Public sector employees (e.g. police, customs, intel, prison officers)

Recruitees – Identifying criminal organisations

• Traditional organised crime groups (e.g. Yakuza – tattoos)
• Groups with common meeting places (e.g. CEM – online clubs)
• Groups with public persona (e.g. OMCGs – motor cycles, club colours)

Identifying suitable targets for recruitment

Recruiters – Identifying interested individuals

• Potential criminals (e.g. skilled; ex-military; drug mules & youth)
• Legitimate workforce (e.g. lawyers, accountants, IT security workers)
• Criminal justice system (e.g. prisoners, other recidivist offenders)
• Public sector employees (e.g. police, customs, intel, prison officers)

Recruitees – Identifying criminal organisations

• Traditional organised crime groups (e.g. Yakuza – tattoos)
• Groups with common meeting places (e.g. CEM – online clubs)
• Groups with public persona (e.g. OMCGs – motor cycles, club colours)

Accidental and serendipitous recruitment

• Common meeting places – pubs, casinos, gyms, brothels, Internet sites
• Familial contacts – family members of criminals or seeking involvement
• Media publicity and social networking – information on individuals who

show a willingness to become involved in illegality

• Opportunistic discovery of potential criminal connections

Recruitment of a police intelligence analyst

Police intelligence analyst

• NSW Police civilian General Support Intelligence Analyst
• Had electronic access to confidential police intelligence reports

Criminal confederates

• Police Analyst’s cousin had OMCG associations
• Drug dealer, his brother and Police Analyst’s cousin in contact

Sting operation

• Release of information from 3 Police Reports detected by covert internal

police surveillance, IT audit and phone call logging

• Search of Analyst’s computer revealed confidential police intelligence

Criminal proceedings

• Charges: 3 counts unlawfully disclosing and releasing information
• Sentence: 14 months’ imprisonment, 7 months non-parole

Source: AAP 20 December 2010

The crime scripts of recruitment

Initial identification

• Signs of criminality (e.g. tattoos, criminal record, behavioural patterns)
• Visibility of skill sets (e.g. lawyers, public servants, IT workers, drivers)

Establishing trust

• Initiation tasks (e.g. sample criminality, violence, CEM libraries)
• Verification over time (e.g. absence of risk; proof of veracity & loyalty)
• Successful operations (e.g. demonstrated skill, or prison time)

Compliance and reinforcement

• Proof of commitment to cause – investment in criminal organisations
• Recruiting others – proof of willingness to use recruitment pathways
• Escalation of criminality – increasing seriousness of involvement

Failed recruitment

• Detection of non-compliance – breaching rules, whistleblowing
• Sanctioning – imposition of sanctions; threat of expulsion
• Removal – exclusion, dobbing-in, assault, murder

Script function Script action NSW Crime Commission case

Preparation (establishing network of contacts and background information)

• Acquire required IT

equipment

• Find possible human

information sources who could be corrupted

• Develop means of

influence over these potential sources

• Access to computers and internet
• Forming friendship with the police investigator by
• btaining financial records and medical records via

phone and laptop

• Online searches of directories and social media sites

to obtain information about his wife, family members and friends

• Gaining physical access to the police investigator

Pre-conditions (preparatory acts)

• Obtain target names
• Locate public sector employees’ names
• Identify informant’s handlers in Crime Commission

Instrumental conditions (agreeing on initial acts to commence activity)

• Select target
• The police investigator—on the basis of the

established relationship with the target and desirability

• f his senior position
• The police investigator also had financial difficulties

and family troubles creating motivations for corruption Instrumental initiation (essential preliminary research needed to execute activity)

• Research background of

target for information on how to coerce or induce acts of corruption

• Searching online resources and media reports to
• btain home address and family members’ names
• Using relationship and proximity to the police

investigator to access personal information via phone, laptop and other ICT

Adapted from: Derek Cornish (1994)

Crime scripts analysis-1

Script function Script action NSW Crime Commission case

Instrumental actualisation (first steps taken to commence criminality)

• Contact target
• Police investigator was the handler of the informant

after an arrest and had interaction with the corruptor

• n a personal level therefore had the ability to contact

him easily Doing (undertaking principal criminal acts)

• Using obtained

information for coercion

• r inducement of target
• Proposal made to the police investigator to import

pseudoephedrine to assist with his financial troubles

• Provide the police investigator with information that

could initiate corrupt behaviour Post condition (procedures following commission of crime)

• Access information /

induce behaviour / utilise corrupt official

• The police investigator used his connections and

knowledge to assist in the importation of illegal substances by providing information on how to avoid detection and investigation by law enforcement Exit (finalisation of criminal activity)

• Completion of the

corrupt activity

• Ensuring that the corrupt conduct is not discovered

Adapted from: Derek Cornish (1994)

Crime scripts analysis-2

The methods of recruitment

Face-to-face contact

• Familial contacts (e.g. ethnic and family connections)
• Common locations (e.g. workplaces, pubs, clubs, prison)
• Use of non-verbal cues to facilitate identification (Diego Gambetta)

Online recruitment

• Social networking (e.g. location of corruptible public servants & CVs)
• Membership of underground groups (e.g. CEM Groups, Shadowcrew,

Carderplanet, DrinkOrDie, Rock-Phish, BotMaster, Mpack)

• Online advertising (e.g. work from home scams; card skimming)

Anonymity and security processes

• Use of aliases and false identities – cyberspace names; gang names
• Data security – encryption, steganography, biometrics, looping networks
• Identity verification procedures – on enrolment and ongoing monitoring
• Verification of commitment and trust over time

Intervening in recruitment pathways

Interrupting recruiter pathways

• Skills – regulation of skill-based sectors (e.g. banking, drivers, lawyers)
• Locations – monitoring high-risk locations (e.g. prisons, pubs, gyms)
• Detection – increasing the probability of detection and indictment

Interrupting recruitee pathways

• Motivations – attacking the motivations for involvement (e.g. red flags of

fraud; gambling debts; business failure; lifestyle attractions)

• Rationalisations – neutralising the rationalisations for involvement
• Risk-taking – monitoring online activities of potential recruitees

Addressing anonymity

• Using convicted offender databases to facilitate identification
• Data analysis of financial and cyber intelligence; location tracking

Changing perceptions about organised crime

• Making organised crime unattractive and unprofitable (confiscation of

assets, unexplained wealth, disruption to lifestyle, physical harms)

Russell.Smith@aic.gov.au