WIND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE Dave Belote, Col (ret), USAF Managing Partner & CEO DARE Strategies LLC
Bona Fides • 32 AOS/CC, Ramstein AB GE, 2001-03 • 32 EASOS/CC, Tel Aviv, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM • 3 ASOG/CC, Fort Hood TX, 2004-06 • 3 EASOG/CC, Camp Victory, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM • Chief, Combating WMD, Joint Staff J-5, 2006-08 • 99 ABW/CC, Nellis AFB NV, 2008-10 • Executive Director, DoD Siting Clearinghouse, 2010-12 • VP for Federal Business, Apex Clean Energy, 2012-14 • SVP, Cassidy & Associates, 2014-17 • CEO, DARE Strategies LLC, 2017-
History • Nevada Test and Training Range, 2008-9 • Solved with MIT/Lincoln Laboratory • ARSR at Fossil OR, 2010 • Solved with MIT/Lincoln Laboratory • 2011 NDAA: Created DoD Siting Clearinghouse • Tied to FAA OEAAA • Done with industry input • Designed three-way process to determine impact on test, training, radar • 32 CFR Part 211 – implemented law while protecting those capabilities
Heard in 2017 … • “The Clearinghouse doesn’t really do due diligence.” (Raleigh, NC) • “Senior Air Force personnel have told us the Clearinghouse can’t object to anything – it has no teeth.” (Oklahoma City, OK) • “The Clearinghouse can only act in situations of overarching national security – it can’t protect an individual base/range/route.” (Austin, TX)
NDAA vs. 32 CFR Part 211 • NDAA: “unacceptable risk to national security” • 32 CFR 211.3: Unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. The construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, or the proposed construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, of a structure or sanitary landfill that would: (1) Endanger safety in air commerce, related to the activities of the DoD. (2) Interfere with the efficient use and preservation of the navigable airspace and of airport traffic capacity at public-use airports, related to the activities of the DoD. (3) Significantly impair or degrade the capability of the DoD to conduct training, research, development, testing, and evaluation, and operations or to maintain military readiness. Adverse impact on military operations and readiness. Any adverse impact upon military operations and readiness, including flight operations research, development, testing, and evaluation and training, that is demonstrable and is likely to impair or degrade the ability of the armed forces to perform their warfighting missions.
32 CFR 211.6(a) - Formal Review (3) Not later than 50 days after receiving the request from the requester, the Clearinghouse shall evaluate all comments and recommendations received and take one of three actions: (i) Determine that the project will not have an adverse impact on military operations and readiness, in which case … (ii) Determine that the project will have an adverse impact on military operations and readiness but that the adverse impact involved is sufficiently attenuated that it does not require mitigation. … (iii) Determine that the proposed project may have an adverse impact on military operations and readiness. When the Clearinghouse makes such a determination it shall immediately – (A) Notify the applicant of the determination of the Clearinghouse and offer to discuss mitigation with the applicant to reduce the adverse impact; (B) Designate one or more DoD Components to engage in discussions with the applicant to attempt to mitigate the adverse impact;
Discussion w/Industry: batting 1.000 • Number of MOAs signed: 12 published, at least 7 proprietary • Mitigation strategies/techniques: • RAG mapping • Fusion • Infill radar • Moving/deleting turbines • Undergrounding HVDC powerlines • Number of failed mitigation negotiations: 1 • Number of projects built despite an “adverse impact” finding: 0
Way Forward • Continued collaboration • Upgrade radars, preserve maneuver space in MTRs and ranges • Honor property rights • Ensure realistic training, not pristine airspace • Federal legislation: HASC, SASC conference • State legislation: build on existing foundation of trust
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