trust but verify
play

Trust but verify Distinguishing distrust from vigilance via Mark L - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Trust but verify Distinguishing distrust from vigilance via Mark L oczy Livia.Markoczy@ucr.edu The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management University of California, Riverside Trust but verify p.1/31 The problem Trust but


  1. Trust but verify Distinguishing distrust from vigilance ıvia Mark´ L´ oczy Livia.Markoczy@ucr.edu The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management University of California, Riverside Trust but verify – p.1/31

  2. The problem Trust but verify – p.2/31

  3. Too trusting? Trust is important for constructive social relationships Problem with trustfulness: there is evidence that trustfulness entails gullibility Trust but verify – p.3/31

  4. The trustful are naïve Garske 1975 Distrustful show higher cognitive complexity Schlenker et al. 1973 Trusters exhibit unwarranted gullibility Gurtman & Lion 1975 Trusters demonstrably gullible. Trust but verify – p.4/31

  5. The distrustful are indiscriminate Good news: there is also evidence that trustfulness entails vigilance Yamagishi 2001 Trusters are more discriminating Yamagishi et al. 1999 Trusters are better at judging trustworthiness. Furthermore, there is also evidence that trustfulness and vigilance are independent constructs Rotter 1980 Trustful individuals are no more gullible than non-trustful individuals are Trust but verify – p.5/31

  6. Toward a synthesis Trust but verify – p.6/31

  7. Defining some terms Trustfulness or trusting Propensity to trust others in general Trust ( n ) Tendency to believe the communication of others when there are no obvious reason to be suspicious Vigilance Attention and sensitiveness to information that reveals potential opportunism Trust but verify – p.7/31

  8. Goal of study (apart from tenure) Show that the distinction I assert exists and matters: H1 The trustful vary in their vigilance H2 Prudent trusters are more accurate in their expectations of others’ behavior than naive trusters or low trusters. Trust but verify – p.8/31

  9. The 2 × 2 grid Trustful Distrustful High vigilance prudent ordinary trusters distrusters Low vigilance naive passive- trusters distrusters Trust but verify – p.9/31

  10. The Study Trust but verify – p.10/31

  11. Data Hypotheses were tested in the context of a large scale social dilemma: the California Energy crises of 2001. Trustfulness, vigilance and expectations were measured by a survey Accuracy of expectations of others’ behavior was measured through accuracy of comparing one’s own electricity conservation effort to that of others. Trust but verify – p.11/31

  12. California electricity crises as a social dilemma Trust but verify – p.12/31

  13. Social dilemmas A social dilemma (AKA n -person prisoner’s dilemma ) is a situation in which each individual has an opportunity to cooperate or defect . An individual’s outcome is Best if everyone else cooperates while they defect Worst if everyone else defects while they cooperate Better off if everyone cooperates than when everyone defects. Trust but verify – p.13/31

  14. When supply doesn’t meet demand The price paid by end users for electricity was capped. Thus it was possible for supply and demand to not meet. This mismatch resulted in shortages implemented through rolling black-outs and requests made for people to conserve. Because there was a need to conserve, and the price paid by end users was artificially low we had a social dilemma. Trust but verify – p.14/31

  15. Non price sensitive conservation Some more reasons to believe that some conservation was not merely due to price. 1 Usage reduction occurred also where no price increase 2 Peak-time usage reduced more than overall usage although price is (mostly) not peak/off-peak sensitive. 3 Individuals expressed concern about rolling blackouts as well as price Trust but verify – p.15/31

  16. Measure for Measure Trust but verify – p.16/31

  17. Trustfulness items Trustfulness items from Yamagishi (1992), following Rotter (1967): 1. Most people tell a lie when they can benefit by doing so; 2. When someone says something complimentary about you it’s because they want to get something from you; 3. People take advantage of you when you work with them; and 4. Given the opportunity, people are dishonest. Trust but verify – p.17/31

  18. Vigilance items Vigilance items from Yamagishi (1992), based on Rotter (1967) 1. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they provided evidence that they are trustworthy 2. In these competitive times, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you; 3. Society will fall apart if the police power that fights criminal activities weakens; and 4. One should be careful to trust others until one knows them well. Trust but verify – p.18/31

  19. Accuracy of expectations Subjects asked if they thought they conserved much more, more, about the same, less or much less than their fellow Californians. Accuracy was measured by how well that matched actual electricity conservation. The accuracy of individuals’ estimates of their own electricity conservation effort was also measured. Trust but verify – p.19/31

  20. Results Trust but verify – p.20/31

  21. Two by Two (minus 1) High trust Low trust High pru. prudent trusters ordinary distrusters N = 210 , 30% N = 336 , 48% Low pru. naive trusters passive low-trusters N = 133 , 19% N = 21 , 3% Trust but verify – p.21/31

  22. Cross-correlation table alt-acc ego-acc Trustful ¯ x σ Acc-others 2 . 77 1 . 45 Acc-self 3 . 00 1 . 33 . 20 ∗∗∗ Trustful 3 . 86 . 96 . 17 ∗∗∗ . 17 ∗∗∗ Vigilance 1 . 30 1 . 04 . 18 ∗∗∗ . 21 ∗∗∗ − . 18 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ p < . 001 Trust but verify – p.22/31

  23. Accuracy of others (Dunnett T3) ¯ ¯ I − ¯ ¯ Group I Group J std err I J J Prudent Naive 3 . 13 2 . 69 . 44 ∗ . 16 Prudent Distrust 3 . 13 2 . 68 . 45 ∗ . 16 Naive Distrust 2 . 69 2 . 68 − . 01 . 18 ∗ p < . 05 Trust but verify – p.23/31

  24. Accuracy of self (Dunnet T3) ¯ ¯ I − ¯ ¯ Group I Group J std err I J J Prudent Naive 3 . 33 3 . 10 . 23 . 11 Prudent Low-trust 3 . 33 3 . 11 . 22 . 14 Naive Low-trust 3 . 10 3 . 11 − . 01 . 12 ∗ p < . 05 Trust but verify – p.24/31

  25. Prudent Trust and Accuracy 0.45 0.40 Prudent trust 0.35 0.30 0.25 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Accuracy Trust but verify – p.25/31

  26. Naïve Trust and Accuracy 0.22 0.21 Naive trust 0.20 0.19 0.18 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Accuracy Trust but verify – p.26/31

  27. Low Trust and Accuracy 0.21 0.20 Low trust 0.19 0.18 0.17 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Accuracy Trust but verify – p.27/31

  28. Conclusions, musings, etc Trust but verify – p.28/31

  29. Two trustings! Hypotheses have been supported: H1 Trusting individuals vary in their vigilance H2 Prudent trustfulness is positively related to accuracy of expectations for others Trust but verify – p.29/31

  30. Is this “Social Intelligence”? The ability to for accurate expectations of others is a form of social intelligence. There are many definitions available for social intelligence, but all of them entail that those with high social intelligence will be better at predicting the social behavior of others better than those with low social intelligence. Trust but verify – p.30/31

  31. Resources A (relatively) up-to-date version of the full paper as well as these slides (PDF) can be found at www.goldmark.org/livia/papers/socint/ Trust but verify – p.31/31

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend