The Global State of Economic Research on Tobacco Taxation Jeffrey - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

the global state of economic research on tobacco taxation
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The Global State of Economic Research on Tobacco Taxation Jeffrey - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Global State of Economic Research on Tobacco Taxation Jeffrey Drope, Vice President, Economic & Health Policy Research, American Cancer Society Michal Stoklosa, Senior Economist, Taxation & Health, American Cancer Society


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The Global State of Economic Research

  • n Tobacco Taxation

Jeffrey Drope, Vice President, Economic & Health Policy Research, American Cancer Society Michal Stoklosa, Senior Economist, Taxation & Health, American Cancer Society

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Cost-effectiveness of tobacco control policies:

Cost per healthy life-year gained, by country income group

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Consumo Precio Impuesto

Impuestos

Más efectivos cuando se implementan como parte de un programa para el control del tabaco integral

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Precio promedio de los cigarros en la Unión Europea,

euros por cajetilla, 2015

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Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea

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Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea

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Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea

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Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea

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Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea

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Precios y ventas de cigarros en Perú

* las ventas de cigarrillos para 2017 se pronostican. 2017 es el base para ajustados por inflación 20 40 60 80 100 120 2 4 6 8 10 12 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Cajetillas por año Soles por cajetilla Precios por cajetilla Marlboro ajustados por inflación Ventas de cigarros (cajetillas por persona, por año)

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Precios y ventas de cigarros en Perú

242 228 231 223 183 181 283 20 40 60 80 100 120 2 4 6 8 10 12 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Cajetillas por año Soles por cajetilla

Recaudación por el impuesto especial al tabaco ajustado según la inflación (millones de soles) Precios por cajetilla Marlboro ajustados por inflación Ventas de cigarros (cajetillas por persona, por año)

* las ventas de cigarrillos para 2017 se pronostican. 2017 es el base para ajustados por inflación

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Demand reduction by tax and price measures

Price elasticities of prevalence, initiation and cessation of tobacco use

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Price elasticity for tobacco products

  • The total price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Bangladesh is −0.49
  • Most of the price effect result in smoking cessation
  • The price elasticity of cigarette consumption is higher for people belonging to

lower socioeconomic status. Cigarette sales Cigarette prices

Source: Nargis, Nigar, et. al. “The Price Sensitivity of Cigarette Consumption in Bangladesh: Evidence from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Bangladesh Wave 1 (2009) and Wave 2 (2010) Surveys.” Tobacco Control 23, no. suppl 1 (March 1, 2014): i39–47.

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Cross-price elasticities across brands/products

  • In Zambia, a method involving a system of equations found substitution
  • f factory-made cigarettes for roll-your-own cigarettes in the event of

increase in factory-made cigarette prices.

Roll-your-own tobacco sales Cigarette prices

Source: Michal Stoklosa, Fastone Goma, Nigar Nargis, Jeffrey Drope, Grieve Chelwa, Zunda Chisha, Geoffrey T. Fong (in review) “Prices and tobacco product use in Zambia” Tobacco Control

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Scenario analysis and simulations

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Excise rate (KES/pack) Excise revenue (Billion KES) Excise revenue in current prices (billion KES) Revenue in 2015 prices (billion KES) Excise rate (KES/pack)

Source: Nargis N, Stoklosa M, Ikamari L, Ong`ang`o JR, Fong GT, Drope J, Kimosop V, Chaloupka FJ. Cigarette Taxation in Kenya at the Crossroads: Evidence and Policy Implications. (October 2015) University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

Simulated revenue growth from cigarette excise tax increases in Kenya, 2015-2025

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Supply reduction

Reliable measures to determine the magnitude of illicit trade

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El comercio ilícito de cigarros como argumento en contra de las políticas para el control del tabaco

Este incremento del impuesto es buena noticia para los criminales, que ya ven al Reino Unido como el paraíso de los contrabandistas y no se preocupan por la edad de sus consumidores ” —Japan Tobacco International, 2010

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El comercio ilícito de cigarros como argumento en contra de las políticas para el control del tabaco (cont.)

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 £0.00 £1.00 £2.00 £3.00 £4.00 £5.00 £6.00 £7.00 £8.00 £9.00 £10.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 billion cigarettes Price per pack (GBP) inflation-adjusted Illicit cigarette market

Cigarette prices vs. illicit market in the UK

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La industria tiende a exagerar la magnitud del comercio ilícito de tabaco

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Estimaciones de comercio ilícito de la industria vs. estimaciones de estudios académicos (comercio ilícito como porcentaje del consumo total)

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Las empresas tabacaleras se benefician del comercio ilícito de cigarros

2% 98% Composición del comercio ilícito global de acuerdo con Philip Morris International, 2013 Falsificación Otro comercio ilícito

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Desde el punto de vista de una compañía que operaba en el mercado, la producción de artículos adicionales significaba mayores ganancias”

— Dmytro Redko, Director de Asuntos Corporativos para JTI

Ucrania

Las empresas tabacaleras se benefician del comercio ilícito de cigarros – el caso de Ucrania (cont.)

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Reliable measures of illicit cigarette trade

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Consumo reportado en encuestas

Comercio ilícito estimado

Ventas con impuestos pagados

Comparando las ventas de tabaco con el consumo reportado – Análisis de diferencias

  • Los datos de encuestas proveen una estimación del consumo total en el

área que cubre la misma, mientras que las ventas proveen una estimación del consumo legal.

  • La diferencia entre estas dos medidas indica la extensión de la evasión y

la elusión fiscal.

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100 million

Consumo reportado en encuestas

Comercio ilícito estimado

Ventas al consumidor final

Comparando las ventas de tabaco con el consumo reportado – Análisis de diferencias (cont.)

  • Ejemplo:
  • Las encuestas reportan: prevalencia de fumadores de 20%, cada

fumadores con un consumo de 3,000 cigarros por año, en promedio.

  • En un país con 1 millón de personas, significa que hay 200,000

fumadores (1 millón x 20%) y que el consumo total reportado en la encuesta es de 600 millones (200,000 x 3,000).

  • Si las ventas fueron de 500 millones, entonces el mercado ilícito es

de 100 millones o 17%.

24 (500 millones) (600 millones)

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Revisión de cajetillas

  • Sellos fiscales
  • Advertencias sanitarias
  • Información de precios y/o contenidos faltante (si la ley lo requiere)
  • Marcas que señalan ventas libres de impuestos (duty-free)
  • Otras características

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Revisión de cajetillas (cont.)

Revisión de cajetillas Revisión de cajetillas desechadas Revisión de cajetillas de fumadores

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Our studies

Estudio en Varsovia Resultados

Tobacco industry study

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Estudio en Columbia Resultados

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Estudio en México

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Situation analysis and mapping

Economic costs of tobacco use

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Health is the obvious starting point for an enquiry into wellbeing. You need a life to have a good life...”

  • Angus Deaton, Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 2015
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Health improvements are DEVELOPMENT

Tobacco control interventions save money in the long term

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Saving on health expenditure Saving on tobacco expenditure

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Tobacco Control Leads to Social Gains

Social Costs of Smoking in France, 2010

Life lost Quality of life lost Lost productivity Healthcare costs Tax revenue

0 € 50 € 100 € 150 € 200 € 250 €

Losses Gains

Billions

Source: French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Le coût social des drogues en France, September 2015

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Global economic cost of smoking- attributable diseases

Cost of tobacco use Direct costs of illness: pubic and private health expenditures Indirect costs: Loss of productivity due to morbidity and mortality

PPP$ 499 billion globally in 2016 PPP$ 1520 billion globally in 2016

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Economic cost of smoking-attributable diseases in Peru

  • A study based on recent Peru-specific data

could produce updated estimates of smoking-attributable costs.

  • These estimates will almost certainly

demonstrate that the costs are increasing.

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Economic and other implications of tobacco control

Impact of tobacco use on poverty

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  • The poor pay a higher share of their income

in tax than the rich.

  • The tax burden is disproportionately larger

for the poor.

What is regressivity of tobacco tax?

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When tax is imposed on the goods that form a larger share of household expenditure for the poor than the rich, the tax becomes regressive.

2 4 6 8 10 12 Poor Middle Rich % of household expenditure Cigarette expenditure as % of total household expenditure Excise tax as % of total household expenditure

Source: Önder and Yurekli, 2014.

TURKEY

What is regressivity of tobacco tax?

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Are tobacco tax increases regressive?

  • Depends on how the poor and the rich will change

tobacco consumption in response to tax-induced price increase.

  • If poor are more price sensitive,
  • They reduce consumption more.
  • They make greater health benefits.
  • The tax burden is shifted to the rich.
  • Tobacco tax increase may not be regressive.
  • The results from studies from low- and middle-income

countries are mixed

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Are tobacco tax increases regressive?

  • Cigarette prices and smoking by income group in South Africa; 1993–2003

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Rand per pack (2000 ZAR) Smoking Prevalence (%) Low Income Middle Income High Income Price

Source: Van Walbeek CP. The Economics of Tobacco Control in South Africa. School of Economics, University of Cape Town; 2005.

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Why are the poor not always more price sensitive?

  • Downward substitution due to
  • Availability of cheaper brands of the same product
  • Availability of cheaper substitutes (e.g. smokeless

tobacco for smoked tobacco products)

  • Preferential tax treatment of cheaper products
  • Complex tiered tax structure imposing lower or no tax
  • n cheaper tobacco products
  • Does not necessarily alleviate regressivity, but

jeopardizes the marginal progressivity of tax increases

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Opportunity cost of continued tobacco use by the poor after tax increase

  • The poor can reallocate expenditures from basic necessities

to tobacco to maintain the consumption of tobacco

  • China: evidence of reduction in food and non-food items (Wang et

al, 2006)

  • Bangladesh: During 1992–1996, the average male smoker spent

more than twice as much on cigarettes as he spent on clothing, housing, health, and education combined (Efroymson et al, 2001)

  • Outcome: Reduction in quality of life and welfare of the

poor

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Conclusions and Policy Implications

  • The tax system needs to be uniform to minimize the

variability of price and the probability of downward substitution.

  • The burden of the additional revenue collected from tax

increases falls mostly on the rich.

  • Tobacco tax policy needs to be part of a comprehensive

tobacco control program.

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