SLIDE 1 The Global State of Economic Research
Jeffrey Drope, Vice President, Economic & Health Policy Research, American Cancer Society Michal Stoklosa, Senior Economist, Taxation & Health, American Cancer Society
SLIDE 2 Cost-effectiveness of tobacco control policies:
Cost per healthy life-year gained, by country income group
SLIDE 3
Consumo Precio Impuesto
Impuestos
Más efectivos cuando se implementan como parte de un programa para el control del tabaco integral
SLIDE 4
Precio promedio de los cigarros en la Unión Europea,
euros por cajetilla, 2015
SLIDE 5
Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea
SLIDE 6
Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea
SLIDE 7
Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea
SLIDE 8
Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea
SLIDE 9
Impuestos y consumo de cigarros en la Unión Europea
SLIDE 10 Precios y ventas de cigarros en Perú
* las ventas de cigarrillos para 2017 se pronostican. 2017 es el base para ajustados por inflación 20 40 60 80 100 120 2 4 6 8 10 12 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Cajetillas por año Soles por cajetilla Precios por cajetilla Marlboro ajustados por inflación Ventas de cigarros (cajetillas por persona, por año)
SLIDE 11 Precios y ventas de cigarros en Perú
242 228 231 223 183 181 283 20 40 60 80 100 120 2 4 6 8 10 12 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Cajetillas por año Soles por cajetilla
Recaudación por el impuesto especial al tabaco ajustado según la inflación (millones de soles) Precios por cajetilla Marlboro ajustados por inflación Ventas de cigarros (cajetillas por persona, por año)
* las ventas de cigarrillos para 2017 se pronostican. 2017 es el base para ajustados por inflación
SLIDE 12
Demand reduction by tax and price measures
Price elasticities of prevalence, initiation and cessation of tobacco use
SLIDE 13 Price elasticity for tobacco products
- The total price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Bangladesh is −0.49
- Most of the price effect result in smoking cessation
- The price elasticity of cigarette consumption is higher for people belonging to
lower socioeconomic status. Cigarette sales Cigarette prices
Source: Nargis, Nigar, et. al. “The Price Sensitivity of Cigarette Consumption in Bangladesh: Evidence from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Bangladesh Wave 1 (2009) and Wave 2 (2010) Surveys.” Tobacco Control 23, no. suppl 1 (March 1, 2014): i39–47.
SLIDE 14 Cross-price elasticities across brands/products
- In Zambia, a method involving a system of equations found substitution
- f factory-made cigarettes for roll-your-own cigarettes in the event of
increase in factory-made cigarette prices.
Roll-your-own tobacco sales Cigarette prices
Source: Michal Stoklosa, Fastone Goma, Nigar Nargis, Jeffrey Drope, Grieve Chelwa, Zunda Chisha, Geoffrey T. Fong (in review) “Prices and tobacco product use in Zambia” Tobacco Control
SLIDE 15 Scenario analysis and simulations
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Excise rate (KES/pack) Excise revenue (Billion KES) Excise revenue in current prices (billion KES) Revenue in 2015 prices (billion KES) Excise rate (KES/pack)
Source: Nargis N, Stoklosa M, Ikamari L, Ong`ang`o JR, Fong GT, Drope J, Kimosop V, Chaloupka FJ. Cigarette Taxation in Kenya at the Crossroads: Evidence and Policy Implications. (October 2015) University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
Simulated revenue growth from cigarette excise tax increases in Kenya, 2015-2025
SLIDE 16
Supply reduction
Reliable measures to determine the magnitude of illicit trade
SLIDE 17 17
El comercio ilícito de cigarros como argumento en contra de las políticas para el control del tabaco
Este incremento del impuesto es buena noticia para los criminales, que ya ven al Reino Unido como el paraíso de los contrabandistas y no se preocupan por la edad de sus consumidores ” —Japan Tobacco International, 2010
SLIDE 18 18
El comercio ilícito de cigarros como argumento en contra de las políticas para el control del tabaco (cont.)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 £0.00 £1.00 £2.00 £3.00 £4.00 £5.00 £6.00 £7.00 £8.00 £9.00 £10.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 billion cigarettes Price per pack (GBP) inflation-adjusted Illicit cigarette market
Cigarette prices vs. illicit market in the UK
SLIDE 19 La industria tiende a exagerar la magnitud del comercio ilícito de tabaco
19
Estimaciones de comercio ilícito de la industria vs. estimaciones de estudios académicos (comercio ilícito como porcentaje del consumo total)
SLIDE 20 20
Las empresas tabacaleras se benefician del comercio ilícito de cigarros
2% 98% Composición del comercio ilícito global de acuerdo con Philip Morris International, 2013 Falsificación Otro comercio ilícito
SLIDE 21 Desde el punto de vista de una compañía que operaba en el mercado, la producción de artículos adicionales significaba mayores ganancias”
— Dmytro Redko, Director de Asuntos Corporativos para JTI
Ucrania
Las empresas tabacaleras se benefician del comercio ilícito de cigarros – el caso de Ucrania (cont.)
SLIDE 22
Reliable measures of illicit cigarette trade
SLIDE 23 Consumo reportado en encuestas
Comercio ilícito estimado
Ventas con impuestos pagados
Comparando las ventas de tabaco con el consumo reportado – Análisis de diferencias
- Los datos de encuestas proveen una estimación del consumo total en el
área que cubre la misma, mientras que las ventas proveen una estimación del consumo legal.
- La diferencia entre estas dos medidas indica la extensión de la evasión y
la elusión fiscal.
23
SLIDE 24 100 million
Consumo reportado en encuestas
Comercio ilícito estimado
Ventas al consumidor final
Comparando las ventas de tabaco con el consumo reportado – Análisis de diferencias (cont.)
- Ejemplo:
- Las encuestas reportan: prevalencia de fumadores de 20%, cada
fumadores con un consumo de 3,000 cigarros por año, en promedio.
- En un país con 1 millón de personas, significa que hay 200,000
fumadores (1 millón x 20%) y que el consumo total reportado en la encuesta es de 600 millones (200,000 x 3,000).
- Si las ventas fueron de 500 millones, entonces el mercado ilícito es
de 100 millones o 17%.
24 (500 millones) (600 millones)
SLIDE 25 Revisión de cajetillas
- Sellos fiscales
- Advertencias sanitarias
- Información de precios y/o contenidos faltante (si la ley lo requiere)
- Marcas que señalan ventas libres de impuestos (duty-free)
- Otras características
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SLIDE 26
Revisión de cajetillas (cont.)
Revisión de cajetillas Revisión de cajetillas desechadas Revisión de cajetillas de fumadores
SLIDE 27 Our studies
Estudio en Varsovia Resultados
Tobacco industry study
SLIDE 28
Estudio en Columbia Resultados
SLIDE 29
Estudio en México
SLIDE 30
Situation analysis and mapping
Economic costs of tobacco use
SLIDE 31 Health is the obvious starting point for an enquiry into wellbeing. You need a life to have a good life...”
- Angus Deaton, Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 2015
SLIDE 32
Health improvements are DEVELOPMENT
Tobacco control interventions save money in the long term
SLIDE 33 Saving on health expenditure Saving on tobacco expenditure
SLIDE 34 Tobacco Control Leads to Social Gains
Social Costs of Smoking in France, 2010
Life lost Quality of life lost Lost productivity Healthcare costs Tax revenue
0 € 50 € 100 € 150 € 200 € 250 €
Losses Gains
Billions
Source: French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Le coût social des drogues en France, September 2015
SLIDE 35 Global economic cost of smoking- attributable diseases
Cost of tobacco use Direct costs of illness: pubic and private health expenditures Indirect costs: Loss of productivity due to morbidity and mortality
PPP$ 499 billion globally in 2016 PPP$ 1520 billion globally in 2016
SLIDE 36 Economic cost of smoking-attributable diseases in Peru
- A study based on recent Peru-specific data
could produce updated estimates of smoking-attributable costs.
- These estimates will almost certainly
demonstrate that the costs are increasing.
SLIDE 37
Economic and other implications of tobacco control
Impact of tobacco use on poverty
SLIDE 38
- The poor pay a higher share of their income
in tax than the rich.
- The tax burden is disproportionately larger
for the poor.
What is regressivity of tobacco tax?
SLIDE 39 When tax is imposed on the goods that form a larger share of household expenditure for the poor than the rich, the tax becomes regressive.
2 4 6 8 10 12 Poor Middle Rich % of household expenditure Cigarette expenditure as % of total household expenditure Excise tax as % of total household expenditure
Source: Önder and Yurekli, 2014.
TURKEY
What is regressivity of tobacco tax?
SLIDE 40 Are tobacco tax increases regressive?
- Depends on how the poor and the rich will change
tobacco consumption in response to tax-induced price increase.
- If poor are more price sensitive,
- They reduce consumption more.
- They make greater health benefits.
- The tax burden is shifted to the rich.
- Tobacco tax increase may not be regressive.
- The results from studies from low- and middle-income
countries are mixed
SLIDE 41 Are tobacco tax increases regressive?
- Cigarette prices and smoking by income group in South Africa; 1993–2003
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Rand per pack (2000 ZAR) Smoking Prevalence (%) Low Income Middle Income High Income Price
Source: Van Walbeek CP. The Economics of Tobacco Control in South Africa. School of Economics, University of Cape Town; 2005.
SLIDE 42 Why are the poor not always more price sensitive?
- Downward substitution due to
- Availability of cheaper brands of the same product
- Availability of cheaper substitutes (e.g. smokeless
tobacco for smoked tobacco products)
- Preferential tax treatment of cheaper products
- Complex tiered tax structure imposing lower or no tax
- n cheaper tobacco products
- Does not necessarily alleviate regressivity, but
jeopardizes the marginal progressivity of tax increases
SLIDE 43 Opportunity cost of continued tobacco use by the poor after tax increase
- The poor can reallocate expenditures from basic necessities
to tobacco to maintain the consumption of tobacco
- China: evidence of reduction in food and non-food items (Wang et
al, 2006)
- Bangladesh: During 1992–1996, the average male smoker spent
more than twice as much on cigarettes as he spent on clothing, housing, health, and education combined (Efroymson et al, 2001)
- Outcome: Reduction in quality of life and welfare of the
poor
SLIDE 44 Conclusions and Policy Implications
- The tax system needs to be uniform to minimize the
variability of price and the probability of downward substitution.
- The burden of the additional revenue collected from tax
increases falls mostly on the rich.
- Tobacco tax policy needs to be part of a comprehensive
tobacco control program.
SLIDE 45