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Oct 21, 2022 520 likes •1.24k views

Staying Secure and Unprepared: Understanding and Mitigating the Security Risks of Apple ZeroConf (Xiaolong Bai , Luyi Xing) (co-first authors), Nan Zhang , XiaoFeng Wang , Xiaojing Liao , Tongxin Li , Shi-Min Hu TNList, Tsinghua University,

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Staying Secure and Unprepared: Understanding and Mitigating the Security Risks

  • f Apple ZeroConf

(Xiaolong Bai, Luyi Xing) (co-first authors),

Nan Zhang , XiaoFeng Wang , Xiaojing Liao , Tongxin Li , Shi-Min Hu TNList, Tsinghua University,

Indiana University Bloomington Georgia Institute of Technology, Peking University

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Staying Secure and Unprepared: Understanding and Mitigating the Security Risks

  • f Apple ZeroConf

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Zero Configuration Networking (ZeroConf)

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ZeroConf

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  • Bonjour
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ZeroConf

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  • Bonjour protocol

– zero-configuration networking over IP that Apple has submitted to the IETF.

  • Goals:

– With little or no configuration – to add devices/services to a local network – Existing devices can automatically find and connect to those new devices/services

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Bonjour

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  • Administrators

– no need to assign IP, host names, service names to network services (e.g., printer)

  • When first use a service, users simply

– ask to see what network services are automatically available – and choose from the list.

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How about traditional configured network?

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Must Configure:

– IP – Printer name,

  • e.g., lh135-soic.ads.iu.edu

– DNS server

Traditionally

✔

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Traditionally

Must Configure:

– IP – Printer name,

  • e.g., lh135-soic.ads.iu.edu

– DNS server

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Features of Bonjour

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  • 1. Service configures itself

– IP, hostname, service instance name

  • 2. Clients automatically discover available services

– No pre-knowledge of the service’s name, hostname or IP

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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. So, how?

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Add a new printer to a network

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Is anybody using IP fe80::abcd:1234....?

A printer configures itself

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No? Great, I’ll take it.

IP fe80::abcd:1234

A printer configures itself

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Anybody using hostname NPI9fe5.host.local?

IP fe80::abcd:1234

A printer configures itself

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No? Wonderful, I’ll take it.

IP fe80::abcd:1234 Hostname HP9FE5.host.local

A printer configures itself

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Anybody having a printing service named HP-Service- 9FE5?

A printer configures itself

IP fe80::abcd:1234 Hostname HP9FE5.host.local Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

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IP fe80::abcd:1234 Hostname HP9FE5.host.local Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

A printer finishes configuring itself

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  • 1. Service configures itself

– IP, hostname, service instance name

  • 2. Clients automatically discover available services

– No pre-knowledge of the service’s name, hostname or IP

Features of Bonjour

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Automatically find the printer

Q1: Anyone has a printer service? A1: I have HP-Service-9FE5

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Q1: Anyone has a printer service? A1: I have service instance HP-Service-9FE5 Q2: So on which host is this HP-Service- 9FE5? A2: It’s on host NPI9fe5.host.local

Automatically find the printer

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Added/Saved the printer to your list

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IP fe80::abcd:1234 Hostname HP9FE5.host.local Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

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Added/Saved the printer to your list

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IP fe80::abcd:1234 Hostname HP9FE5.host.local Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

Apple: Applications store service instance names, so if the IP, port, or host name changed, the application can still connect.

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Service instance name HP-Service-9FE5 is saved

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IP fe80::abcd:1234 Hostname HP9FE5.host.local Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

Saved printer = A printer who owns service name HP-Service-9FE5

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Adversary

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  • On a device (malware infected) in your local network
  • Aims to intercept secrets/files transferred between uninfected

devices

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Adversary

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  • Your Mac/printer are un-infected
  • Steal your printing documents?
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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking

Printer

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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking

Case 1: Printer

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A device infected by malware

IP Hostname Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

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A device infected by malware

I have a printing service instance named HP-Service-9FE5

IP Hostname Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5 Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

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A device infected by malware

xf I have a printing service instance named HP-Service-9FE5

IP Hostname Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5 Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

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Saved printer = A printer who owns service name HP-Service-9FE5

New Service Name HP-Service-9FE5 (2)

Service Instance Name HP-Service-9FE5

x xf

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Three Changing Attributs:

– IP – Hostname – Service Instance Name

Apple: Applications store service instance names, so if the IP, port, or host name changed, the application can still connect.

Why it happens?

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  • Anyone can claim any value of the three attributes
  • The protocol only guarantees no duplicates.

Lack of authentication

Three Changing Attributs:

– IP – Hostname – Service Instance Name

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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking

Case 2: Airdrop

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Airdrop between Apple devices

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Jeff’s Macbook: Q1: Anyone has an airdrop service? Alice’s iPhone:

Attack Airdrop

I have a service named abcd.airdrop.service

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Attack Airdrop

Jeff’s Macbook: Q2: So on which host is Alice’s service? Alice’s iPhone: I have a service named abcd.airdrop.service

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Attack Airdrop

Alice’s iPhone: A2: It’s on host Alices.iphone.local Jeff’s Macbook: Q2: So on which host is Alice’s service? Bob’s iMac: A2: It’s on host Bobs.imac.local

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Alice’s iPhone has service named abcd.airdrop.tcp, which is on host Bobs.imac.local

Jeff’s Macbook: Q2: So on which host is Alice’s service? Bob’s iMac: A2: It’s on host Bobs.imac.local Alice’s iPhone: A2: It’s on host Alices.iphone.local

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Attack Airdrop

Jeff’s Macbook: Connect https://Bobs.imac.local Alice’s iPhone: A2: It’s on host Alices.iphone.local Bob’s iMac: A2: It’s on host Bobs.imac.local

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Does TLS help?

Bob’s iMac: A2: It’s on host Bobs.imac.local Jeff’s Macbook: Connect https://Bobs.imac.local Alice’s iPhone: A2: It’s on host Alices.iphone.local

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TLS in Airdrop

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Server certificate issued to appleid. CDEF … https://Bobs.imac.local

Bob’s iMac Jeff’s Macbook

Server certificate issued to appleid.ABCD… https://Alices.iphone.local

Alice’s iPhone

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So the certificate in airdrop can hardly be used for authentication.

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Server certificate issued to appleid.CDEF… https://Bobs.imac.local

Bob’s iMac Jeff’s Macbook

Server certificate issued to appleid.ABCD… https://Alices.iphone.local

Alice’s iPhone

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Domain should match the certificate

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https://google.com Certificate issued to google.com

Jeff’s Macbook Bob’s iMac

https://Bobs.imac.local Server certificate issued to appleid.CDEF… xf xf

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Server certificate issued to appleid.CDEF… https://Bobs.imac.local

Bob’s iMac Jeff’s Macbook

Server certificate issued to appleid.ABCD … https://Alices.iphone.local

Alice’s iPhone

Domain should match the certificate

xf xf xf xf

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What’s wrong with TLS in Airdrop

  • The certificate in airdrop cannot be used for authentication

– E.g, certificate should be issued to Alice – but indeed issued to appleid.ABCD…

  • Linking a human to her certificate is complicated

– challenge in finding any identifiable information that are

  • well-known
  • no privacy implication
  • and unique
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Some customized ZeroConf protocols

  • FileDrop

– TCP packets for discovery – elliptical curve cryptography for security – Failed in authentication

  • challenge in linking a human to her public key
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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking

Case 3: Apple’s Vulnerable framework

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Apple’s Vulnerable framework

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  • Multipeer Connectivity (MC)

– A framework for automatic service discovery between nearby devices across Wi-Fi and Bluetooth without configuration

  • Object to identify each app: peerID

– displayName (public) & uniqueID (private)

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  • Automatic Service Discovery Without Configuration

– Servers advertise peerIDs

Normally

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Server Server Client

peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: 8573a peerID displayName: Bob uniqueID: 6c5b3

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  • Automatic Service Discovery Without Configuration

– Servers advertise peerIDs, Client browse peerIDs (show displayName)

Normally

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peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: 8573a peerID displayName: Bob uniqueID: 6c5b3

Alice Bob

Server Server Client

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  • Even if servers have the same displayName

Normally

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peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: 54321

Server Server Client

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  • Even if servers have the same displayName

– uniqueIDs generated by MC will always be different

Normally

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peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: 54321

Server Server Client

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  • Even if servers have the same displayName

– uniqueIDs generated by MC will always be different

Normally

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Alice Alice

peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: 54321

Server Server Client

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  • Attacker acts as both client and server

– Browse and acquire peerID object from victim server

What Can Go Wrong?

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peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde

Server Client & Server Client

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  • Attacker acts as both client and server

– Advertise using the same peerID object

What Can Go Wrong?

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Alice

peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde

Server Client & Server Client

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  • Client can not distinguish because of same uniqueID

What Can Go Wrong?

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Alice

An Update?

peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde

Server Client & Server Client

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  • Client can not distinguish because of same uniqueID
  • Client maps the only peer to attacker’s address (MitM)

What Can Go Wrong?

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Alice

peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde peerID displayName: Alice uniqueID: abcde

Server Client & Server Client

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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking

Case 4: Bluetooth

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All your iOS notifications belong to me

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  • ZeroConf on Bluetooth: Apple Handoff

– Handoff creates Bluetooth channel without configuration

  • Malicious app on Mac can steal notifications on iPhone
  • For details, please refer to our paper

Bluetooth

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Summary of attacks

  • Attacks on Apple ZeroConf channels

– Printer (Bonjour) – Airdrop (Bonjour) – Multipeer Connectivity (MC) – Handoff

  • Attacks on other channels (please refer to our paper)

– BLE – Customized ZeroConf protocols

  • All vulnerabilities were reported to vendors, acknowledged by

most vendors

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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking
  • 4. Impact
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Impact

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  • Measurement

– We analyzed 61 popular Mac and iOS apps working with ZeroConf – 88.5% are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle or impersonation attacks

ZeroConf Channels Vulnerable/ Sampled Sensitive Information Leaked Bonjour 18/22 files, directories and clipboard synced, documents printed, instant message MC 24/24 files and photos transferred, instant message BLE 10/13 User name and password for OS X Customized protocols 2/2 remote keyboard input and files transferred

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  • 1. ZeroConf Concept
  • 2. ZeroConf How
  • 3. ZeroConf Breaking
  • 4. Impact
  • 5. Protecting ZeroConf
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Protecting ZeroConf

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  • Problem: linking a human to her certificate is complicated
  • Speaking out Your Certificate (SPYC)

– Voice biometrics ties certificate to identity – Human Subject Study: convenient and effective

  • For more details, please refer to our paper
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Conclusion

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  • Apple’s ZeroConf techniques are not secure as expected

– The usability-oriented design affects security

  • Addressing such security risks is nontrivial

– Challenge in binding a human to her certificate

  • Our Defense: SPYC

– Voice biometrics ties certificate to identity

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ZeroConf

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  • The ZEROCONF Working Group’s requirements

and proposed solutions for zero-configuration networking over IP essentially cover three areas:

– addressing (allocating IP addresses to hosts) – naming (using names to refer to hosts instead of IP addresses) – service discovery (finding services on the network automatically)