Son ongta tao JI JI Departme artment t of Reacto tor r Engin - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

son ongta tao ji ji
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Son ongta tao JI JI Departme artment t of Reacto tor r Engin - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

18th IGORR Conference 2017 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of 49-2 Swimming Pool Reactor with a Passive Siphon Breaker Son ongta tao JI JI Departme artment t of Reacto tor r Engin ginee eering ng Technolo nology gy China a Insti


slide-1
SLIDE 1

18th IGORR Conference 2017

Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of 49-2 Swimming Pool Reactor with a Passive Siphon Breaker

Son

  • ngta

tao JI JI

Departme artment t of Reacto tor r Engin ginee eering ng Technolo nology gy China a Insti titute tute of Atomic mic Energy gy December 4-7, 2017, Sydney

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Introduction of Nuclear facilities of CIAE

目录

CONTENTS

Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of 49-2 Swimming Pool Reactor with a Passive Siphon Breaker Overview of Safety Reassessment and Improvement of Research Reactors

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Introduction of Nuclear facilities of CIAE

slide-4
SLIDE 4

List of Nuclear facilities in CIAE

序号 No. 核设施名称 Name of Nuclear Facility 堆 型

Reactor Type

设计功率 Design Power 安全分类 Safety Class

1 中国实验快堆(CEFR) 钠冷快堆 SFR 65MW Ⅲ类 Class III 2 中国先进研究堆(CARR) 轻水堆 LWR 60MW Ⅲ类 Class III 3 重水研究堆(HWRR) 重水堆 HWR 10MW Ⅱ类 Class II 4 49-2 游泳池式反应堆(Pool Reactor) 轻水堆 LWR 3.5MW Ⅱ类 Class II 5 原型微型反应堆(Prototype Miniature Reactor) 轻水堆 LWR 27kW Ⅰ类 Class I 6 微堆零功率装置(Zero Power Facility of Miniature Reactor) 临界装置 Zero Power Criticality Facility — Ⅰ类 Class I 7 氢化锆固态临界装置(Solid Criticality Facility of Zirconium Hydride) 临界装置Zero Power Criticality Facility — Ⅰ类 Class I 8 DF-VI 快中子临界装置 (DF-VI Fast Neutron Criticality Facility) 临界装置Zero Power Criticality Facility — Ⅰ类 Class I 9 ADS启明星次临界实验装置 (ADS Criticality Test Facility) 次临界装置 Sub- criticality Facility — Ⅰ类 Class I

slide-5
SLIDE 5

CEFR has a thermal power of 65MW and electrical power of 20MW. Its first loading is UO2, and it is of a pool-type design with a 3 loops (Sodium-Sodium-Water) heat transfer system. The whole project takes an area of 44,000 m2, and has 16 sub-projects and 219 systems.

China Experimental Fast Reactor

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-6
SLIDE 6

The nuclear power

  • f CARR is 60MW. The fuel has a plate structure and

uses smeared U3Si2-Al with 19.75% enrichment; there are 21 SAs in the core; it is a pool-tank type, light pressure, water cooled, heavy water moderated, anti-neutron sink research reactor.

China Advance Research Reactor

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-7
SLIDE 7

The HWRR reactor is the first reactor of China. It was operated from 1958 to 2007, and made a great contribution to the nuclear industry development of China. It is now in the preparation stage of decommissioning.

Heavy Water Research Reactor

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-8
SLIDE 8

It is the first reactor designed and constructed independently by

  • China. It reached first criticality on 20 Dec 1964, and went into

power operation in March 1965. it has been operated safely for 53 years. Its main work is

  • n

material irradiation, in-core measurement technology research.

49-2 Pool Type Reactor

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-9
SLIDE 9

The Prototype Miniature Reactor was established in March 1984, and later 8 commercial miniature reactors were built for several Chinese organizations and countries like Pakistan, Iran, Ghana, Syria, Nigeria, etc. The main usages of miniature reactors are neutron activation analysis, production of short-life nuclides, education and training, and test

  • f

instruments.

Prototype Miniature Reactor

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-10
SLIDE 10

DF-VI is a zero power fast neutron critical facility, and it is mainly used for the research of fast neutron physics and technology. It went to first criticality on 29 June 1970.

Critical Facility of DF-VI

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Critical Facility with Zirconium Hydride

The Solid Critical Facility with zirconium hydride is a thermal-neutron zero-power test facility with solid hydrogen as moderator. 18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-12
SLIDE 12

The ADS subcritical facility consists

  • f

a core, neutron measurement system, and instrumentation.

ADS Subcritical Facility

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Overview of Safety Reassessment and Improvement of Research Reactors

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Safety Assessment after Fukushima Nuclear Accident

As required by NNSA, safety of all nuclear facilities were re- assessed, the following reports were submitted to NNSA: (1)SMAG for China Experimental Fast Reactor ; (2)Safety Self-examination Report of HWRR ; (3)Safety Self-examination Report of 49-2 Reactor; (4)Safety Self-examination Report mini Reactor; (5)Evaluation of Safety Condition of Critical Facilities. 18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Safety Assessment after Fukushima Nuclear Accident

  • Investigation and evaluation of tornadoes at the site of CIAE
  • Beyond design base accidents were screened and evaluated for

different research reactors.

  • The scenario of emergency response caused by accidents from

multiple reactors at one site and at same time were studied and evaluated. 18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Safety Improvement Measures Based on Experiences and Lessons from Fukushima Nuclear Accident ( Overlay of multiple accidents and extreme natural disaster):

Safety Improvements after Fukushima Nuclear Accident

1、49-2 reactor

Improving the ability for response to the LOCA and flood, and surveying the aging of the main equipment. 18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Safety Improvements after Fukushima Nuclear Accident

  • In 2012,a siphon breaker was applied to 49-2 reactor, which

can break the siphon passively when water pipeline breach and ensure that the core keeps covered by water. 18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Safety Improvements after Fukushima Nuclear Accident

  • The gap between the inlet valve of horizontal tube

and the cylindrical body was blockage in order to prevent LOCA due to fracture of horizontal tube under the earthquake of more than M8.0.

  • A water barrage was set to prevent flood
  • A mobile diesel power supplier can provide

power under site blackout

18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Safety Improvement after Fukushima Nuclear Accident

  • 2. CEFR

To improve the margin of two lines safety power supply bus bar for the CEFR , an additional emergency diesel power generator (800kW) has been added, while keeping the original configuration

  • f 2 safety diesel generators (728kW).
  • 3. Mini reactor and Critical Facilities

Additional UPS and reliable power supply 18th IGORR Conference 2017

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Thermal hydraulic analysis of 49-2 swimming pool reactor with a passive siphon breaker

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Manual Siphon Breaker Valve Passive siphon breaker

Illustration of primary system of 49-2 SPR

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Nodalization of 49-2 SPR using Relap5 code

100—reactor core 110—heat pipe section of primary coolant loop 120 、 130 、 140—branch pipes connecting to three main pumps 160、170—swimming pool over reactor core 110-6—siphon breaker 180—atmosphere over swimming pool

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Results Under Steady-State Operating Condition

  • Under the normal operating condition, the pressure difference between core

inlet and outlet is about 8950 Pa, and the flow rate of the core flow is 277.76 kg/s.

  • When the siphon breaker’s diameter is 1.6 cm, the pressure at the siphon

breaker is about 87485 Pa, the flow through the siphon breaker is about 1.90 kg / s, the flow rate of the coolant flowing through the core is 277.45 kg / s, which indicates its impact on the core flow is only 0.11%.

  • It can be seen from the calculation that a siphon breaker with diameter of

1.6 cm has a very small effect on the core coolant, and has no influence on the normal operation of the reactor.

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Basic assumptions for LBLOCA condition

  • LBLOCA occurs in the front part of the primary loop pump during the

reactor shutdown period, and the break diameter is 265 mm, the its elevation is 0.07 m.

  • The elevation of the water in the pool is 7.15 m (distance between the

water surface and the upper surface of the core is 5.91 m).

  • All engineered safety features cannot be put into operation.
  • There is no flow resistance in the pipe when siphon occurs.
slide-25
SLIDE 25

100 200 300 400 50 100 150 200 250 300

flow rate of sbreach/kg . s-1

Time/s 20 40 60 80 100 120 50 100 150 200 250 300

pressure of siphon breaker/kPa

Time/s 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 50 100 150 200 250 300 flow rate of the siphon breaker/kg . s-1 Time/s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 50 50 10 100 15 150 20 200 25 250 30 300

distance between water surface and the top of core /m

Time/s

Results of LBLOCA

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Basic assumptions for SBLOCA condition

  • SBLOCA occurs in the front part of the primary loop pump during

the reactor shutdown period, and the break diameter is 1.6cm, its elevation is 0.07 m.

  • To present the calculation results clearly, it is assumed that the

elevation of the water in the pool is 6.65 m (distance between the water surface and the upper surface of the core is 5.41 m).

  • All engineered safety features cannot be put into operation.
  • There is no flow resistance in the pipe when siphon occurs.
slide-27
SLIDE 27
  • 1
  • 0,8
  • 0,6
  • 0,4
  • 0,2

0,2 0,4 10 1000 00 20 2000 00 30 3000 00 40 4000 00 50 50

flow rate of the siphon breaker/kg.s-1 time/s

5 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,8 6 10 1000 00 20 2000 00 30 3000 00 40 4000 00 50 5000 00 distance between water

subface and top core/m time/s

100 101 102 103 104 105 10 1000 00 20 2000 00 30 3000 00 40 4000 00 50 5000 00

pressure of the siphon breaker /kPa time/s

0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2 1000 2000 3000 4000 50

flow rate of the breach/kg.s-1 time/s

Results of SBLOCA

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Conclusion

  • A 1.6 cm passive siphon breaker basically has no negative

effects on the steady-state operation of the reactor;

  • It can stop siphon and prevent core uncovering when

LBLOCA accident

  • ccurs

as the reactor and pump shutdown;

  • It has sufficient margin to stop siphon and ensure the core

safety when SBLOCA accident occurs as the reactor and pump shutdown.

slide-29
SLIDE 29

THANKS

谢 谢 聆 听

18th IGORR Conference 2017