Sociological Theory II Week 1: Micro & Macro Hilary 2019 Dr - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Sociological Theory II Week 1: Micro & Macro

Hilary 2019 Dr Anna Krausova

Introduction

▪ Office hours

▪ Wednesdays 2pm - 4pm ▪ Room 8 at New (New College Lane)

▪ Lecture slides

▪ http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sant3223/

▪ Please do ask questions ▪ Week 3 Lecture on Gender: Dr Amanda Palmer

Taking a step back

▪ What is society, and what does the individual do within it ▪ Homo sociologicus

▪ As the object of study of sociology?

▪ individuals programmed by ‘social structures’; lives determined by social origin / position ▪ individual is ‘acted upon’; actions channelled by external constrains do not leave any substantial room for choice

▪ Versus Homo economicus

▪ A rational actor only interested in maximising economic benefits, who acts upon society

Methodological holism

▪ Durkheim’s functionalism ▪ “social facts”

• External to the individual; Social norms, values and structures/institutions

“A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; or, which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations”

(Durkheim, 1982: 59)

▪ Durkheim’s types of suicide:

▪ Anomic ▪ Altruistic ▪ Egoistic

➔only interested in “deviant” rates of suicide, different to the “normal” rate ➔E.g. during economic crises

▪ But, unclear how these “social facts” emerge, operate, reproduce themselves, etc.

Methodological individualism

▪ Weber’s interpretive sociology

▪ The “intentional actor”

“For sociological purposes there is no such thing as a collective personality which ‘acts’. When reference is made in a sociological context to a State, a nation, a corporation, a family or army corps, or to similar collectivities, what is meant is ... only a certain kind of development of actual

• r possible social actions of individual persons.” (Weber, 1921: 14)

▪ A simple aggregation model:

▪ Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905)

• Protestant religious doctrine generates certain values

➔ Individuals with those values adopt certain kind of orientations to economic behaviour ➔ Individual orientations to economic behaviour help bring about capitalist economic organisation in a society

▪ A bigger side-question: Do values impact the economy (Weber), or does the economy determine values? (Marx) ▪ Either way, is simple aggregation from individual to society enough?

➔Micro-macro linkages

Now to micro and macro linkages… But first….

▪ The most important question!

Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break?

Clear causality, right? Or not so much?

What is the most pertinent question? ▪ What concrete steps led to the accident? ▪ Or, what made it more likely that while skiing, I will sustain such a serious injury?

Exercise: Write down your best guess as to why I broke my knee skiing.

▪ The most important question:

Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break?

▪ Sociological Imagination: “Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both.”

(C. Wright Mills, 1959: 3)

Now to micro and macro linkages… But first….

▪ The most important question:

Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break? ▪ My likelihood of accident…Compared to whom?

• How do we decide

whether the individual is more important than society? ➔Cannot do so a priori!

Now to micro and macro linkages… But first….

▪ The most important question:

Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break?

▪ Individual factors

▪ E.g. Propensity for risk-taking + Physical fitness

• Systemic factors
• Women 3x more likely to have binding not release (Posch et al., 2017)

➔ Women 3x more likely overall to suffer knee ligament injury while skiing, compared to men (Ruedl et al., 2011) (10x more likely according to Daily Telegraph! )

▪ Did intentions matter? Or ‘social fact’ of greater risk for women? Or, combination? ▪ Biological differences; but why not researched earlier / equipment not adjusted?

Now to micro and macro linkages… But first….

▪ Perrow’s Normal Accidents ▪ Nuclear accidents, for example

▪ Common sense: individual operator mistakes ▪ But, “it is the interaction of the multiple failures that explains the accident” (Perrow, 1999: 7)

▪ Beck’s Risk Society (1992)

▪ Unequal distribution of risks within “modern” society

But, helping us understand micro-macro links? ▪ E.g., the ‘social accident’ (Factor et al, 2007)

▪ “Looking at road accidents, we suggest that social causes at the macro level – such as cultural differences – might account for the attitudes and behaviors of drivers and their relationship to road accidents on the micro- level” (p.918)

▪ Or, ‘feedback loops’ (Bellaby & Lawrenson, 2001)

▪ “The body and space can be both real and culturally constructed, and cultural constructs can be real in their

• consequences. Thus statistical risk assessment contributes to the construction of roads in ways that neglect

motorcycling safety.” (p.385)

Sociology of risk and accidents

➔Causal mechanisms & structural individualism ➔Analytical Sociology

▪ explanations, and mechanisms; not purely descriptive/interpretive ▪ E.g. asks not only what ‘social facts’ we can observe, but how they ‘come about’ ▪ considers the importance of individual intentions and actions, but within wider social structures

“Structural individualism is a methodological doctrine according to which social facts should be explained as the intended or unintended outcomes of individuals’ actions. Structural individualism differs from traditional methodological individualism in attributing substantial explanatory importance to the social structures in which individuals are embedded.”

(Hedström & Bearman, 2009: 4)

Analytical Sociology

Aggregation models

▪ Prisoner’s dilemma (not again!)

▪ Two players (actors) ▪ Assumptions:

▪ no trust between the actors; only motivation for each player is to maximise one utility, that is minimum prison years (no room for moral beliefs, for example)

▪ Shelling (1978):

▪ ‘system of interaction’ between individual and environment

▪ interaction between different individuals + ▪ interaction between individuals and environment+ ▪ how previous interactions affects further interactions

▪ 1st assumption: behaviour is purposive ▪ 2nd assumption: behaviour is contingent

▪ Equilibrium analysis

▪ Prisoner’s dilemma represents an inefficient equilibrium (total pay off would be higher if they cooperated) ▪ Can be extended to Mutli-person ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’

Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978)

Individual Payoffs Collective Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2 =D =C C = cooperate D = defect

Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978)

Individual Payoffs Collective Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2 =D =C

Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978)

Individual Payoffs Collective Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2 =D =C

Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978)

Individual Payoffs Collective Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2 =D =C

Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978)

▪ For the collective, best if all three players cooperate ▪ But, if you don’t know what the other players are going to choose, always better for you individually to defect ▪ Shape of curve depends on different payoffs and if they change based on the n of people involved

▪ 1: more people ➔ larger the payoffs, but still individually better to defect, and the relative difference stays the same ▪ 2: difference in payoff for defecting v. cooperating  the more people play ▪ 3: difference in payoff for defecting v. cooperating  the more people play

=D =C 1 2 3

Threshold models

▪ Other scenarios: where at some point, as the number of people increases, it becomes more costly to defect (or vice versa) ▪ E.g. Granovetter’s (1978) threshold model of collective behaviour

▪ probability of individual participating in collective action  with n participating  ▪ benefit , but cost  ▪ moral obligation  ▪ heterogeneity: each individual has a threshold ▪ low threshold: high propensity to participate

(➔ lecture on collective action)

Individual Threshold Action

a

participates unconditionally

b 1

participates because 1 other has

c 2

participates because 2 others have

d 3

participates because 3 others have

e 4

participates because 4 others have

f 4

participates because 4 others have

g 5

participates because 5 others have

h 6

participates because 6 others have

i 8

participates because 8 others have j 10 (does not)

▪ Example 1 ▪ Average threshold: 4.3 ▪ Participation: 8

▪ If these were 10 people in a square, 8 of them will engage in collective behaviour, such as a demonstration

Threshold models

Individual Threshold Action

a participates unconditionally b 1 participates because 1 other has

c 3

(does not)

d 3

(does not)

e 4

(does not)

f 4

(does not)

g 5

(does not)

h 6

(does not)

i 8

(does not)

j 10

(does not)

Threshold models

▪ Example 1 ▪ Average threshold: 4.4 ▪ Participation: 2

▪ If these were 10 people in a square,

• nly 2 of them will

engage in collective behaviour, such as a demonstration

‘Rational’ action?

▪ So, “rational” is contextual ▪ E.g. Bolivia:

▪ Aymara and Quechua indigenous communities:

▪ “able to effectively shut down the entire country

until their demands are met” (Rice, 2012: 68) ▪ Protest attendance

▪ normal for nearly all to join or support protests ▪ talk of solidarity, feelings of outrage ▪ but also fines for not attendance

▪ Does it matter whether the individual decides out

• f pure self-interest (e.g. avoiding fines; fearing

expulsion; etc.) or following an emotional response (feelings of solidarity; shame; etc.)? ➔ What if the outcome is the most ‘rational’ (the greatest pay-off), but the motivation is ‘emotional’?

▪ Individual intentions ≠ observed outcomes ▪ Not just direct observation of others, but also perceptions, expectations, trust,

• etc. (➔ next week)

▪ This includes wrong expectations, misunderstandings, miscalculations “With people, we can get carried away with our image of goal seeking and problem

• solving. We can forget that people pursue misguided goals or don't know their goals,

and that they enjoy or suffer subconscious processes that deceive them about their

• goals. And we can exaggerate how much good is accomplished when people achieve

the goals we think they think they have been pursuing.”

(Shelling, 1978: 18-19)

‘Rational’ action?

‘Purposive’ action?

▪ Individual intentions ≠ observed outcomes ▪ Perverse effects (Boudon, 1982) “The very notion of perverse effect implies the notion of action. A perverse effect can only

• ccur in an analytic framework in which the sociological subject, homo sociologicus, is

thought to be moved by the objectives he has in mind and the way he represents their eventual realisation to himself. There is thus a logical contradiction between the perverse effect paradigm and those paradigms in which homo sociologicus is always depicted as a creature moved by social forces exterior to him… The image of a 'rational' homo sociologicus is not implied in the perverse effect paradigm but the image of an 'intentional' one is.”

(Boudon, 1982:7)

Essay questions:

▪ Must accounts of social order always be able to provide micro-foundations for their claims? ▪ ‘Society is not something external to the individual; it is internalized through social emotions such as shame and anger.’ Discuss.

Further revision questions:

▪ ‘Society is not the mere sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association

represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics’ (Durkheim). Discuss. ▪ Can ‘culture’ be reduced to the preferences and beliefs of individuals? ▪ Is the Prisoners’ Dilemma a plausible model of human interaction?

Any questions?

anna.krausova@sociology.ox.ac.uk

References

Core readings:

▪ Boudon, R. (1982). The unintended consequences of social action. London: Macmillan. ▪ Durkheim, É., Buss, R., & Riley, A. (2006). On suicide. London: Penguin. ▪ Durkheim, É., & Lukes, S. (1982). The rules of sociological method : and selected texts on sociology and its method. London: Macmillan. ▪ Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 1420-1443. ▪ Hedström, P., & Bearman, P. S. (2009). The Oxford handbook of analytical sociology. Oxford ; New York,: Oxford University Press. ▪ Weber, M., Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (1968). Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology. New York: Bedminster Press

Extra resources:

▪ Beck, U. (1992). Risk society towards a new modernity. London: Sage. ▪ Bellaby, P., & Lawrenson, D. (2001). Approaches to the Risk of Riding Motorcycles: Reflections on the Problem of Reconciling Statistical Risk Assessment and Motorcyclists' Own Reasons for Riding. The Sociological Review, 49(3), 368-388. doi:10.1111/1467-954X.00337 ▪ Factor, R., Mahalel, D., & Yair, G. (2007). The social accident: A theoretical model and a research agenda for studying the influence of social and cultural characteristics on motor vehicle accidents. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 39(5), 914-921. ▪ Hamill, H. (2011). The hoods: crime and punishment in Belfast. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. ▪ Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ▪ Rice, R. (2012). The new politics of protest: Indigenous mobilization in Latin America's neoliberal era: University of Arizona Press.

(And in case you want to read more about women, skiing and injuries!: ▪ Posch, M., Ruedl, G., Eberle, R., & Burtscher, M. (2017, 2017//). Self-Release of Ski Bindings: A Sex Comparison. Paper presented at the Snow Sports Trauma and Safety, Cham. ▪ Ruedl, G., Webhofer, M., Linortner, I., Schranz, A., Fink, C., Patterson, C., . . . Burtscher, M. (2011). ACL Injury Mechanisms and Related Factors in Male and Female Carving Skiers: A Retrospective Study. Int J Sports Med, 32(10), 801-806. doi:10.1055/s-0031-1279719 ▪ https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/ski/news/why-are-female-skiers-more-likely-to-injure-their-acl/)

The lectures slides were also informed by previous lectures notes by Prof. Federico Varese.