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SIKS tutorial Agent Systems Multi-agent learning Gerard Vreeswijk - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics SIKS tutorial Agent Systems Multi-agent learning Gerard Vreeswijk Intelligent Systems Group, Computer Science Department Faculty of Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands


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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

Multi-agent learning Gerard Vreeswijk

Intelligent Systems Group, Computer Science Department Faculty of Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

December 9, 2013

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games with real-valued actions.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games with real-valued actions. Choose how much lemonade to produce.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 7

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games with real-valued actions. Choose how much lemonade to produce. Or bandwidth (think competition between broadband providers).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 8

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games with real-valued actions. Choose how much lemonade to produce. Or bandwidth (think competition between broadband providers). Or personal attention (think competition between social bots).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 9

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games with real-valued actions. Choose how much lemonade to produce. Or bandwidth (think competition between broadband providers). Or personal attention (think competition between social bots). Players adapt to each other’s actions.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 10

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Objective of this presentation

Objective To consider processes of adaptation in repeated two-player games with real-valued actions. Choose how much lemonade to produce. Or bandwidth (think competition between broadband providers). Or personal attention (think competition between social bots). Players adapt to each other’s actions. For some modes of adaptation, interesting dynamics will

  • ccur.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 12

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 13

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 15

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining. Learning online in a non-influenceable environment.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining. Learning online in a non-influenceable environment. Learning online in a changing but non-influenceable environment.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining. Learning online in a non-influenceable environment. Learning online in a changing but non-influenceable environment. Multi-agent learning:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 19

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining. Learning online in a non-influenceable environment. Learning online in a changing but non-influenceable environment. Multi-agent learning:

  • Vs. one other learning agent (playing 1 − 1).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 20

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining. Learning online in a non-influenceable environment. Learning online in a changing but non-influenceable environment. Multi-agent learning:

  • Vs. one other learning agent (playing 1 − 1).
  • Vs. multiple learning agents (playing n − n).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 21

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

What is multi-agent learning?

Traditional machine learning: Learning offline: statistics / data mining. Learning online in a non-influenceable environment. Learning online in a changing but non-influenceable environment. Multi-agent learning:

  • Vs. one other learning agent (playing 1 − 1).
  • Vs. multiple learning agents (playing n − n).
  • Vs. very many other learning agents. (Large populations, but

playing 1 − 1.)

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents. Adaptation = learning (following)

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents. Adaptation = learning (following) as well as teaching (exercising influence).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents. Adaptation = learning (following) as well as teaching (exercising influence). Study the adaptation to other’s behaviour (descriptive).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 26

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents. Adaptation = learning (following) as well as teaching (exercising influence). Study the adaptation to other’s behaviour (descriptive). Prescribe the adaptation to other’s behaviour (normative).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 27

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents. Adaptation = learning (following) as well as teaching (exercising influence). Study the adaptation to other’s behaviour (descriptive). Prescribe the adaptation to other’s behaviour (normative). Formalise and study emergence in multi-agent systems.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 28

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Why multi-agent learning?

Goal of multi-agent learning To understand and / or prescribe processes of (mostly) social adaptation in systems of artificial agents. Adaptation = learning (following) as well as teaching (exercising influence). Study the adaptation to other’s behaviour (descriptive). Prescribe the adaptation to other’s behaviour (normative). Formalise and study emergence in multi-agent systems. Explain how Nash equilibria may come about.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Teaching

A game in normal form L R T 1, 0 3, 2 B 2, 1 4, 0

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Teaching

A game in normal form L R T 1, 0 3, 2 B 2, 1 4, 0 Row player has a dominating strategy: B.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Teaching

A game in normal form L R T 1, 0 3, 2 B 2, 1 4, 0 Row player has a dominating strategy: B. Pure Nash equilibrium: (B, L) with payoff profile (2, 1).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Teaching

A game in normal form L R T 1, 0 3, 2 B 2, 1 4, 0 Row player has a dominating strategy: B. Pure Nash equilibrium: (B, L) with payoff profile (2, 1). However: action profile (T, R) with payoff profile (3, 2) Pareto dominates the equilibrium.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Teaching

A game in normal form L R T 1, 0 3, 2 B 2, 1 4, 0 Row player has a dominating strategy: B. Pure Nash equilibrium: (B, L) with payoff profile (2, 1). However: action profile (T, R) with payoff profile (3, 2) Pareto dominates the equilibrium. Both can achieve the Pareto optimum if the row player teaches T, and the column player recognises this, and follows.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Coordination game

Who should be teaching here? L R L 1, 1 0, 0 R 0, 0 1, 1

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Coordination game

Who should be teaching here? L R L 1, 1 0, 0 R 0, 0 1, 1 Intuition: left- vs. right-hand traffic.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Coordination game

Who should be teaching here? L R L 1, 1 0, 0 R 0, 0 1, 1 Intuition: left- vs. right-hand traffic. Optimal profiles are (L, L) (UK) and (R, R) (the rest).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Coordination game

Who should be teaching here? L R L 1, 1 0, 0 R 0, 0 1, 1 Intuition: left- vs. right-hand traffic. Optimal profiles are (L, L) (UK) and (R, R) (the rest). Suppose start profile is (R, L).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Coordination game

Who should be teaching here? L R L 1, 1 0, 0 R 0, 0 1, 1 Intuition: left- vs. right-hand traffic. Optimal profiles are (L, L) (UK) and (R, R) (the rest). Suppose start profile is (R, L). If both teach: (R, L) → (R, L) → (R, L) → (R, L) → . . .

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Coordination game

Who should be teaching here? L R L 1, 1 0, 0 R 0, 0 1, 1 Intuition: left- vs. right-hand traffic. Optimal profiles are (L, L) (UK) and (R, R) (the rest). Suppose start profile is (R, L). If both teach: (R, L) → (R, L) → (R, L) → (R, L) → . . . If both follow: (R, L) → (L, R) → (R, L) → (L, R) → . . .

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980)

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play. Regret-matching.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 46

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play. Regret-matching. Rational learning (a.k.a. Bayesian learning).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 47

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play. Regret-matching. Rational learning (a.k.a. Bayesian learning). Learning through evolution.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 48

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play. Regret-matching. Rational learning (a.k.a. Bayesian learning). Learning through evolution. Win-stay loose-shift / Win or Learn Fast (WoLF) priciples.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 49

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play. Regret-matching. Rational learning (a.k.a. Bayesian learning). Learning through evolution. Win-stay loose-shift / Win or Learn Fast (WoLF) priciples. Maintaining and rejecting hypothesis.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 50

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

Forms of multi-agent learning

Rudimentary strategies: tit-for-tat, trigger, cooperative, unforgiving (Robert Axelrod’s tournaments in 1980) Reinforcement learning. Fictitious play. Regret-matching. Rational learning (a.k.a. Bayesian learning). Learning through evolution. Win-stay loose-shift / Win or Learn Fast (WoLF) priciples. Maintaining and rejecting hypothesis. . . .

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly. Inspired by spring water duopoly.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly. Inspired by spring water duopoly. All agents produce the same homogeneous product.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly. Inspired by spring water duopoly. All agents produce the same homogeneous product. Price is a commonly known decreasing function of total output.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly. Inspired by spring water duopoly. All agents produce the same homogeneous product. Price is a commonly known decreasing function of total output. Agents compete in the quantities they produce.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly. Inspired by spring water duopoly. All agents produce the same homogeneous product. Price is a commonly known decreasing function of total output. Agents compete in the quantities they produce. They choose quantities independently and simultaneously.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 59

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Economic model of duopoly. Inspired by spring water duopoly. All agents produce the same homogeneous product. Price is a commonly known decreasing function of total output. Agents compete in the quantities they produce. They choose quantities independently and simultaneously. Agents maximise profit given their competitors’ decisions.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions: Agent 1 and Agent 2.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions: Agent 1 and Agent 2. Choose real-valued quantities x and y of the same good to produce (simultaneously).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions: Agent 1 and Agent 2. Choose real-valued quantities x and y of the same good to produce (simultaneously). These quantities are not revealed.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions: Agent 1 and Agent 2. Choose real-valued quantities x and y of the same good to produce (simultaneously). These quantities are not revealed. The revenue per unit is a monotone decreasing function of x + y.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions: Agent 1 and Agent 2. Choose real-valued quantities x and y of the same good to produce (simultaneously). These quantities are not revealed. The revenue per unit is a monotone decreasing function of x + y. Let us say: r =Def max{0, a − (x + y)}, where a > 0 is some saturation level.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Assumptions: Agent 1 and Agent 2. Choose real-valued quantities x and y of the same good to produce (simultaneously). These quantities are not revealed. The revenue per unit is a monotone decreasing function of x + y. Let us say: r =Def max{0, a − (x + y)}, where a > 0 is some saturation level. There are production costs per unit. These are c, with 0 < c < a.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit: The profit for Agent 1 per unit is therefore π1(x) = rx − cx

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit: The profit for Agent 1 per unit is therefore π1(x) = rx − cx = (a − (x + y))x − cx if x + y ≤ a, 0 − cx else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit: The profit for Agent 1 per unit is therefore π1(x) = rx − cx = (a − (x + y))x − cx if x + y ≤ a, 0 − cx else. = −x2 + (a − c − y)x if x + y ≤ a, −cx else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit: The profit for Agent 1 per unit is therefore π1(x) = rx − cx = (a − (x + y))x − cx if x + y ≤ a, 0 − cx else. = −x2 + (a − c − y)x if x + y ≤ a, −cx else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit: The profit for Agent 1 per unit is therefore π1(x) = rx − cx = (a − (x + y))x − cx if x + y ≤ a, 0 − cx else. = −x2 + (a − c − y)x if x + y ≤ a, −cx else. Likewise for Agent 2.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot competition

Profit: The profit for Agent 1 per unit is therefore π1(x) = rx − cx = (a − (x + y))x − cx if x + y ≤ a, 0 − cx else. = −x2 + (a − c − y)x if x + y ≤ a, −cx else. Likewise for Agent 2. At (arbitrary or periodic) times the quantities x and y are revealed (simultaneously), and both agents adapt their production to the new situation (simultaneously).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Profit function is differentiable: ∂ ∂x π1(x) = −2x + (a − c − y) if x + y ≤ a, −c else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Profit function is differentiable: ∂ ∂x π1(x) = −2x + (a − c − y) if x + y ≤ a, −c else. Stationary point: x∗ = (a − c − y)/2 if y ≤ a − c, else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Profit function is differentiable: ∂ ∂x π1(x) = −2x + (a − c − y) if x + y ≤ a, −c else. Stationary point: x∗ = (a − c − y)/2 if y ≤ a − c, else. 2nd-order derivative at x∗ is positive

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Profit function is differentiable: ∂ ∂x π1(x) = −2x + (a − c − y) if x + y ≤ a, −c else. Stationary point: x∗ = (a − c − y)/2 if y ≤ a − c, else. 2nd-order derivative at x∗ is positive ⇒ π1 is concave at x∗

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Profit function is differentiable: ∂ ∂x π1(x) = −2x + (a − c − y) if x + y ≤ a, −c else. Stationary point: x∗ = (a − c − y)/2 if y ≤ a − c, else. 2nd-order derivative at x∗ is positive ⇒ π1 is concave at x∗ ⇒ maximum

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

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SLIDE 82

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Best response

Suppose Agent 1 knows the production quantity, y, of Agent

  • 2. What would be the best response?

Profit function is differentiable: ∂ ∂x π1(x) = −2x + (a − c − y) if x + y ≤ a, −c else. Stationary point: x∗ = (a − c − y)/2 if y ≤ a − c, else. 2nd-order derivative at x∗ is positive ⇒ π1 is concave at x∗ ⇒ maximum ⇒ best response.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-83
SLIDE 83

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-84
SLIDE 84

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-85
SLIDE 85

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

If both production quantities are stationary, we speak of a Cournot equilibrium: x∗ = (a − c − y∗)/2 if y∗ ≤ a − c, else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-86
SLIDE 86

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

If both production quantities are stationary, we speak of a Cournot equilibrium: x∗ = (a − c − y∗)/2 if y∗ ≤ a − c, else. y∗ = (a − c − x∗)/2 if x∗ ≤ a − c, else.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-87
SLIDE 87

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

If both production quantities are stationary, we speak of a Cournot equilibrium: x∗ = (a − c − y∗)/2 if y∗ ≤ a − c, else. y∗ = (a − c − x∗)/2 if x∗ ≤ a − c, else. Solving yields

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-88
SLIDE 88

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

If both production quantities are stationary, we speak of a Cournot equilibrium: x∗ = (a − c − y∗)/2 if y∗ ≤ a − c, else. y∗ = (a − c − x∗)/2 if x∗ ≤ a − c, else. Solving yields (x∗, y∗) = a − c 3 , a − c 3

  • .

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-89
SLIDE 89

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

If both production quantities are stationary, we speak of a Cournot equilibrium: x∗ = (a − c − y∗)/2 if y∗ ≤ a − c, else. y∗ = (a − c − x∗)/2 if x∗ ≤ a − c, else. Solving yields (x∗, y∗) = a − c 3 , a − c 3

  • .

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-90
SLIDE 90

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot equilibrium

If both production quantities are stationary, we speak of a Cournot equilibrium: x∗ = (a − c − y∗)/2 if y∗ ≤ a − c, else. y∗ = (a − c − x∗)/2 if x∗ ≤ a − c, else. Solving yields (x∗, y∗) = a − c 3 , a − c 3

  • .

The Cournot equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto dominant.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-91
SLIDE 91

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-92
SLIDE 92

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

1 How does adaptation proceed? Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-93
SLIDE 93

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

1 How does adaptation proceed? 2 Does it converge? Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-94
SLIDE 94

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

1 How does adaptation proceed? 2 Does it converge? 3 If yes, does every begin situation (x, y) leads to the same

  • utcome?

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-95
SLIDE 95

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

1 How does adaptation proceed? 2 Does it converge? 3 If yes, does every begin situation (x, y) leads to the same

  • utcome?

4 Are these outcomes (static) equilibria? Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-96
SLIDE 96

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

1 How does adaptation proceed? 2 Does it converge? 3 If yes, does every begin situation (x, y) leads to the same

  • utcome?

4 Are these outcomes (static) equilibria? 5 Is it possible have more than one equilibrium? Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-97
SLIDE 97

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

Cournot dynamics

Possible questions:

1 How does adaptation proceed? 2 Does it converge? 3 If yes, does every begin situation (x, y) leads to the same

  • utcome?

4 Are these outcomes (static) equilibria? 5 Is it possible have more than one equilibrium? 6 If yes, is it possible that some equilibria are missed by

adaptation / iteration?

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-98
SLIDE 98

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-99
SLIDE 99

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-100
SLIDE 100

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-101
SLIDE 101

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-102
SLIDE 102

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-103
SLIDE 103

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-104
SLIDE 104

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-105
SLIDE 105

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-106
SLIDE 106

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

“Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly”

David Rand. Journal of Math. Ec., 1978, vol. 5(2), pp. 173-184.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-107
SLIDE 107

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-108
SLIDE 108

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-109
SLIDE 109

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991 by T¨

  • nu Puu (born 1936, in Tallinn, Estonia).

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-110
SLIDE 110

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991 by T¨

  • nu Puu (born 1936, in Tallinn, Estonia).

Professor of Economics Emeritus at Ume˚ a University, Sweden.

Portfolio selection, investment and production, phil. of science, spatial economics, nonlinear dynamic processes, oligopoly, business cycles. Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-111
SLIDE 111

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991 by T¨

  • nu Puu (born 1936, in Tallinn, Estonia).

Professor of Economics Emeritus at Ume˚ a University, Sweden.

Portfolio selection, investment and production, phil. of science, spatial economics, nonlinear dynamic processes, oligopoly, business cycles.

Idea: suppose

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-112
SLIDE 112

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991 by T¨

  • nu Puu (born 1936, in Tallinn, Estonia).

Professor of Economics Emeritus at Ume˚ a University, Sweden.

Portfolio selection, investment and production, phil. of science, spatial economics, nonlinear dynamic processes, oligopoly, business cycles.

Idea: suppose Sales price per unit is iso-elastic: s =Def max

  • 0,

1 x + y

  • .

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-113
SLIDE 113

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991 by T¨

  • nu Puu (born 1936, in Tallinn, Estonia).

Professor of Economics Emeritus at Ume˚ a University, Sweden.

Portfolio selection, investment and production, phil. of science, spatial economics, nonlinear dynamic processes, oligopoly, business cycles.

Idea: suppose Sales price per unit is iso-elastic: s =Def max

  • 0,

1 x + y

  • .

Agents have different production costs α and β per unit.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-114
SLIDE 114

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Alternative assumptions

Proposed around 1991 by T¨

  • nu Puu (born 1936, in Tallinn, Estonia).

Professor of Economics Emeritus at Ume˚ a University, Sweden.

Portfolio selection, investment and production, phil. of science, spatial economics, nonlinear dynamic processes, oligopoly, business cycles.

Idea: suppose Sales price per unit is iso-elastic: s =Def max

  • 0,

1 x + y

  • .

Agents have different production costs α and β per unit. Adaptation proceeds gradually, through learning: new = (1 − δ)· old + δ· input.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-115
SLIDE 115

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-116
SLIDE 116

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-117
SLIDE 117

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at: x∗ = y α − y

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-118
SLIDE 118

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at: x∗ = y α − y y∗ = x β − x

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-119
SLIDE 119

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at:            x∗ = y α − y y∗ = x β − x

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-120
SLIDE 120

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at:            x∗ = y α − y y∗ = x β − x Cournot: adapt simultaneously.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-121
SLIDE 121

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at:            x∗ = y α − y y∗ = x β − x Cournot: adapt simultaneously. xt+1 = yt α − yt

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-122
SLIDE 122

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at:            x∗ = y α − y y∗ = x β − x Cournot: adapt simultaneously. xt+1 = yt α − yt yt+1 = xt β − xt

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-123
SLIDE 123

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Compute response functions as usual. We arrive at:            x∗ = y α − y y∗ = x β − x Cournot: adapt simultaneously.            xt+1 = yt α − yt yt+1 = xt β − xt

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-124
SLIDE 124

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-125
SLIDE 125

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually. xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • Gerard Vreeswijk

SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-126
SLIDE 126

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually. xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 represents the learning speed.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-127
SLIDE 127

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually. xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • yt+1

= yt + θ xt β − xt − yt

  • ,

where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 represents the learning speed.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-128
SLIDE 128

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually.            xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • yt+1

= yt + θ xt β − xt − yt

  • ,

where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 represents the learning speed.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-129
SLIDE 129

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually.            xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • yt+1

= yt + θ xt β − xt − yt

  • ,

where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 represents the learning speed. If α/β ∈ (3 − 2 √ 2, 3 + 2 √ 2) then Nash equilibrium is stable.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-130
SLIDE 130

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually.            xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • yt+1

= yt + θ xt β − xt − yt

  • ,

where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 represents the learning speed. If α/β ∈ (3 − 2 √ 2, 3 + 2 √ 2) then Nash equilibrium is stable. If α/β ∈ [4/25, 25/4] then trajectory remains bounded.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-131
SLIDE 131

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

New response functions

Puu: adapt gradually.            xt+1 = xt + θ yt α − yt − xt

  • yt+1

= yt + θ xt β − xt − yt

  • ,

where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 represents the learning speed. If α/β ∈ (3 − 2 √ 2, 3 + 2 √ 2) then Nash equilibrium is stable. If α/β ∈ [4/25, 25/4] then trajectory remains bounded. If 0.16 ≤ α/β ≤ 0.171 or 5.828 ≤ α/β ≤ 6.25 then bounded but not stable ⇒ periodicity, semi-periodicity, or chaos.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-132
SLIDE 132

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Four types of system behaviour

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-133
SLIDE 133

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Four types of system behaviour

Stable

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-134
SLIDE 134

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Four types of system behaviour

Stable Periodic

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-135
SLIDE 135

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Four types of system behaviour

Stable Quasiperiodic Periodic

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-136
SLIDE 136

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Four types of system behaviour

Stable Quasiperiodic Periodic Chaotic

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-137
SLIDE 137

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Outline

1

Introduction Multi-agent learning (MAL) Teaching

2

Cournot dynamics Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium

3

Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-138
SLIDE 138

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Conclusions

Conclusions:

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-139
SLIDE 139

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Conclusions

Conclusions: Multi-agent learning is not only about

  • learning. It is also

about teaching.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-140
SLIDE 140

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Conclusions

Conclusions: Multi-agent learning is not only about

  • learning. It is also

about teaching. Simple scenarios of multi-agent learning may invoke complex behaviour.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”

slide-141
SLIDE 141

Introduction Cournot dynamics Alternative Cournot dynamics Work of David Rand (1978) Work of T¨

  • nu Puu (1991)

Conclusions

Conclusions

Conclusions: Multi-agent learning is not only about

  • learning. It is also

about teaching. Simple scenarios of multi-agent learning may invoke complex behaviour.

Gerard Vreeswijk SIKS tutorial “Agent Systems”