Secure Data Preservers for Web Services Byung-Gon Chun Yahoo! - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

secure data preservers for web services
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Secure Data Preservers for Web Services Byung-Gon Chun Yahoo! - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Secure Data Preservers for Web Services Byung-Gon Chun Yahoo! Research Joint work with Jayanthkumar Kannan (Google) and Petros Maniatis (Intel Labs) Users Entrust Web Services with Their Data Health Credit card records number Trading


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SLIDE 1

Secure Data Preservers for Web Services

Byung-Gon Chun Yahoo! Research

Joint work with Jayanthkumar Kannan (Google) and Petros Maniatis (Intel Labs)

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SLIDE 2

Users Entrust Web Services with Their Data

Credit card number Trading strategy Health records Web click logs

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SLIDE 3

Users Entrust Web Services with Their Data

Credit card number Trading strategy Health records Web click logs

  • How their data will be used
  • What parts will be shared
  • With whom they will be shared
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SLIDE 4

Exposure of Sensitive Data

  • dataloss.db lists 400 data loss incidents in

2009; on average exposed half-a-million customer records

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SLIDE 5

Exposure of Sensitive Data

  • dataloss.db lists 400 data loss incidents in

2009; on average exposed half-a-million customer records

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SLIDE 6

Exposure of Sensitive Data

  • dataloss.db lists 400 data loss incidents in

2009; on average exposed half-a-million customer records

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SLIDE 7

Exacerbated by Giving Up Data Usage Control

Individuals

Health records

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SLIDE 8

Exacerbated by Giving Up Data Usage Control

Individuals

Health records

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SLIDE 9

Exacerbated by Giving Up Data Usage Control

Individuals

Health records

  • How their data will be used
  • What parts will be shared
  • With whom they will be shared
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SLIDE 10

Give Control Back to Users

Individuals

Health records

  • How their data will be used
  • What parts will be shared
  • With whom they will be shared

Personalizable trust

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SLIDE 11

Roadmap

  • Motivation
  • Secure Data Preserver
  • Design
  • Evaluation
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SLIDE 12

Our Approach

  • Entrusting raw data violates least privilege
  • Encapsulate sensitive data and enforce well-

defined interface for service to access data

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SLIDE 13

Secure Data Preserver (SDaP)

(a) Service + User Data Service

Service Code OS HW User Data isolation boundary (b) Service + Preserver Service

Service Code OS HW Data Interface

Preserver

Preserver Code User Data access control

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SLIDE 14

Preserver Deployment Scenarios

Co-location

HW HW OS OS Service app SDaP

Trusted third party or client Faulty service app Faulty service operator

HW Mini- OS OS Service app SDaP VMM

Faulty service app

HW OS Service app SDaP

Secure co- processor

Faulty service app Faulty service operator

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SLIDE 15

What Apps Are Suitable?

  • Sensitive query

– User provides sensitive query, service provides data stream – E.g., Trading, Health

  • Analytics on sensitive data

– Service performs data mining on user’s sensitive data – E.g., Targeted advertising, Recommendation

  • Proxy

– User provides credentials to another service

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SLIDE 16

What Apps Are Suitable?

  • Sensitive query

– User provides sensitive query, service provides data stream – E.g., Trading, Health

  • Analytics on sensitive data

– Service performs data mining on user’s sensitive data – E.g., Targeted advertising, Recommendation

  • Proxy

– User provides credentials to another service

* Limitation Data-centric service reading and updating users’ data at fine granularity

  • E.g., Docs, Social networking apps
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SLIDE 17

Roadmap

  • Motivation
  • Secure Data Preserver
  • Design
  • Evaluation
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SLIDE 18

Preserver Design Goals

  • Simple Interface
  • Flexible deployment
  • Fine-grained use policy
  • Trust but mitigate risk
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SLIDE 19

Preserver Operational View

OS E*Trade app Preserver Policy Data

  • 2. Specify policy
  • 1. Pick Preserver
  • 3. Install Preserver
  • 4. API

Ticker()

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SLIDE 20

Preserver Architecture

Data Layer User Data P3 Policy Engine Base Layer Preserver 1 Service OS Service Client I n s t a l l P2 Interface I n s t a l l / x f

  • r

m Host Facilities H H Host Hub I n v

  • k

e Service Data Policy Data

Hosting Invocation Transformation

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SLIDE 21

Preserver Hosting

  • Which services can host users’ preservers
  • Hosting policy

– Declarative language based on SecPAL

  • 1. alice SAYS CanHost(M) IF OwnsMachine(amazon, M)
  • Hosting mechanism

– Hosting protocol based on Diffie-Hellman protocol

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SLIDE 22

Preserver Hosting

  • Which services can host users’ preservers
  • Hosting policy

– Declarative language based on SecPAL

  • Hosting mechanism

– Hosting protocol based on Diffie-Hellman protocol

  • 2. alice SAYS CanHost(M) IF TrustedService(S),

OwnsMachine(S,M), HasCoprocessor(M)

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SLIDE 23

Preserver Hosting

  • Which services can host users’ preservers
  • Hosting policy

– Declarative language based on SecPAL

  • Hosting mechanism

– Hosting protocol based on Diffie-Hellman protocol

  • 3. alice SAYS amazon CANSAY TrustedService(S)
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SLIDE 24

Preserver Invocation

  • Constrain interface invocation parameters with

SecPAL

  • Two kinds: stateless, stateful
  • 1. alice SAYS CanInvoke(amazon, A) IF LessThan(A, 50)
  • Transfer of invocation policies: exo-leasing
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SLIDE 25

Preserver Invocation

  • Constrain interface invocation parameters with

SecPAL

  • Two kinds: stateless, stateful
  • Transfer of invocation policies: exo-leasing
  • 2. alice SAYS CanInvoke(doubleclick,A) IF

LessThan(A,Limit), Between(Time,”01/01/10”,”01/31/10”) STATE (Limit=50,Update(Limit,A))

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SLIDE 26

Preserver Invocation

  • Constrain interface invocation parameters with

SecPAL

  • Two kinds: stateless, stateful
  • Transfer of invocation policies: exo-leasing
  • 3. alice SAYS amazon CANSAY CanInvoke(S,A) IF

LessThan(A,Limit) STATE (Limit=50,Update(Limit,A))

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SLIDE 27

Preserver Transformation

  • Filtering: retain a subset of data

– E.g., only the web history in the last six months

  • Aggregation: merging of raw data from

mutually trusting users of a service

– E.g., ad-click history of users

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SLIDE 28

Roadmap

  • Motivation
  • Secure Data Preserver
  • Design
  • Evaluation
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SLIDE 29

Evaluation

  • Deployment options:

– TTP, client, Xen-based co-location

  • Three sample preservers:

– Stock trading, targeted advertising, credit card xact

  • Main results:

– Cost of preserver – Comparison of deployment options – Security analysis: LS2-based theoretical analysis, Trusted Computing Base (TCB) comparison

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SLIDE 30

Cost of Basic Invocation (Latency)

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SLIDE 31

Cost of Stock Trading (Latency)

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SLIDE 32

Discussion

  • Find appropriate interfaces, verify them
  • Easy refactoring

– Even automated

  • Apps with rich interfaces

– Information flow control

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SLIDE 33

Related Work

  • Wilhelm’s mobile agent
  • CLAMP
  • BSTORE
  • Decentralized privacy frameworks
  • Information flow control
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SLIDE 34

Conclusion

  • Rearchitect web services around the principle
  • f giving data usage control back to users
  • Secure Data Preserver achieves this goal via

data encapsulation and interface-based access control

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SLIDE 35

Thank you! Q & A