Robert M artinage e Senior Fellow 1 Agenda Introduction - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Exploiting U.S. Long ng- g-Term Advantages to Restore ploiting U.S. Lon ng g erm Advantages to Resto Te T U.S. Global Power Projection Capability Robert M artinage e – Senior Fellow

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Introduction

Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions

Agenda

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Introduction

• DoD

D faces a period of fiscal austerity of unknown duration

• Nevertheless, numerous national security challenges cannot

Nevertheless, be ignored:

– Resurgent Russia –

Resurgent Russia R

– China seeks hegemony in East Asia –

China seeks hegemony in East Asia C

– North Korea as belligerent as ever –

North Korea as belligerent as ever N

– Iran expanding its missile arsenal, pursuing nuclear weapons –

Iran expanding its missile arsenal, pursuing nuclear weapons I

– Radical Islamic threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia –

Radical Islamic threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia R

– Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifically designed to threaten – Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifica

Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifica A traditional U.S. methods of power projection

An offset strategy is needed to address growing scale and complexity of security challenges in a fiscally constrained ty challenges in a ty challenges in a environment

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Introduction

Antecedents of a “Third” Offset Strategy

Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions

Outline

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Historical Antecedents

Past DoD Efforts to Offset Numerical Inferiority:

• 1950s – President Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy

emphasizes large numbers of nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and missiles.

• 1970s – Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under

Secretary William Perry direct DoD to develop stealth, precision strike weapons, and improved C4ISR.

President Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Harold Brown

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M -65 Atomic Canon “ Atomic Annie” HB1001 “ Have Blue” 1950s 1970s

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Eisenhower’s “New Look”

• Eisenhower determined to deter the USSR

isenhower determined to deter without bankrupting America. –

Soviet conventional forces greatly outnumbered U.S. forces

–

Soviets could probe periphery and start proxy wars to exhaust U.S., as in Korea 1950–53

• Emphasized nuclear weapons, bomber forces, and missile forces as

Emphasized nuclear weapons, bom backstop to conventional forces: –

Accelerated fielding of the hydrogen bomb

–

B-47 and B-52 bombers with KC-135 tankers

–

Atlas, Titan, and M inuteman ICBMs

–

George Washington SSBN with Polaris SLBMs

–

U-2 and Corona satellite for strategic reconnaissance

–

BM EWS, Nike, airborne alerts, dispersal, and silos for survivability

• ,

, , p ,

Air Force budget increased to 47% of

,

f DoD D spending; Air Force budget increased to 47% of oD DoD Army and M arine Corps budgets shrank

U-2 Dragon Lady Atlas

• Ei

Ei w

6

B-47

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Eisenhower’s “New Look”

• Nation needs a

a balanced strategy y to Nation needs a alanced strategy ba y o to confront full range of anticipated threats.

• Global air warfare capability

y provides valuable e strategic Global air warfare capab freedom of maneuver.

• Threats of
• f asymmetric punishment

nt can be an effective Threats of symmetric punis as instrument of deterrence.

• Covert operations

s can provide an affordable option for Covert operations an provide a ca achieving national objectives.

• Alliances matter – they complicate enemy planning and

impose costs on competitors rs rs.

U-2 Dragon Lady Atlas

• N

7

B-47

N i d l d b N

The Key Lessons

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Brown / Perry Offset Strategy: Stealth, C4ISR and Precision Strike

• SecDef

ef Harold Brown and USD William Perry devised technological cDe ef Harold Brown and USD William Perry devised technologic H “offset strategy” to counter 1970s Soviet conventional buildup.

• Core thrusts were

e ISR, PGM s, stealth h aircraft, anti t - ti ti-armor

• Core thrusts were

C weapons, space ere ce ce- SR, PGM s s IS I ere e e-based ISR / stealth M s, s / / comms a craft, an rc i ti-a th a s / navigation

– Genesis of F-117, B-2, JSTARS, AWACS, GPS, ATACMS, BAT

• Capabilities became integral to 1980s

s AirLand d Battle concept

• Key Lessons:

–

T echnology multiplied combat effectiveness

–

Shifted competition into areas of U.S. advantage

–

“High-low” mix to meet scale of global presence requirement

–

Institutional commitment to “offset strategy” persisted from Carter to Reagan administration

Assault Breaker ATACM S E-8 JSTARS M issile with Bus PAVE M over Surface Launcher Fusion Center Targets Terminally Guided Sub-M unitions

• Sec

S

• Sec

S “of “

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Toward a Third Offset Strategy

• New offset strategy should

d exploit enduring U.S. advantages s in New offset strategy should d unmanned operations, long d ng- ploit e xp x ex g-range nduring it e e and low ring w- U.S. advantage U ng w-observable air unmanned unmanned op

• perations,

peration perations, l d op d op s undersea lon lon ng ng g- ange ange a ra ra r e e nd low nd low an an w- bservable air bservable air

• b
• b
• ns, l

ns, l a warfare, and complex systems engineering in

• perati
• perations
• rder to

s, s, ndersea ndersea un un a a arfare, and complex systems engineerin arfa are, an are, are d compl d co ex systems enginee ex sy ex s w

• ns
• ns

s

• project power despite adversary A2/ AD capabilities

g erin es es.

• New

w strategy should also: – Reduce dependence on forward bases and space-based capabilities – Foster novel concepts of operation that leverage mix of new and legacy

capabilities

– Increase emphasis on deterrence by denial and punishment rather than the

threat to restore the status quo

• Premium on survivable forward presence and global responsiveness
• Hold targets at risk within A2/AD umbrella and outside immediate combat zone

– Impose long-term costs upon rivals – Leverage alliances to gain positional advantage and share burdens

• N

u

9

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Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy

Why Not “Business As Usual”?

Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions

Outline

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Power Projection: The Capacity Challenge

• 2014 QDR

R argues that U.S. will have sufficient military capacity to defeat 014 QDR R rgues that U.S. will have sufficient military capacity to defeat ar

• ne aggressor and “deny the objectives of, or impose unacceptable costs

ne aggressor and deny the objectives of, o ne aggressor and deny the objectives of, o esso

• n, another aggressor in another region.”
• US will

ll likely lack the capacity to fight and win two major theater wars in US will kely lack the capac lik

• verlapping timeframes

apac s s – ci pac – if y to fight and win two major theater ity ci f if if we don’t project power differently.

• As the

e 2014 National Defense Panel Review w notes:

–

“ A global war-fighting capability [is] the sine qua non of a superpower and thus essential to the credibility of America’s overall national security strategy.”

–

“ U.S. military must have the capability and capacity to deter or stop aggression in multiple theaters – not just one – even when engaged in a large- scale war.”

• 20

20 20

• 11

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1 11 11 11 1 11 11 11 11 11 1 11 1 11 11 11 11 11 11

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Power Projection: The Capability Challenge

• Traditional approach to power projection:

– Build up combat power and logistical support. – M aximize airpower sortie generation from close-in land- and sea-bases. – Employ heavy mechanized ground forces.

• Problems with the traditional approach:

– Requires political access to forward bases and littoral waters. – Depends on unimpeded use of ports and airfields. – Strategically unresponsive – requires months to prepare. – Difficult to implement in multiple theaters simultaneously. – Entails growing operational risk…

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Operational Risks with the Traditional Approach

Kinetic ASAT DF DF- F- F 21 Kilo, Song g - g Class SSN Hong ng- g-6 Bomber DF DF- F- F 15 DF DF- F- F 15 variant DF DF- F- F 11A DF DF- F- F 15 DF DF- F- F 11A DF DF- F- F 21D SA SA- A-N

• N-

N-20 Sovremenny Destroyer SA SA- A-22 S300 HQ HQ- Q-9 HY HY- Y- Y 2 C- C-704/NASR HY HY HY- HY Y- Y 2 H Y- Y 3A DH DH- H-10 Sovremenny y Destroy D 30 days at 650 nm 75 days at 1,760 nm Kilo, Song - lass SS C 18 days at 930 nm D t D 1 day at 130 nm Laser ASAT

M odern M odern Fighters

1 day at 130 nm Fast Attack Craft

Over er- Ove the

• ver

r- he e- th he e- Horizon

• n

H zo

• riz

Radar Sea M ines Anti nt - ti Satellite An nt ti- atellite Sa S Capabilities Anti t - ti Ship O An nti- hip Sh S Ballistic M issiles Land nd- d Attack Lan nd d- ttack At A Ballistic M issiles Land nd- d Attack / Lan Anti nd nt - ttac At A nd d-A ti i Ship

2 HY Y 2 H A R A R An

nt ti i- p hip h Sh Sh S Cruise M issiles Advanced Advanc IADS Space ce- e based Spac ISR/

• ased

ba b ac ce e / R/ / Comms sed ms/ ed s/ Nav Strategic Strategi g c depth/ breadth

Hon ng g Bomber 6 6

M aritime Strike M aritime Aircraft Advanced Submarines Naval Surface Forces G- G-RAM M attacks on bases G AM M attacks on base A RA R CBRN attacks on bases Long Range Long Ra AAM s Counter- r PGM Counte er- G PG P defenses

Laser ASAT

Directed Directed Directed Energy “Armed M erchant Armed M e “A Cruisers”

• Close-in ports

and airbases vulnerable to attack

• Surface ships

and carriers easier to detect, track, and attack at range

• Non-stealthy

aircraft vulnerable to modern IADS

• Space no longer

a sanctuary

ys at 1 760 nm 75 day Shang Class SSN

Cl i

13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 3 13 13 13 3 13 13 13 13 13 13 3 13 13 13 13 13 13 3 13

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Strategic Risks with the Traditional Approach

• Crisis Instability:

–

Strong incentive for enemy to preemptively attack forward U.S. bases, forces, and

• n-orbit satellites
• Cost Imposition on the United States:

–

Defending regional hubs is very costly and cheaply countered

• g

g y y p y

Waning deterrent credibility and Allied confidence ce:

–

Enemies may increasingly perceive the likely cost of U.S. intervention as high

–

Allies may begin to question credibility of U.S. security commitments

• Cr

–

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M obile TELs ALCM s Leakers Leakers SLCM s Leakers

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Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”?

Enduring U.S. Advantages

Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions

Outline

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Leverage Key Enduring Sources of U.S. Advantage

– Unmanned operations – Extended-range air operations – Low-observable air operations – Undersea warfare – Complex systems engineering and integration

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Unmanned Operations

• U.S. is a world leader in unmanned systems development and

U.S. is a world leader in unmanned systems development a

• peration, as well as artificial intelligence and autonomy.

–

We have maintained large numbers of UAS, employed them in combat, and trained operators two decades.

• Unmanned systems can provide

e responsive, persistent coverage Unmanned systems can provide e esponsive, persisten re needed to find and attack mobile targets over wide t cove ten e e areas

• Unmanned systems offer

g er er much lower life fe fe- e-cycle costs s s relative to Unmanned system manned aircraft

• Current

nt nt and planned joint UAS fleet primarily consists of short rt- t- and Current medium t m- d planned joint UAS nd n an m-range aircraft, and S fleet pr UAS d d consists rimarily consists of sho t pr s s almost entirely of non sho

• n
• n-

rt t- nd a

• r

r sho n-stealthy medium medium m-r aircraft.

• M edium Range

M edium M Q ium Q- Rang R um Q 1B/ C M Q M Q Q M Q Q Q- / C / C B/ B/ Q- B 1 Q 8B M M Q M Q M Q M Q- B 8B 8B 8 Q-8 Q 9A M Q M Q- A 9A 9 UCLASS UC RQ UC UC Q RQ- SS SS SS S AS AS CLA CLA Q-170 Long Range Long Ra RQ g Ra RQ- nge an g Ra Q 4B RQ RQ M Q Q M Q M Q Q- B Q-4B 4B 4 Q-4C

J

• int UAS Fleet, FY17

Unbalanced Range

Non

• n-

n-Stealthy No

• n

tealthy t S Predator Predator Predator Pred Pred Reaper Reaper Reaper Fire Scout Fire Scout Fire Scout Global Hawk Global Haw Global Haw Triton Semi m - mi i-Stealthy em mi tealth St S UCLASS UCL RQ UC UCL RQ RQ- SS SS AS AS CLA CLA CLA CL Q-170

J

• int UAS Fleet, FY17

Unbalanced Stealth

Predator Ground Control Station Avionics specialists prepare a Global Hawk M Q-9 takeoff

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Extended-Range Air Operations

• U.S. has unmatched capability for high

gh- h-tempo U.S. has unmatched global ISR / strike. – Over seventy years of experience developing, building, maintaining,

and using heavy bombers in combat.

– Aerial refueling is a key enabler for manned operations, and will have

an even more profound effect on unmanned operations.

• p

Bombers have the long g combat radius s to

p

• enable rapid, global

Bombers have the l response to short he l rt-

• ng

g ombat radiu co

• he l

t-notice aggression s dius

• n.

– Crew fatigue limits their ability to sustain long-range operations for

extended periods.

• p

Current and planned joint air portfolio is heavily weighted Current and planned joint air towards manned and short t air rt- portfolio is heavily weighted r air t-range fighter / attack aircraft.

Short Range Short Range USAF/ USN USAF/ USN USAF/ USN Fighter/ Attack Long Range ng Ra B g Ra

• ng

an g Ra B-1 B- 1 B 1 B-2 B- 2 B 2 B-52

J

• int Aviation Inventory, 2014 – 2023:

Unbalanced Range

B-52 landing gear test B-2 Spirit, KC-135 tanker A B-1B Lancer drops cluster munitions

J

• int Aviation Inventory, 2014 – 2023:

Unbalanced M anned/ Unmanned M ix

M anned M anned USAF/ USN USAF/ USN USAF/ USN Fighter/ Attack Fighter/ Attack Fighter/ Attack Long Range Strike Long Range Strike Long Range Strike Manned ISR Aircraft Unmanned Unma M Q nma M Q M Q- nned n ma Q-1, M Q ed M Q M Q- d Q-9, RQ RQ- Q-4, M Q M Q- Q-4, M Q M Q- Q-8, UCLASS

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Low-Observable Air Operations

• U.S. has significant qualitative lead in design, manufacture,

U.S. has significant qualitative and operation of LO aircraft. – Stealth aircraft employed in Desert Storm (1991), Kosovo (1999),

Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), and S yria (2014).

• Stealth enables precision attacks in

n denied airspace ce.

• Current

nt t and planned joint air portfolio is s heavily weighted Curren nt towards nd pl t n an non d pl

• anned joint air p

a pl stealthy aircraft

• ir p

.

• F-

F 35 and F F- F 22 are more stealthy than fourth th- h generation F- 5 and 35 3 F- 2 are more stealt 22 2 fighters but have the same thy than fourth h- eneration ge g ealt e disadvantages resulting from g te s but a e t e sa fighters b figh figh but have the same ut h ut their short combat radius d e me us us.

Non

• n-

n-Stealthy No

• n

tealthy t S USAF/ USN USAF/ USN US SAF/ USN SAF/ SAF Fighter/ Attack, ig ighter B gh ghter B- / Att r/ r/ hter hter B-1, B / Att B- ack ack ta ta / Att / Att B-52 Semi m - mi i-Stealthy mi F mi

• ealt

e te t S F 35 F- 5 35 35 F-3 F-22 Stealthy Stealt B ealt

• hy

th ealt B-2

J

• int Aviation Inventory, 2014 – 2023:

Unbalanced Stealth

F-117 Nighthawk drops a guided bomb B-2 Spirit Night vision aerial refueling

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Undersea Warfare

• USN submarine force was victorious in WW2 and has

USN submarine force was victorious in WW2 and ha conducted constant SSN/ SSBN patrols since 1958. – USN used TLAM s in combat many times since 1991.

• SSNs permit operations in A2/ AD environments and are

SSNs permit operations in difficult, costly, and time s in me me- A2/ AD environments a A in e-consuming to counter.

• Current and planned overall Navy force structure is

Current and planned overall Navy force structure is weighted towards surface forces, not submarine forces. – In FY28, SSNs drop to 41 boats and SSGNs retire

• Undersea payload capacity in 2028 will be

e 38% of 2014 capacity

– Fewer than 12 SSBNs from FY30 to FY42

Surface Surface CVN CVN CVN CG/ DDG CG/ DDG CG/ DDG FFG/ LCS FFG/ LCS FFG/ LCS Amphibious Ships Amphibious Ships mphibious Sh Combat Logistics Ships Subsurface ubsurfac SSN SSN SSN SSBN

Navy Force Structure, 2030

“Wet training” aboard SUBTRFAC Dry dock bow repair PCU Virginia (SSN 774)

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Complex Systems Engineering

• M ilitary and defense industry have designed, built, and

M ilitary and defense industry have designed, bu

• perated very complex weapons systems and
• perated very c
• perated very c

architectures.

• To exploit this advantage, the U.S. should link

To exploit this advantage, the U.S. should link heterogeneous, geographically distributed platforms into a heterogeneous, g heterogeneous, geog global surveillance ge geog ce ce- raphically distri raphically distri g eog eog e-strike network.

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Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages

Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept

Conclusions

Outline

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The J

• int Global Surveillance Strike (GSS)

Network

• Leverage enduring advantages in the five capability areas to

verage enduring advantages in the five capability area ev create a joint global surveillance strike (GSS) network.

• Attributes of the GSS:

– Balanced: Tailored attributes for different roles and environments – Resilient: Less dependent on close-in bases, reduced sensitivity to air

defense threat, tolerant of disruption in space capability

– Responsive: Able to generate surveillance-strike presence within hours

• f decision to do so

– Scalable: Can be expanded to influence events in multiple locations

around the world concurrently

• With “high

gh- h-low” mix of elements, GSS network could be cost st- With hig gh h effective in

• w m

h- o lo n both mix o m h low ix o w- f elements, GSS netwo

• f

x o w-medium and medium two m- rk could be c

• r

wo m-high threat effective in effective in n n

• th
• th

bo bo bo b h environments.

• Le

Le

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Exploiting Advantages in Unmanned Operations

• Employ UAS to maintain persistent ISR

SR- R-strike orbits and mploy UAS to maintain pers hedge against loss of space pers

• istent ISR

R- trike orbits and t s si ers based ISR, navigation, timing, and communications

• Develop

p automated aerial refueling g for UAS: – Refuelable UAS offer extended mission endurance with low life-cycle

cost, and are an affordable way to provide scalable, persistent coverage

• ver multiple areas at once.
• Rebalance UAS fleet

et with acquisition of three new survivable, Rebala long bala ng ng- nce UAS flee et w a bala g-range systems:

1. Stealthy HALE ISR UAS 2. Stealthy, refuelable land-based UCAS 3. Stealthy, refuelable sea-based UCAS

• Acquire UUVs and payload modules to
• expand limited SSN

Acquire U capacity

• E

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Exploiting Advantages in Long-Range / LO Air Operations

• Harness synergy between low passive radar signatures and

advance electronic c c attack.

• Focus R&D on enhanced

d d IR signature e management.

• Future joint long-range ISR and strike fleet should be

increasingly unmanned and survivable le le.

• D

g y Develop and field stealthy HALE UAS, stealthy land nd- d- and sea ea- D velop and field st ev based UCAS, and teal ld st d LRS teal RS- eal S-B y HALE UAS thy lt al B to sustain S, stealthy lan UAS n n U.S. advantage nd e e in nd sea-

• n

a d- n n global, ba bas low as as w- UCAS, and UCAS, and d d R LR LR RS RS-B B o sustain

• sustain

to to d d sed sed s w-observable air operations.

• p

M issions to include: – Wide-area surveillance – Electronic attack – High-volume precision strike and HDBT defeat – Persistent surveillance-attack – M ining and ASuW a

26

Exploiting Advantages in Undersea Operations

• SSNs and SSGNs to provide covert ISR coverage and SOF

support in peacetime, as well as ASW, W, W ASuW W, counter e - r-sensor, support in pea and counter pea e - cetime, as well as ASW, A a pea r-land attacks in wartime.

• Navy should expand undersea strike capacity, including

ability to conduct electronic attack, counter e - r-sensor, and ability to counter to e - conduct electro c to r-air operations.

• To mitigate decline in SSN/ SSGN force structure:

– Procure Virginia Payload M odule – Field family of UUVs for littoral operations – Develop towed and seabed payload modules – Develop wider array of undersea

weapons

sup

Towed Payload M odule Virginia Payload M odule Upward falling Seabed payload modules

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Exploiting Advantages in Complex Systems Engineering

• GSS should link the nodes within a resilient and protected C3

architecture.

• Develop advanced battle management system to fuse and

Develop advanced battle management system to fuse an correlate ISR data, as well as to allocate ISR and strike resources quickly and efficiently.

• Initially rely on legacy C3 paths and core GSS platforms, and

Initially rely on legacy C3 paths and core GSS platforms, a

• ver time, add more nodes and communications paths.

a

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Selected GSS Network Elements – Restore Balance Across Threat Spectrum

M anned Unmanned

Responsiveness Threat Level

B-2 LRS-B SSN SSGN B-1 B-52 Tankers P-8 AWACS JSTARS Army SOF CG DDG CVN F-35 F-22 Army A2/ AD Networks F-15 F-16 F-18 E-2D LCS M Q-X UUV Payload M odules Global Hawk Triton N-UCAS RQ-170 M Q-1 M Q-9 M Q-8 Army / USM C Ground Forces New HALE ISR UAS

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GSS Implementation Actions

• What should we do to make GSS a reality?

– Accelerate development and potentially expand procurement of LRS-B – Develop and field stealthy HALE UAS – Develop and field stealthy, refuelable, carrier- and land-based UCAS – Automated aerial refueling (especially for UAS/ UCAS) – Counter-space capability to deter attacks on US satellites – GPS alternatives such as HALE UAS “pseudolites,” advanced IM Us, and

miniaturized atomic clocks

• W

–

30

GSS Implementation Actions, cont’d

• What else should we develop and field?

– M ulti-mission, long-endurance UUVs – Undersea strike: Virginia Payload M odule, seabed payload pods, towed

payloads, improved TLAM, multi-mission missiles, sub-launched conventional ballistic missile

– Expanded undersea sensor networks – Improved naval mines and long-range ASW weapons – EM rail guns and directed energy weapons – New counter-sensor weapons – Expeditionary ground-based A2/AD, including air defense missiles,

coastal defense, mines, UUVs

31

Potential Funding Offsets

• Shed excess bases, rein in personnel costs.
• Pursue burden sharing with allies
• Refocus current programs (e.g., UCLASS, F/ A

/ A- A-XX, Refoc M Q efoc

• us

cu foc X)

• Restore balance:

– Scale

le l - e-back force structure and modernization programs

– Scal

S le e- ack force structure and modernization progra ba b

• ptimized for power projection in permissive (low

a

• gra

w-

• ptimized for power projection i
• pti
• imized for power projection i

miz miz medium threat) environments

32

Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept

Conclusions

Outline

33

Restoring U.S. Global Power Projection With a New Offset Strategy

• Adversaries are developing their own ISR

SR SR- R-strike networks ks—with an Adversaries are developing the emphasis on missile systems g the ms ms—

• wn ISR trike network

t st ks with an w eir he —to challenge conventional U.S. power emphasis on projection

• To “offset,”

” DoD D should leverage its “core competencies” in To offset, oD DoD hould lev sh unmanned systems, long lev ng ng- erage its core ve lev g-range and low

• re

w- competencies in c

• re

w-observable airpower, unmanned systems, lon ng g ange and low a ra w bservable air

• b
• undersea warfare, and complex systems engineering
• Global Surveillance

ce- e-Strike (GSS) network with a “high gh- h-low” mix of Global Surveillanc ce e trike (GSS) network with a hig St S gh ow mix of

• lo

elements could provide balanced, resilient, globally responsive, elements could provide balanced, re scalable power projection capacity

• If deterrence fails, GSS network could deny the aggressor’s war

If deterrence fails, GSS network could deny the aggressor s war aims, inflict asymmetric punishment, and roll back his A2/ AD aims, inflic network

• GSS force could reach IOC in the mid

id- d-to

• to-
• -late 2020s if focused R&D

GSS force could reach IOC in the mid d to to

• te 2020s

a la begins now and the government stays the course

• A

e

34

Questions?