Resolve in international politics
Joshua D. Kertzer Paul Sack Associate Professor of Political Economy Department of Government, Harvard University jkertzer@gov.harvard.edu May 29, 2019
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Resolve in international politics Joshua D. Kertzer Paul Sack Associate Professor of Political Economy Department of Government, Harvard University jkertzer@gov.harvard.edu May 29, 2019 Political psychology in international relations Mass
Joshua D. Kertzer Paul Sack Associate Professor of Political Economy Department of Government, Harvard University jkertzer@gov.harvard.edu May 29, 2019
– Public opinion about foreign policy – Public diplomacy, counterinsurgency, information warfare
– Leaders and foreign policy decision-making
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Politics (Princeton University Press, 2016).
Risk”, International Organization 71(S1), 2017, S109-S136.
International Relations”, Conflict Management and Peace Science 34(1), 2017, 81-97.
Keren Yarhi-Milo, “How Do Observers Assess Resolve?”, British Journal of Political Science, 2019.
Jonathan Renshon, “Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(10), 2018, 2150- 2179.
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1. Political psychology in international politics
– Focusing in particular on the psychology of resolve
2. Resolve’s central role in international politics
– The same reason why resolve matters also makes it hard to study
3. Two puzzles about resolve:
– Explaining variation in resolve – Explaining assessments of resolve at a distance
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– Same traits we study when explaining variation in willpower more generally
– Given complex information environment, which indicators do observers use to draw inferences about resolve?
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13 Average marginal component effect (AMCE)
0.1 0.2
Established Leader New Leader No Military Service Some Military Service Long Military Service Female Leader Male Leader
Leader characteristics
Ally Adversary
Relationship with USA
Dictatorship Democracy Mixed
Regime type
Low Capabilities High Capabilities Low Stakes High Stakes
Capabilities & interests
(Positive values equal greater resolve)
0.0
Horizontal bars denote 95% clustered bootstrapped confidence intervals
14 Average marginal component effect (AMCE)
Nothing Mobilized troops Public threat
Current behavior
Target Initiator Against ally Against adversary Different leader, stood firm Same leader, stood firm Same leader, backed down Different leader, backed down
Past behavior in previous foreign policy crisis
0.1 0.2
(Positive values equal greater resolve)
– 89 current and former members of the Israeli Knesset – 64% of sample served on Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee
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– Cross-cultural variations in assessments of resolve – Differences between elite and mass cognition – Aggregation in foreign policy decision-making
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