POL POL201Y1: Po Politics of Development Karol Czuba, University - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

POL POL201Y1: Po Politics of Development Karol Czuba, University of Toronto Lecture 15: Regime change and regime types

Re Recap • What is the relationship between society and development? • Social capital: – Fukuyama: social capital à development – Putnam: social development à institutional performance / state capacity à development Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Re Recap • What is the relationship between society and development? • Social capital: – Fukuyama: social capital à development – Putnam: social development à institutional performance / state capacity à development Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Re Recap • State as an: – Migdal: – Participant in political contestation between competing political agents and social forces – Interactions between the state and society à type of distribution of social control à state capacity à development – Migdal, Kohli, and Shue: – Arena of political contestation between competing political agents and social forces – Struggles for domination between social forces à patterns of domination à state capacity Karol Czuba, University of Toronto à development • Types of domination / social control: – Integrated / concentrated – Dispersed / fragmented

Wh What are the developmental outcomes s of of dif ifferent con onfig figuration ions s of of state-soc socie iety rela lation ions? s? Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Ou Outcomes s of f distribution of f domination • Integrated / concentrated à state autonomy à – High state capacity à development (or, in some cases, unsuccessful ‘seeing like a state’ schemes) + repression – (Neo)patrimonialism à low state capacity à low level of development + repression • Dispersed / fragmented à – ‘Triangle of accommodation’ à low state capacity à low level of development + (in some cases) decentralization of predation (i.e. emergence of roving bandits) Karol Czuba, University of Toronto – ‘Consensually strong state equilibrium’ (Acemoglu 2005) • Disclaimer: stylized / ideal types

Ca Cause ses s of f distri ribution of f domi mination • Path dependence / complex historical process (Olson, Tilly) • Outcome of strategic interactions between political agents / social forces (Migdal; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue) • Economic basis: – Point resources (oil, other extractives, logging), horticulture (coffee, cocoa), seignorage, trade taxes, high capacity to observe transactions à state autonomy – Livestock, manufacturing, informal sector à state dependence Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Ho How does es soci ciety y rea eact ct to unde undesirabl ble s state a acti tions ns ( (i.e .e. the . the pi pitf tfalls o of st state capacity)? Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

In Initial itial conditio itions • Dependent states: – ‘Consensually strong state equilibrium’ – Low state capacity + low level of development + decentralization of predation • Autonomous states: – State autonomy + development – State autonomy + lack of development Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

So Society / citizen responses • Exit: citizen accepts the deleterious change but alters her behaviour to optimize in the new environment • Voice: citizen does not accept the deleterious change and instead seeks to ‘persuade’ the government to reinstate her original environment • Loyalty: citizen accepts the deleterious change and makes no change to her pre-existing behaviour Based on Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2017. “An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics.” British Karol Czuba, University of Toronto – Journal of Political Science .

Gam Game tr tree Karol Czuba, University of Toronto Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2017. “An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics.” British Journal of Political Science .

Mo Model • Lost / seized benefit = 1 • E: benefit of exit • L: benefit of retaining citizen loyalty (L > 0) • c: cost of voice (c > 0) Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Su Subgame me perf rfect Nash equilibri ria Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

EVL EVL game and nd di distribut bution n of f do domina nation • ‘Consensually strong state equilibrium’: – Response to voice (return of benefit to citizen), or – No predation – à Consolidation of state accountability (and state capacity if required to provide the benefit) Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

EVL EVL game and nd di distribut bution n of f do domina nation • Low state capacity + low level of development + (potentially) decentralization of predation: – Response to voice – But: – Does the state have capacity to return the benefit? – Is the state the predator? – If not, exit? Karol Czuba, University of Toronto – à Further weakening of state accountability and state capacity

EVL EVL game and nd di distribut bution n of f do domina nation • Autonomous states: – Voice ignored – Citizen exit where credible à state loss of loyalty Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Ou Outcome • Accountable and capable states stay accountable and capable and continue to deliver public goods / development • Elsewhere society loses out Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Wha What can n so society y do do whe when n the he state ha has s no no in incen entiv tive e to res espond to its its dem eman ands? Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Ho How does es reg egim ime e chan ange e hap appen en? • Escalation of voice through reduction of its cost • Loss / reduction of state autonomy Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

‘Ci ‘Civic culture’ ’ / so social capital Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Va Vanguard Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Re Repertoire of contention • Associations and coalitions • Public meetings • Processions • Vigils • Rallies and demonstrations Karol Czuba, University of Toronto • Sit-ins • Petitions • Boycotts and strikes

In Involv lvem emen ent t of spec ecialis ialists ts in in vio violen lence Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

(Ra (Rapid) ) economic change Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

(Ra (Rapid) ) economic change • Reduction of cost of voice for citizens • Reduction of state autonomy—inability to coopt, repress, or placate opposition or sustain patrimonial networks Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Ex Externa nal infl flue uenc nces • Foreign policy of other countries: – Democracy promotion – Restrictions on repression – Threat of international (humanitarian) intervention • Diffusion • Neighbourhood effects Karol Czuba, University of Toronto • Changes in the international system

In Inter ernatio tional al system em an and reg egim ime e chan ange Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

In Inter ernatio tional al system em an and reg egim ime e chan ange Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

Ou Outcomes s of f regi gime change • Level of regime consolidation: – Consolidated – Unconsolidated • Regime types: – Authoritarian – Totalitarian – Anocratic / hybrid Karol Czuba, University of Toronto – Democratic

De Democr cratiz tizatio tion tr trend Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

De Democr cratiz tizatio tion tr trend Karol Czuba, University of Toronto

De Democr cracy acy • Schumpeter: – “ The institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy . London: Unwin Hyman Ltd. – • Sen: – “We must not identify democracy with majority rule. Democracy has complex demands, which include voting and respect for election results, but it also requires Karol Czuba, University of Toronto the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment.” Sen, Amartya. 1999. “Democracy as a Universal Value.” Journal of Democracy 10 (3): 3-17. –

Ke Key democratic processes and institutions • Political system: – Free and fair elections – Political pluralism – Due process • Civil society: – Active (and free) participation of citizens in politics and civic life Karol Czuba, University of Toronto • Rule of law: – Protection of the human rights of all citizens – Equal application of laws and procedures to all citizens

De Democr cracy acy as as a s a social s cial str truggle le • Ake: – “There is really only one process of democratization, and that is a process of struggle. Democracy is never given, it is always taken.” Ake, Claude. 2000. The feasibility of democracy in Africa . Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development of – Social Science Research in Africa. Karol Czuba, University of Toronto