personality as an emergent process some metaphors
play

Personality as an Emergent Process: Some Metaphors/Speculation - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Personality as an Emergent Process: Some Metaphors/Speculation Steven N. Durlauf University of Wisconsin at Madison October 1, 2015 1 In this talk, I will propose some metaphors for personality which may be relevant to measurement


  1. Personality as an Emergent Process: Some Metaphors/Speculation Steven N. Durlauf University of Wisconsin at Madison October 1, 2015 1

  2. In this talk, I will propose some metaphors for “personality” which may be relevant to measurement issues. I have neither formal models to present nor empirical evidence, hence use of words metaphor and speculation. 2

  3. Emergence No single meaning. One idea: property that occurs at a higher order of aggregation that description of components of system. Examples: ice, ferromagnet, ghetto Sometimes conflated with path dependence Basic idea in what I will say: personality types are properties of interactions 3

  4. Empirical Metaphor 1: Social determinants of personality type Code of the Street, Elijah Anderson Oppositional Identity Theory, John Ogbu 4

  5. Courtesy of West Side Story (Officer Krupke Song) My father's a bastard, my ma's an S.O.B. My grandpa's always plastered, my grandma pushes tea. My sister wears a mustache, my brother wears a dress. Goodness gracious, that's why I'm a mess. Yes, Officer Krupke you're really a slob. This boy don't need a doctor just a good honest job. Society's played him a terrible trick. And sociologically he's sick. Personality trait emerges as regularity in a population. 5

  6. Social Interactions Approach { } ω ∈ − Suppose that personality is binary, 1 ,1 i Private observable influences: h i Social influences: m − perceived average personality type of others e i ε Unobserved heterogeneity: i Personality type 1 occurs if ( ) ( ) − − = + + α − ε > e u 1 u 1 2 h 2 Jm 2 0 i i i i g , g i 6

  7. If unobserved heterogeneity is logit, then self-consistent personality type of group has average value ( ) ∫ = β + β + β α m tanh h J m dh i i i i i g where dh is empirical density of h within g . If all heterogeneity except in ε is eliminated, then ( ) = β + β + βα m tanh h Jm g 7

  8. Standard results: h α β there exists a threshold function ( ) β + βα For fixed , , such that J h g If ( ) β + βα > then one average personality type J h J g If ( ) β + βα < there exist 3 average personality types. J h J g Analogous results for size of h and α . 8

  9. Relevance for Personality 1. Personality distribution is “emergent” i.e. not pinned down by knowledge of fundamentals h i 2. Nonlinearities may be important in cost-benefit. Phase transition. 3. Different notion of parental investment. Parents invest via social interactions. 9

  10. Econometrics: Issues for Identification 1. Simultaneity (reflection problem). Not generic. 2. Endogeneity of social structure. Solution via richer economics: Model expansion 3. Unobserved group effects. Hardest since only have “statistical” solutions available . 10

  11. Unexplored Idea: Evolution of Social Structure Encodes Information on Personality. Within econometrics, the deepest analyses of self-selection are based on explicitly modeling the self-selection and including it as part of the statistical analysis. Unlike the instrumental variables approach, this has interesting implications for identification. 11

  12. Consider linear model ( ) ω = + + + ε + ξ cX dY Jm E X Y F , , . i i g g i i g i X g where X and Y denote individual and group level heterogeneity (capturing difference between parental education and distribution of education among adults in a neighborhood. This expression exploits Heckman’s classic idea that in the presence of ε no longer has a conditional self-selection, the regression residual i mean of zero. 12

  13. Following the logic behind Heckman’s selection correction, can be consistently estimated if one adds a term proportional to ( ) ε E X Y F , , i i g X g | ( ) ฀ κ ε prior to estimation; denote this estimate as E X Y F , , . Hence, i i g X g | from this perspective, controlling for endogenous social structure amounts to estimating ( ) ฀ ω = + + + ρκ ε + ξ cX dY Jm E X Y F , , i i g g i i g X g | i This is a nonlinear model, and may be identified when identification fails under random assignment. 13

  14. Parent Investment as Location ∈ − Model parents as making choices of group memberships, g {0,... G 1} , ∈ − δ and offspring behaviors, l {0,... L 1} . Group choices are denoted as i ω continues to denote the behavioral choice. while i 14

  15. The sequential logit structure ensures that choice probabilities at both stages have a multinomial logit probability structure. Defining = + + h k c x d y , the behavioral choices conditional on a group i l g , , l l i l g choice g will be defined by the probabilities ( ) β + e ( ) exp h Jp µ ω = ∀ = i l g , , i l g , , e . l h , p l i g , i l g , , i l g , , ( ) ∑ β + e exp h Jp i l g , , i l g , , l 15

  16. Group choices reflect the fact that choices in the stage stage will produce utility in the fashion of our original multinomial choice model. ω Group choice probabilities depend on the expected utility of the choice i δ = will produce in the second stage. Letting g code the choice of group i by individual i , these choices are also assumed to be logit ( ) β ( ) exp Z = ∑ µ δ = ∀ G i g , e g h , p l g , ( ) i i l g , , i l g , , β exp Z G i g , g β denotes the heterogeneity parameter for group choices and G ( ) = + + ε ∀ e e Z E max h Jp h , p l . i g , l i l g , , i l g , , i l g , , i l g , , i l g , , 16

  17. A joint probability description of group memberships and personality ( ) µ ω = δ = ∀ = e l , g h , p l g , i g , i i l g , , i l g , ,     ( ) ∑ − β β β + ( ) 1 e exp log exp h Jp     β + e G i l g , , i l g , , exp h Jp     ⋅ i l g , , i l g , , l   ( )   ( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ β + − e β β β + 1 e exp h Jp exp  log exp h Jp    i l g , , i l g , , G i l g , , i l g , ,     l g l This model has not been studied. 17

  18. Personality as Emergent from Many Specific Traits: Kurt Gerstein Oskar Schindler “Men in Dark Times”-Hannah Arendt. Why were they different? Are these examples of types? 18

  19. Dear kindly, social worker, they say go earn a buck. Like be a soda jerker which means like be a schmuck. It's not I'm antisocial, I'm only anti-work. Gloryosky, that's why I'm a jerk! Officer Krupke, you've done it again. This boy don't need a job, he needs a year in the pen. It ain't just a question of misunderstood. Deep down inside him he's no good. 19

  20. Suppose that there the personality type “moral hero” is modelled via the threshold approach ω = if x γ + ε > 1 0 i i i Explanation of the type is due to unusual heterogeneity. With reference to observable heterogeneity, my assertion is that in additive world, hard to understand these cases. Other way to think? 20

  21. ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ − − = + − ε > u 1 u 1 2 h x 2 h x x 0 i i j ij ij ij ik i ≠ j j k One can add higher order terms, of course. Properties: multiple configurations of traits can produce same type. Supervenience. Analogy to SNP and disease, IQ, etc? 21

  22. Fisherian argument for additivity is not, I think persuasive. Can This Link to Binary Choice Model? The various characteristics x can themselves be interdependent or i determined by social interactions. 22

  23. Personality as Outcome of Reinforcement Process Dear, dear, dear kindly Sergeant Krupke you gotta understand. It's just our bringin' up-ke that gets us out of hand. Our mothers all are junkies, our fathers all are drunks. Golly Moses, naturally we're punks. Gee, Officer Krupke we're very upset. We never had the love that every child oughta get We ain't no delinquents, we're misunderstood. Deep down inside us there is good. 23

  24. Background: Heckman Curve on rates of return to investment at different ages 24

  25. Dynamic Complementarity Cunha and Heckman emphasize dynamic complementarities. θ + = θ η f ( , , I X , ) t 1 t t t t θ denotes skills, I investment, X stock variable (to be explained), η is shock. To understand the role of the extra stock variable, onsider the dynamics, 25

  26.   α ( ) ( )( ) − = − + π + s + − α − + π + s X X   x X I e 1 x X I e , − − − t t 1 t t 1 t t t t 1 t t  S  t − = S S s − t t 1 t ≤ α ≤ . where X S are given by history and 0 , 1 0 0 α = 0 If there are no long lasting “averaging” type effects. S is the sum of non-negative “step sizes” s t t The variable x denotes an effect at date t which could be a function of t past X s as well as other variables. ' The “shocks” { e are given by a mean zero, finite variance, stochastic } t process. 26

  27. 27

  28. α = The simplest version of this system is one where the step size is 1, 1 s = and 0 , so dynamics determined by average of past ' x s , t ∑ − = 1 X t x t i = i 1 This gives the model a Polya Urn flavor. 28

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend