[PDF] - Outline Authentication and Identity Management Authentication PDF Document

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Computer Security: Security at Work

Bart Jacobs

Institute for Computing and Information Sciences – Digital Security Radboud University Nijmegen

Version: fall 2010

Bart Jacobs Version: fall 2010 Computer Security 1 / 58 Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Outline

Authentication and Identity Management Authentication Identity management Kerberos, and derivatives Operating System and Network Security Security models A very brief look at operating systems Network security basics Cyber war and terrorism Cyber war Terrorism Conclusions

Bart Jacobs Version: fall 2010 Computer Security 2 / 58 Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

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Human to computer authentication

Recall: identification = saying who you are; authentication = proving who you are. The three basic human-to-computer authentication mechanisms are based on:

1 something you have, like a (physical) key, or card

Risk? theft, copying

2 something you know, like a password or PIN

Risk? eavesdropping (shoulder-surfing), brute-force trials, forgetting (how secure is the recovery procedure?), social engineering, multiple use, fake login screens (use wrong password first!)

3 something you are, ie. biometrics, like fingerprints or iris

Risk? imitation (non-replaceability), multiple use

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More about passwords

It is common wisdom that at least a 64 bit string is needed to be secure against password guessing. These 64 bit amount to:

11 characters, randomly chosen
16 characters, computer generated but pronounceable
32 characters, user-chosen

With modern brute force and rule-based techniques, passwords can be broken easily. A well-known system to do so is Crack

Heuristics

Reasonably good passwords come from longer phrases, eg. as first letters of the words in a sentence: they are relatively easy to remember, and reasonably arbitrary (with much entropy). It is then still wise to filter on bad passwords. An alternative is to use one-time passwords, distributed via an independent channel (eg. via a generator, via GSM or TAN-lists).

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Password change policies

Does it make sense to force users to change their passwords periodically (say every 3 months)?

Pro: compromised passwords are usable for only a relatively

short amount of time

Against: lot’s of things:
the cause of a password compromise (if any) is ignored, and

may be re-exploited

users get annoyed, and use escape techniques:
insecure variations: passwd1, passwd-2010 etc.
writing passwords down

(so that they become ‘something you have’)

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Password recovery

What to do when a user forgets his/her password? This happens

frequently. Hence recovery procedures should not be too

complicated (or expensive). What to do? Some options:

self service password reset, by supplying answers to previously

set security questions, like “where was your mother born?” “what’s your first pet’s name?” etc.

Often, answers can be obtained by social engineering, phishing or simple research (recall the Sarah Palin mailbox incident in 2008)

Provide a new password via a different channel
face-to-face transfer is best, but not always practical
ING bank provides new password via SMS

(recall: GSM (esp. SMS) is now broken)

force re-registration (like DigiD does in NL)

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Biometrics: intro

Biometrics refers to the use of physical characteristics or deeply ingrained behaviour or skills to identify a person.

Physical characteristics: facial features, fingerprints, iris,

voice, DNA, and the shape of hands or even ears.

Behaviour or skill: handwritten signature, but also someone’s

gait, or the rhythm in which someone types on a keyboard. Different types of biometrics have important differences in:

accuracy (percentage of false matches/non-matches)
how easy they are to fake
which population groups they discriminate against
how much information they reveal about us, and how sensitive

this information is (eg. your DNA may reveal health risks of

interest to insurance companies)

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Biometrics: intentional or unintentional

Important difference between types of biometrics:

necessarily intentional and conscious production, like with

signature

(except under extreme coercion)

possibly unintentional production: people leave copies of their

fingerprints and samples of their DNA wherever they go.

With the increased use of surveillance cameras we also leave
ur facial image and gait in many places. This is what enables

such biometrics to be used in law enforcement

It also makes fingerprint information more valuable to the
wner, and to potential attackers, as fake fingerprints could be

planted at a crime scene.

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Biometric systems in operation

A biometric system works in several steps

1 its sensors capture a presented biometric 2 this input signal is then processes to extract features from it 3 these features are compared to previously recorded and stored

biometric information

4 it is decided if there is a match or not

Ideally, not the raw biometric information is stored, but a template with crucial info about features extracted from the raw data

Fingerprint example

raw information: image of the fingerprint (stored eg. in e-passport)
template: so-called minutiae, bifurcations and endpoints of ridges,

which most fingerprint recognition systems use Storing such templates goes some way towards preventing abuse, assuming that fingerprints cannot be reconstructed from the templates.

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Biometrics for verification or identification

Biometrics can be used in two completely separate ways:

Verification: a person is matched with one particular stored

biometric (template), eg. the fingerprint on his e-passport, to check that someone has a certain claimed identity

Identication: a person is matched with a large collection of

stored biometrics, for example to see if he occurs in a database of known criminals, or has not already applied for a passport under a different name

(Clearly, this is more error-prone than one-to-one matches, since in

ne-to-many matches errors accumulate)

e-Passport example in NL

originally proposed for verification only (against look-alike fraud)
function creep happened in the form of central storage of all

biometrics: now usable for identification and law enforcement

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Biometric systems are not perfect

False match: the system reports a match when in fact the

stored biometric comes from someone else Example: innocent person barred from boarding a plane

False non-match: the system reports that the two don’t

match, even though both are from the same person Example: Bin Laden gets on board

Note on terminology

False matches are often called false accepts, and false non-matches false rejects. This can be confusing: if a database of biometrics is used to check that known terrorists do not enter the country, then a false non-match leads to a false accept (into the country), not a false reject

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Biometrics performance

Exact rates of false (non-)matches depend on the type of

biometric used and the particulars of the system (eg. verification or identification).

There is a trade-off between the false match and non-match

rates: by turning up the precision required for a match, the false non-match rate of a system can be decreased at the expense of a higher false match rate.

Tuning the system for a good balance

what is the purpose: do you prefer a higher false non-match rate or

a higher false match rate?

who controls the tuning: entry guards hate false matches because of

the hassle (angry customers). Hence they minimise false non-matches, leading possibly to a greater risk of false matches (terrorist entering the building)

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Biometrics performance studies

NL passport fingerprint study (2005, 15.000 participants)

At enrollment phase, 3.2% of fingerprints could not be recorded
1.9% impossible to record two fingerprints
1.3% only possible to record one
In verification phase, in 4.3% one finger could not be verified;

in 2.9% neither finger

US-VISIT study (2004, 6.000.000 in database)

false match rate of 0.31% (1 in 300 hassle for innocent travellers)
changing operational parameters:
false match rate reduced to 0.08%
false non-match rate rise to 4% to 5%

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Biometrics usage

For identification Useful, with error margins

basis for usage in surveillance systems

For authentication Problematic, since it assumes that:

only you are the source of fresh biometric measurements
freshness of such measurements can be recognised
you provide input to these fresh measurements intentionally

and consciously For non-repudiation Unsuitable: same spoofing problems

biometrics not suitable as signatures in payment systems

How about biometrics for access to secure facilities

only rarely used type of biometrics, like hand-palm or iris
spoofing/transfer is more difficult

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Privacy issues in biometrics

1 biometric measurements may contain much more information

than is strictly needed for identification

eg. DNA contains your genetic build up (and of subsequent

generations)

also claimed for eyes, by irisscopists

2 when improperly stored (as original measurements and not as

abstract templates) and protected, biometrics may actually increase the risk of identity fraud

3 biometric information may be used for tracing people, either

penly, for instance via public security cameras, or covertly

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Biometrics, conclusions

biometrics are often proposed as solution to the security

problems associated with passwords

however, they are problematic themselves (highly overrated)
always the same, in every application
not replaceable (after compromise)
entangled error rates associated with false (non-)matches
errors accumulate in one-to-many comparisons
really useful only for identification, and not for authentication

(or non-repudiation)

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What is Identity Management (IdM)?

Allowing many services via a limited number of access / authentication checks. It is a collection of mechanisms for

identity synchronisation
single-sign-on
access management

So-called federated IdM is IdM between different organisations.

Possible functions of IdM

Authentication, esp. via single-sign-on
Autorisation, via access controle lists (ACLs) at objects, or based
n capabilities/roles at subjects, supported by credentials
Personalisation, service adjustment to individual preferences
Provisioning, i.e. automatic propagation of changes in identity data

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Advantages & disadvantages of IdM

Advantages of IdM

centralisation of control, administration and policy
ease for users
structuring of roles and responsabilities within organisations
cost reduction

Disadvantages of IdM

possible reliability reduction, via single point of failure;
increased linking of activities, harming privacy.

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Examples of IdM systems

Kerberos
OpenId
DigiD
Eduram
. . .

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Key Distribution Center (KDC)

A KDC shares a secret key KX with each participant X
Naive usage: let all communication, say between A and B, go

via the KDC who decrypts and re-encrypts in the middle

More efficiently: let the KDC provide a session key, to be used

by A and B directly, like in: A

I want to talk to B

KDC

A KDC

KA{KAB,ticket} ticket=KB{A,KAB}

A

Hi let’s talk, via: ticket

B

These first steps must be followed by a standard mutual

authentication between A and B, using the session key KAB.

The KDC does not send the ticket itself to B, but lets A do

this, in order to limit its load.

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KDC issues

Disadvantages of a KDC

It is a single point of failure because it must always be online
The KDC can read all traffic (since it knows the keys KAB)
The KDC can impersonate everyone
The KDC may be a performance bottleneck

So far, there is no identification of runs

not for A, in the link between the initial request and answer from

the KDC

not for B, in the link between the ticket and the request of A: an
ld ticket might be re-used.

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Using tickets via a Key Distribution Center (KDC)

Basis for Kerberos comes from Needham-Schroeder (1978), A

I want to talk to B,NA KDC

A KDC

KA{NA,KAB,ticket} ticket=KB{A,KAB}

A

ticket,KAB{N1}

B

A B

KAB{N1−1,N2}

A

KAB{N2−1}

B

Note that the ticket may still be reused in the (exceptional) situation when an attacker manages to get hold of either:

the session key KAB
the shared key KA (even if A changes to a new key K ′

A)

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Better include nonce as session-binder in a ticket

A

hi, I’m A, let’s talk

B

A B

KB{A,NB}

A

I’m A & want B,NA,KB{A,NB} KDC

A KDC

KA{NA,KAB,ticket} ticket=KB{A,KAB,NB}

A

ticket,KAB{N1}

B

A B

KAB{N1−1,N2}

A

KAB{N2−1}

B

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Kerberos intro

Kerberos is a secret key based authentication service in a

network

developed at MIT in 1980s
now used in Windows & Linux (and elsewhere)
Kerberos splits Key Distribution Center (KDC) into two roles:
Authentication Server (AS)

Each user X (including the TGS) shares a key KX with the AS.

Ticket-Granting Server (TGS).
Kerberos’ aim: let Alice access servers after she has

authenticated herself once:

by decrypting a secret from the AS
at her own workstation
by only locally using her password KA

Subsequently, Alice uses a session key KS.

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Kerberos 4, protocol

A

I’m A, get me a session key for TGS AS

A AS

KA{KS,ticketTGS} ticketTGS=KTGS{A,KS,validity}

A

ticketTGS,B,KS{timestamp}

TGS

A TGS

KS{B,KAB},ticketB ticketB=KB{A,KAB}

A

ticketB,KAB{timestamp}

B

A B

KAB{timestamp+1}

A and B can communicate under cover of KAB; B trusts that

anyone knowing KAB is acting on behalve of A

A can use ticketTGS at multiple service providers (for some time)

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DigiD intro

DigiD is central authentication service for government services
tax, local authorities, social benefits, etc
operational since 2005
Citizen identification based on BSN (Burger Service Nummer)
BSN can be used by all government services
use in commercial sector not allowed (except in special

mandatory circumstances)

DigiD has three levels/strengths of authentication
login + password
one-time password via SMS
smart card based (currently not implemented)
DigiD is based on A-select, which is based on Kerberos

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DigiD protocol essentials

Let U = User, PS = Public Service, DS = DigiD Server in the following messages (protected eg. via SSL) U

service request

PS

U PS

rid,level=ℓ

(rid is session identifier)

rid,level=ℓ

DS

U

rid

DS

U

authenticate, at level ℓ

DS

U DS

ticket = {rid, BSNU, level = ℓ, validity, PS}dDS

U

ticket

PS

U

service, based on BSNU

PS

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OpenId

Open (standard) framework for Single-Sign On (SSO), used
eg. by MicroSoft, Google, Yahoo
Main parties involved:
Relaying Party (RP), eg. website where authentication is

required

User (U), who wishes to use some online service from a RP
Identity Provider (IP), providing authentication, for multiple

RPs.

In practice, RP = IDP, since no RP trusts other IdP
Basic mechanisms via redirects:

U − → RP − → U − → IP − → U − → RP

Focus on usability, not security (eg. ssl is not mandatory)

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Access control basics

Terminology: “subjects” can perform “actions” on “objects”
Two basic access control approaches:

1 list per object who can do what, via “access conrol lists” 2 list per subject (or group, or role) what can be done to which

bjects, via “capability lists”
These two can be combined in an access control matrix:
bj1
bj2
bj3

subj1 read read, write read subj2 write write subj2 exec read, exec exec

The mechanism that checks such permissions is usually called

the reference monitor

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Slicing things up

If you wish to restrict access, there are two basic forms:

Horizontal divisions into security levels

top secret secret confidential public ✤ ✣ ✜ ✢ ✛ ✚ ✘ ✙

This may be used both for confiden- tiality and for in- tegrity

Vertical divisions into security compartments

project 1 project 2 project 3 project 4 ✗ ✖ ✔ ✕ ✓ ✒ ✏ ✑

“Need to know”

r “Chinese wall”

approach These two approaches can also be combined

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Operational rules for horizontal slicing

For confidentiality (most common)
No read up: you are not allowed to read material of higher

classification than you have (obviously)

No write down: this may reveal “higher” material to lower

classifications

This is the essence of the so-called Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model; rules may be enforced via “data diodes”

For integrity
No write up: if your classification says “can write reliably up-to

level n”, writing higher may spoil integrity there

No read down: it may spoil your mind, so that you make

mistakes when writing higher up (at your level)

In practice these rules are very restrictive (eg. in multilevel

perating systems)

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OS security issues

OS security tasks include: identification, authentication,

access control (authorisation), and auditing

preferably these (sensitive) tasks are concentrated in a small

trusted computing base (TCB)

small security “micro” kernels recent development, especially

as basis for virtualisation

Security failures often based on programming errors
encryption etc. does not help much against them
ordinary OSs are highly complex & dynamic; they require

constant updating

problematic for certification
updates may break consistency in larger systems
risks from update postponement/neglect and zero-day exploits
update process itself may also be vulnerable
(alien) driver software in kernel is problematic

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Example: Unix/Linux security essentials

Long history: Unix started as multi-user OS in network, scaled

up to servers, and scaled down to PCs (esp. Linux)

Originally developed for friendly environments (research labs
r universities), with weak security mechanisms
security controls are add-ons, not part of architecture
Basic philosophy: security is managed by skilled administrator,

not by average user.

Basic set-up:
Users have user and group identities (UID, GID); Users can

belong to multiple groups; no security checks for “root” user

Objects (resources) are files, directories, devices; permission is
ctal number (like 654) or rw-r-xr--, for owner-group-other
Processes has several identities (real, effective, saved)

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Network security, in general

Being connected is a mixed blessing
Internet protocols have been designed for robustness, not for

security (benign environment assumed)

sometimes attacks are shockingly simple
Security focus on access control (including firewalls), intrusion

detection, and resilience

Programming errors main source of problems
keeping up-to-date with security warnings is full-time job
reporting itself is delicate: responsible disclosure means:

informing manufacturer first, and publishing after some delay

zero-day exploits valuable (eg. stuxnet used 4!)

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Basic internet protocols

Layering of protocols:

application (HTTP, FTP, etc) transport (TCP) network/routing (IP) link

IP = Internet Protocol: routes packets between (multiple)

machines, each with 32 bit address (192.168.1.1 notation)

TCP = Transmission Control Protocol: reliable, delivers a

stream of bytes between two machines; IP packets can be lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order, but TCP detects these problems, requests retransmission of lost data, rearranges out-of-order data etc.

☛ ✡ ✟ ✠

Security mechanisms can be implemented at different layers

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Other internet protocols

DNS = Domain Name System: translates domain names

meaningful to humans into the IP addresses

lookup: dig porthos.science.ru.nl yields

131.174.30.39 (among others)

reverse lookup: dig -x 131.174.30.38 yields

poly.science.ru.nl

SNMP = Simple Network Management Protocol
used for configuring machines in the network
originally without security
ICMP = Internet Control Message Protocol
used for error & status messages
includes eg. ping

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

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Typical network protocol (attack)

First, note: on the internet it is easier to send a message with

a forged sender address than to intercept a message

used for address- (instead of crypto-) based authentication
Three-way handshake is used for setting up TCP connections,

with ‘SYN’ and ‘ACK’ as message types

Simple exchange of 32 bit nonces:

1. A − → B : A, SYN(NA) 2. B − → A : ACK(NA + 1), SYN(NB) 3. A − → B : ACK(NB + 1)

easy to forge 1, but difficult to intercept 2, so attacker does

not see NB and does not know how to reply

however, in many (old) implementations NB is predictable
eg. by setting up a proper connection with B first
Once message 3 is accepted, the attacker can request services

from B, masqueraded as A: “blind connection forgery”

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Another attack (DOS)

DOS attacks are popular these days, eg. Anonymous group using LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon) network stress test tool

SYN-flooding
A sends many SYN(NA) packets (message 1), without

responding to the second message

B reserves some memory for NB, with each (expected)

connection

B runs out of memory, at some stage, and falls over
Crypto-based defence (by Dan Bernstein, see http://cr.yp.to)
make NB = K{NA}
as result, B need not keep state
implemented in Linux

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More DOS attackes, via amplification

A broadcast ip address reaches many machines
it can be abused for a smurf DOS attack:
send a ping message to such a broadcase address
put the victim’s address as (forged) source of this ping
this victim will receive ping-replies from all machines reachable

via the broadcast address

Most routers have now been reconfigured to obstruct such

attacks

A fraggle attack is similar, but uses UDP packets

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Security at different layers

Hardening the infrastructure
Ideally invisible to the user
IPSec (often used for VPNs), DNSsec
End-to-end security:
op top of (insecure) infrastructure
can be built into applications, but often requires explicit action
SSL/TLS, ssh/scp/sftp, PGP, S/Mime, Tor, etc.

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Protocol example: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

PGP provides:
confidentiality, via symmetric (IDEA) encryption with session

key

integrity, authenticit and non-repudiation via (RSA) signature
As single protocol line, for plaintext m

A − → B : {K}eB, K{zip(m, [hash(m)]dA)}

Recent unsigned data injection vulnerability found by Verheul
due to sloppy parsing by PGP Desktop (versions 8-10)
see paper on the web for more details
demonstrates that critical review of open source software can

take a long time . . .

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Protocol example: Secure Socket Layer (SSL)

SSL was introduced in the Netscape browser in 1995
became an open (slightly different and incompatible) standard

“TLS” but is still most frequently used as SSL.

SSL builds a secure connection between two sockets, including

1 Parameter negotiation between client and server 2 One-way (by server) or two-way authentication 3 confidentiality & integrity

SSL consists of two subprotocols:
establishing a secure connection
using it

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Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

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One-way Client-Server SSL-authentication

C

m1=[SSL version, preferences,NC ]

S

C S

m2=[SSL version, choices,NS,X.509 certificate, session id]

C

m3=[{PMK}eS , h(MK, m1m2C)] where MK=f (PMK,NC ,NS)

S

C S

h(MK,m1m2S)

C

data protected with keys derived from MK

S

Preferences are of the form ‘SSH2-3des-cbc-hmac-sha1’
PMK is 384 bit PreMaster Key, generated by C; MK is Master Key
session id is used for resuming (web) connections

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Cyber war

Title of a recent book (2010), by Richard Clarke:
former top counter-terrorism advisor under President Clinton
cybersecurity czar under President Bush
Several cyberwar incidents:
Iraqi military officers received US warning/advise email on

their military accounts before the 2003 gulf war started

Estonia (2007), several weeks under DOS attack after moving

a sensitive Russian statue; wake-up call for NATO

Georgia (2008) DOS attack preceded Russian invasion
DOS attack on US and South-Korean computers at the time
f several North-Korean (test) missile launches
Many countries have cyberwar capabilities. US is not leading:
its offensive capabilities may be strong(est)
US is most vulnerable to attacks (compared to possible

adversaries)

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Clarke’s 21 questions

1 What do we do if we wake up one day and find the western

half of the U.S. without electrical power as the result of a cyber attack?

2 Is the advent of cyber war a good thing, or does it place us at

a disadvantage?

3 Do we envision the use of cyber war weapons only in response

to the use of cyber war weapons against us?

4 Are cyber weapons something that we will employ routinely in

both small and large conflicts? Will we use them early on in a conflict because they give us a unique advantage in seeking

ur goals, such as maybe effecting a rapid end to the conflict?

5 Do we think we want to have plans and capabilities to

conduct “stand-alone” cyber war against another nation? And will we fight in cyberspace even when we’re not shooting at the other side in physical space?

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Clarke’s 21 questions, ctd

6 Do we see cyberspace as another domain (like the sea,

airspace, or outer space) in which we must be militarily dominant and in which we will engage an opponent while simultaneously conducting operations in other domains?

7 How surely do we have to identify who attacked us in

cyberspace before we respond? What standards will we use for these identifications?

8 Will we ever hide the fact that it was us who attacked with

cyber weapons?

9 Should we be hacking into other nations’ networks in

peace-time? If so, should there be any constraints on what we would do in peace-time?

10 What do we do if we find that other nations have hacked into

ur networks in peacetime? What if they have left behind

logic bombs in our infrastructure networks?

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Clarke’s 21 questions, ctd

11 Do we intend to use cyber weapons primarily or initially

against military targets only? How do we define military targets?

12 Or do we see the utility of these weapons being their ability to

inflict disruption on the economic infrastructure or on the society at large?

13 What is the importance of avoiding collateral damage with

ur cyber weapons? How might avoiding it limit our use of

the weapons?

14 If we are attacked with cyber weapons, under what

circumstances would, or should, we respond with kinetic weapons? How much of the answer to this question should be publicly known in advance?

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Clarke’s 21 questions, ctd

15 What kind of goals specific to the employment of cyber

weapons would we want to achieve if we conducted cyber war, either in conjunction with kinetic war or as a stand-alone activity?

16 Should the line between peace and cyber war be brightly

delineated, or is there an advantage to us in blurring that distinction?

17 Would we fight cyber war in a coalition with other nations,

helping to defend their cyberspace and sharing our cyber weapons, tactics, and targets?

18 What level of command authority should authorize the use of

cyber weapons, select the weapons, and approve the targets?

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SLIDE 9

Authentication and Identity Management Operating System and Network Security Cyber war and terrorism Conclusions

Radboud University Nijmegen

Clarke’s 21 questions, ctd

19 Are there types of targets that we believe should not be

attacked using cyber weapons? Do we attack them anyway if similar U.S. facilities are hit first by cyber or other weapons?

20 How do we signal our intention with regard to cyber weapons

in peacetime and in crisis? Are there ways that we can use

ur possession of cyber weapons to deter an opponent?

21 If an opponent is succesful in launching a widespread,

disabling attack on our military or on our economic infrastructure, how does that affect our other military and political strategies?

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Terrorism, in general

What is terrorism in the first place?
definition strongly dependent on one’s own political/historical

views

eg. are WWII resistance fighters terrorists?
what about Palestinians fighting Israeli occupation?
Very general description of terrorism:

politically or ideologically motivated threatening or use of violence (often by small groups aimed at the public at large)

Actual number of casualties is really limited
eg. in comparison to road casualties
Still, authorities react strongly and introduce profound

changes in order to combat terrorism

laws enabling non-selective surveillance of the population
stricter security measures in public places
tasks for intelligence services & special forces

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Bob de Graaff’s 20 points

Bob de Graaff is professor of (counter)terrorism at Den Haag; the list of observations below comes from a NISA lecture (10/9/10)

1 Difference between national and international threats

diminishes, so nations feel more free to interfere in other nations’ internal affairs

2 Difference between what is public and private diminishes, so

nations feel more free to interfere in people’s private lives

3 Difference between public and private tasks diminishes, eg. in

hiring private security contractors (with little public supervision/control)

4 Under pressure to act, authorities have little time to think and

take decisions based on instincts and gut feelings

5 Iterative intelligence cycles (direction, collection, processing,

analysis, dissemination, feedback) become parallel and less systematic

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Bob de Graaff’s 20 points, ctd

6 Intelligence relies more on open sources and data mining;

everyone is a suspect and is under constant surveillance

7 Policy makers do their own intelligence analysis, leading to

either: frustration among intelligence professionals
or: intelligence to please

8 Intelligence services become more public, and (thus) under

expectation pressure

9 Difference between military and civil intelligence diminishes 10 Difference between intelligence analysis and operations

diminishes

11 Difference between intelligence and covert operations (often

more controversial) diminishes

12 Difference between intelligence and policing diminishes 13 Vaguer boundaries between different forms of conflict: war,

terrorism, guerrilla, insurgency; the approaches become similar

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Bob de Graaff’s 20 points, ctd

14 An integrated approach to countering terrorism undermines

historically grown separations among state institutions

15 Self-defensive and pre-emptive action become synonimous;

hence states adopt terrorist methods themselves

16 Difference between war and peace diminishes 17 Dependence on non-western intelligence agencies increases,

with their own norms, possibly leading to moral problems

18 Difference between suspicion and proof diminishes (eg. in

Cheney doctrine: If there’s a 1% chance of a nuclear weapon threat, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response)

19 Authorities judge people increasingly on ideas and intentions

than on their acts (leading to societal distrust and threat of a thought-police)

20 Difference between state of law and dictatorship diminishes

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Radboud University Nijmegen

What this course tried to achieve

Insight both in:
basic computer security mechanisms
design & usage issues, in organisations and in society
Expected competences on-the-job:
computer scientists should master technicalities
information scientists should be able to translate & exploit the

relevance of these technicalities for the business/organisation

(there is greatest need for people who can do this)

But ideally, you should be able to do both!

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