Outline The Web of Prevention: A Multi-dimensional Approach to - PDF document

Outline The Web of Prevention: A Multi-dimensional Approach to Inhibit • Some “non-proliferation, arms control and CBRN Acquisition disarmament” (NACD) issues ISTC seminar • Nuclear and chemical control issues 12 October 2017 • Biological control issues Richard Guthrie • Aspects of CBRN acquisition and of control CBW Events • Development of the web of prevention concept www.cbw-events.org.uk • Connecting the web of prevention into A project to create a record of events to enable and encourage understanding of how policies on the issues relating to chemical governance roles and biological warfare (CBW) are developed. NACD issues Layers of controls • Disarmament – the weapons themselves are Three layers – overarching, domestic and external Each government should therefore: the problem and so must be eliminated • Comply with international regimes • Arms control – weapons contribute to • Enact controls within territory under jurisdiction problems and so need to be managed of that government [i.e., no prohibited weapons • Non-Proliferation – wrong weapons in the within the country] wrong hands, spread of weapons, new • Ensure that external entities are not assisted by acquisitions – historically a loaded term so activities within the jurisdiction of that government [i.e., no help to acquire prohibited should be used with care. Often better to talk weapons in other countries] of preventing acquisition Traditional NACD regime measures Traditional internal NACD measures • Declarations & information exchanges on • Declarations & information exchanges on material balances and objects of verification material and technologies used • Evaluation of information provided • Evaluation of information provided • On-site visits to (i) illustrate / demonstrate • On-site visits to (i) illustrate / demonstrate legitimate activities (ii) uncover non-legitimate legitimate activities (ii) uncover non-legitimate activities activities • Consultations and clarifications on anomalies and • Consultations and clarifications on anomalies and ambiguities ambiguities • Examples include CWC/OPCW, NPT/IAEA, CFE, • Example agencies include law enforcement, Stockholm/Vienna Document health and safety bodies, education ministries 1

Traditional NACD export measures Why biological is different • Declarations & information exchanges on • Biological has much wider range of materials & materials and technologies requested technologies with both peaceful and hostile • Evaluation of information provided applications • On-site visits to (i) illustrate / demonstrate • Living organisms cannot be subject to reliable legitimate activities (ii) uncover non-legitimate material balance monitoring activities • The politics are very different, no verification • Consultations and clarifications on anomalies and agency ambiguities • Interaction between governments, international • Agency = export licensing body, but requires organizations, industry & civil society very input from other branches of government different Dual-use nature of CBRN issues Other dual use areas • Materials & technologies may have both peaceful • Narcotics and hostile applications • Money laundering • Technologies and techniques can be tangible or • Tax arrangements intangible • Obscene publications • No clear definitive boundary between non- legitimate activities and legitimate activities • Small arms • New/additional frame of reference: In each of these areas there is no clear definitive – the control of technologies outside of the ownership boundary between non-legitimate activities and the of governments that have not only peaceful purposes, legitimate systems they operate within but also economically significant purposes. (non-)compliant activities Linear model of policy • If there is no clear dividing line between Traditional methods of analysis of policy assumes a linear set of activities: problem -> solution -> implementation: compliant activities and non-compliant • The problem is defined activities, what lies in between? – Clearly legitimate • A solution is identified – Anomalous – Suspicious • The solution is implemented across government – Clearly non-legitimate However, this linear model has limited utility when a problem has many aspects 2

Problem definition Aspects of acquisition To reach a consensus on the definition of the Logistics Finances and Personnel problem of CBRN weapons could only be done resources in the most simple of terms, for example: • “CBRN weapons are bad, peaceful uses of Tools and Materials Targeting related science & technology are good” equipment This requires a broader approach to the control Engineering Planning Doctrine of CBRN weapons Example aspects of controls Web of prevention concept • In biological realm, with no central implementation Legal Follow the Professional body, realisation that basic problem -> solution -> prohibitions money ethics implementation model unworkable • Many web of prevention definitions developed, notably by ICRC Intelligence Transfer Vigilance • Growing understanding of usefulness of concept in controls other areas • A suitable definition for this seminar: Material Education & Institutional “multiple overlapping measures to ensure that all security awareness culture potential stages or aspects of research, development and production are protected from misuse” 3