Limits on Low-Degree PRGs
- r
or SoS Meets Program Obfuscation Ilan Komargodski Joint work with - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Limits on Low-Degree PRGs or SoS Meets Program Obfuscation Ilan Komargodski Joint work with Boaz Barak (Harvard) Zvika Brakerski (Weizmann Institute) Pravesh K. Kothari (Princeton) Pseudorandom Generators (PRGs) : {0,1} {0,1}
2
๐ป: {0,1}๐ โ {0,1}๐ ๐ฆ1 ๐ฆ2 ๐ฆ๐ ๐ง1 ๐ง2 ๐ง๐ ๐ป ๐๐ โc.i ๐๐ Fundamental primitive in cryptography How simple can it be? ๐ป๐: {0,1}๐ โ {0,1} ๐ป๐ ๐ฆ = ๐ป ๐ฆ ๐ Assuming OWFs, โ ๐ป: {0,1}๐ โ {0,1}poly(๐)
3
Locality ๐ โ every output bit depends on ๐ input bits
๐ป: {0,1}๐ โ {0,1}๐ ๐ฆ1 ๐ฆ2 ๐ฆ๐ ๐ง1 ๐ง2 ๐ง๐ ๐ป ๐๐ โc.i ๐๐ ๐ป๐: {0,1}๐ โ {0,1} ๐ป๐ ๐ฆ = ๐ป ๐ฆ ๐ ๐ป๐: {0,1}d โ {0,1} ๐ป๐ ๐ฆ|๐ฝ๐ = ๐ป ๐ฆ ๐
4
Positive:
โ โ ๐ฏ: ๐, ๐ ๐ โ ๐, ๐ ๐+๐๐, ๐ = ๐ท(๐) [AIK06]
, ๐ = ๐ท(๐) [Gol00,โฆ,App13,โฆ,AR16,โฆ] Negative:
[CM01]
[CM01]
๐ = ๐(๐) [MST06]
[MST06] Many applications:
5
Theorem: [Lin16,AnanthSahai16] โ iO based on:
6
Theorem: [LinTessaro17] โ iO based on:
๐ป: ฮฃ๐ โ {0,1}๐ ๐ฆ1 ๐ฆ2 ๐ฆ๐ ๐ง1 ๐ง2 ๐ง๐ ๐ป ๐๐ โc.i ๐๐ ๐ป๐: ฮฃ๐ โ {0,1} ๐ป๐ ๐ฆ = ๐ป ๐ฆ ๐ ฮฃ = 2๐: ๐ป: 0,1 ๐๐ โ 0,1 ๐ [LinTessaro17] need ๐ป: 0,1 ๐๐ โ 0,1 23๐๐1+๐ Attacks of [CM,MST] do not apply so might exist even for ๐ = ๐ !
7
8
๐ป: ฮฃ๐ โ {0,1}๐ ๐ฆ1 ๐ฆ2 ๐ฆ๐ ๐ง1 ๐ง2 ๐ง๐
๐ป ๐๐ โc.i ๐๐
๐ป๐: ฮฃ๐ โ {0,1} ๐ป๐ ๐ฆ = ๐ป ๐ฆ ๐
Stretch Predicate Worst-case
Graph Worst-case
Predicate Different
Remark ๐ = เทจ ๐(22๐๐) Worst case Worst case Different ๐ = เทจ ๐(2๐๐) Worst case Worst case Same Also in [LV17] ๐ = เทจ ๐(2๐๐) Random Random Different
9
๐จโG r A ๐จ = 1 = 1
๐จโ๐ A ๐จ = 1 < 0.5
๐จโ๐ A ๐จ = 1 โ
๐จโG r A ๐จ = 1
10
๐ฆโ{ยฑ1}๐ เท ๐=1 ๐
11
๐ฆโ{ยฑ1}๐ เท ๐=1 ๐
๐=1 ๐
๐=1 ๐
2 = ๐
๐ โค ๐ก.
๐=1 ๐
๐ โค ๐
12
๐ฆโ{ยฑ1}๐ เท ๐=1 ๐
13
๐ ๐ 2๐ 2๐ 2๐ 2๐ ๐
14
Using preprocessing
15