Legislative Oversight in Japan Michael Thies, UCLA Prepared for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Legislative Oversight in Japan

Michael Thies, UCLA Prepared for Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan: Oversight or Overreach? The Brookings Institution Monday, June 23, 2014

Oversight in a Parliamentary System

No separation of powers

– The executive “branch” and the legislative “branch” are headed by the same people – So legislative oversight of cabinet ministers is, essentially, backbench oversight of party leaders – Best done at Party HQ, not in the public eye

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Oversight in a Parliamentary System

• Opposition parties would like to oversee ministers, but why

should the ruling party institute rules to allow that?

• Complications (deviations from Westminster):

1. Coalition government (keeping tabs on partners) 2. Divided parliaments (twisted bicameralism)

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Oversight in a Parliamentary System

• Still, “executive” means more than ministers, and even the ruling

party wants to oversee civil servants (bureaucrats)

• But again, why not let the ministers (who are good agents) do

that in-house?

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Oversight in a Parliamentary System

• Hypothesis: As long as the ruling party has a long time horizon,

effective formal procedures for oversight should be minimal.

• Even for “fire alarm oversight,” have the alarms ring in Party

HQ, not in the courts.

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Legislative Oversight in Japan

• During LDP’s long period of dominance (1955-1993), formal

legislative procedures were moribund.

• Gave (false) impression that bureaucrats were un-checked.

(“Bureaucratic dominance”)

• But then the LDP lost power in 1993…

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Legislative Oversight in Japan

• Nov 1993 – passage of an APA
• 1998 – Changes to Diet Law and HR/HC rules
• PM question time
• Changes to the Cabinet Law in 1999 (eff. 2001)
• Information Disclosure Law (FOIA) in 1999 (eff. 2001)

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Cabinet Law Changes (2001)

• “Planning and Drafting” instead of merely “coordinating”
• More resources, more Special Advisors for PM
• Ministers for “Special Missions” put above line ministries
• Councils reported to PM, drafted major bills
• New positions of State Secretary, Parliamentary Secretary

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Bureaucratic Reorganization

• Reduced ministries from 22 to 12
• Set up Independent Administrative Agencies to audit ministries
• Streamlining and shrinking to combat “sectionalism”
• Reduced and opened up “shingikai”

– Encouraged use of public hearings – Limited membership, excluded officials – Term limits – Minority reports

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Changes in the Diet

• From “government delegate system” to “government witness system”
• Establishment of Government Oversight Committees in both houses
• Increased used of committee investigations and questions by

individual MPs

• QT introduced in late 1999
• Effective?

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More MPs demanding answers from the Cabinet (質問主意書)

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

HR rate HC rate

Questions per day

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More questioning during Twisted Diets

1 2 3 4 HR rate Divided Unified 1 2 3 4 HC rate Divided Unified

Lower House Upper House

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Enhanced Fire Alarm Oversight?

Administrative Procedure Act (1993)

– Agencies must establish and publicize standards for reviews that are “as concrete as possible” – Includes times for administrative review – Agencies must “give reasons” when applications are denied – Notice and comment – But many exemptions, and much discretion for officials – 3rd party intervention at discretion of officials

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Enhanced Fire Alarm Oversight?

Information Disclosure Act passed 1999, effective 2001.

– All agencies must adopt written standards for disclosure – But much more restrictive than U.S. FOIA, with more exemptions and more discretion for officials – No sanction for an agency’s improper denial of an information request

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Assessment

• The quantity of oversight activity seems to have increased in the

last decade

• Perhaps there is a different attitude, some recognition of popular

desire for transparency

• The laws do give some room for judicial enforcement, but they

don’t guarantee it

• Oversight is still largely channeled through the ruling party

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Extra slides

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But no differences for committee investigations

.02 .04 .06 .08 .1 C/Day Divided Maj-Min Unified .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 C/Day AgFF Cabinet Ec_Trd_Ind GenAff Hlth_Wlfr_Lbr

Data for Lower House Committees Only

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