KYIV ARBITRATION DAYS 2016: THINK BIG! The Confidence Complex - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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KYIV ARBITRATION DAYS 2016: THINK BIG! The Confidence Complex - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

KYIV ARBITRATION DAYS 2016: THINK BIG! The Confidence Complex Closed Lists or Freedom of Choice? Brussels / Dsseldorf / Hamburg / London / Manchester / Milan / Munich / Paris / Rome / Shanghai / Silicon Valley /


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Brussels / Düsseldorf / Hamburg / London / Manchester / Milan / Munich / Paris / Rome / Shanghai / Silicon Valley / fieldfisher.com

KYIV ARBITRATION DAYS 2016: THINK BIG!

The Confidence Complex

Closed Lists or Freedom of Choice?

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Brussels / Düsseldorf / Hamburg / London / Manchester / Milan / Munich / Paris / Rome / Shanghai / Silicon Valley / fieldfisher.com

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The Confidence Complex 2

Confidence in whom?

  • the arbitrator?
  • the tribunal?
  • the institution?
  • the arbitration process?
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Closed Lists -vs- Freedom of Choice

The best way to avoid incidents of moral hazard is “… to forbid, or at least rigorously police, the practice of unilateral appointments…” “The only decent solution … is thus that any arbitrator, no matter the size of the tribunal, should be chosen jointly or selected by a neutral body.” “… an institutional requirement that appointments be made from a pre-existing list of qualified arbitrators. …such a restricted list may have undeniable advantages…”

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The call for closed lists

Unilateral appointments are wrong:

Appointing a nominee to help win the case is wrong No evidence that three heads are better than one Irrational for parties to have more confidence in arbitrator appointed for a special skill ‘Cultural’ appointments exacerbate moral hazard and are unnecessary Unanimity in awards is less likely to be achieved

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The institutions

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Freedom of choice

  • To arbitrate?
  • To choose system of law?
  • To choose seat of arbitration?
  • To choose the/its arbitrator
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Against closed lists’ arguments

  • Perpetuates the very moral hazard argued against
  • Limits breadth of experienced arbitrators rather than broadening it
  • Wrongly assumes all participants appointments are ‘hired-guns’
  • Ignores party autonomy – bedrock of arbitration’s credibility
  • Wrongly assumes closed list arbitrators will not be biased or poor judges
  • Wrongly assumes institutions’ knowledge is greater than their sum
  • Increases likelihood of repeat appointments due to limited pool
  • Disparaging of less-established institutions
  • Asserts that unilateral appointments increase dissenting judgements – but are

dissenting judgements such a bad thing?

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Simon Sloane

Partner - London E: Simon.Sloane@fieldfisher.com T: +44 (0)20 7861 4934 M: +44 (0)7341 566 854