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Investor Presentation 1 Cautionary Statement on Forward Looking Information This presentation contains certain forward-looking information and forward-looking statements, as defined in applicable securities laws (collectively referred to herein


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Investor Presentation

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This presentation contains certain forward-looking information and forward-looking statements, as defined in applicable securities laws (collectively referred to herein as “forward- looking statements”). Forward-looking statements reflect current expectations or beliefs regarding future events or the Company’s future performance. All statements other than statements of historical fact are forward-looking statements. Often, but not always, forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of words such as “plans”, “expects”, “is expected”, “budget”, “scheduled”, “estimates”, “continues”, “forecasts”, “projects”, “predicts”, “intends”, “anticipates”, “targets”, or “believes”, or variations of, or the negatives of, such words and phrases or state that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “should”, “might” or “will” be taken, occur or be achieved. Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors which may cause the Company’s actual results, performance or achievements to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements, including those herein are qualified by this cautionary statement. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements in this presentation speak only as of the date of this presentation or as of the date or dates specified in such statements. Inherent in forward-looking statements are risks, uncertainties and other factors beyond the Company’s ability to predict or control. These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, gold price volatility, changes in debt and equity markets, the uncertainties involved in interpreting geological data, increases in costs, environmental compliance and changes in environmental legislation and regulation, support of the Company’s Indigenous communities, interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations, general economic conditions and other risks involved in the gold exploration, development and production industry, as well as those risk factors listed in the section entitled "Description of Business - Risk Factors" in Detour Gold's Annual Information Form (“AIF”) for the year ended December 31, 2017 and in the continuous disclosure documents filed by Detour Gold

  • n and available on SEDAR at www.sedar.com. Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive of the factors that may affect forward-looking statements.

Actual results and developments are likely to differ, and may differ materially or materially and adversely, from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements, including those contained in this presentation. Such statements are based on a number of assumptions which may prove to be incorrect, including, but not limited to, assumptions about the following: the availability of financing for exploration and development activities; operating and capital costs; results of operations; the Company’s available cash resources; the Company's ability to attract and retain skilled staff; the mine development and production schedule and related costs; dilution control; sensitivity to metal prices and other sensitivities; the supply and demand for, and the level and volatility of the price of, gold; timing of the receipt of regulatory and governmental approvals for development projects and

  • ther operations; the timing and results of consultations with the Company’s Indigenous partners; the supply and availability of consumables and services; the exchange rates of the

Canadian dollar to the U.S. dollar; energy and fuel costs; required capital investments; estimates of net present value and internal rate of returns; the accuracy of mineral reserve and mineral resource estimates, production estimates and capital and operating cost estimates and the assumptions on which such estimates are based; market competition;

  • ngoing relations with employees and impacted communities and general business and economic conditions.

The Company undertakes no obligation to update publicly or otherwise revise any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information or future events or otherwise, except as may be required by law. If the Company does update one or more forward-looking statements, no inference should be drawn that it will make additional updates with respect to those or other forward-looking statements.

Cautionary Statement on Forward Looking Information

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Visit https://www.detourgold.vote for more information

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Focus on the 2018 LOM Plan execution LOM Plan is working as demonstrated by operating results the fire sale that is not value-maximizing now

  • f the Board refreshed by May 2019

new directors nominated or recruited by Paulson

Detour Gold’s Recommended Path Forward

NONETHELESS, PAULSON STILL WANTS A WHOLESALE BOARD CHANGE, WITH NO REAL PLAN

100% 2018 3 2/3

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Continuity Is Critical to Operational Success

This approach balances shareholders’ desire for further change with the need for continuity

We are willing to make these changes today, but Paulson has been unwilling to accept and end this proxy fight.

To ensure a responsible Board construct we have led the process of change:

It has the support in writing of one of Detour Gold’s largest shareholders and indicative support of many others.

(1) Added three new directors since August 2018 with two long-term directors (Ingrid Hibbard and Robert Doyle) stepping down (2) Interim CEO Michael Kenyon will step down from the Board on the earlier of a new CEO being named or the next AGM (3) Recommending the addition

  • f Paulson’s two most qualified

nominees as two long-tenured directors (Lisa Colnett and Jonathan Rubenstein) depart

Continuity provided by Michael Kenyon and Alex Morrison is critical

✓ 

The non-recommended Paulson nominees are inexperienced & unqualified

Our Recommended Board:

  • Steven Feldman (Paulson nominee)
  • Christopher Robison (Paulson nominee)
  • Edward Dowling, Jr.
  • Alan R. Edwards (New director)
  • André Falzon
  • James K. Gowans (New director)
  • J. Michael Kenyon (Interim CEO)
  • Judy M. Kirk (New director)
  • Alex Morrison (Chairman of the Board)

The Recommended Board has an average tenure of only 2 years

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Our Recommended Board Has Sufficient Institutional Knowledge to Provide Continuity

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Extensive Public Board Experience

  • 6 directors have sat on an average of 8 public boards

Extensive Mining Experience

  • 7 directors have extensive mining experience and 4 have been involved in the development,

construction and/or operation of more than three dozen mines Strong Corporate Governance

  • Detour Gold scored a 1 for ISS Governance QualityScore and continues to perform well in

The Globe and Mail’s Board Games Extensive M&A Experience

  • Our Recommended Board has facilitated numerous major M&A transactions at other

companies they’ve served Extensive Shareholder Engagement

  • Over the last 5 years, Detour Gold’s Board and management have had an average of 260

meetings per year with investors Path to Qualified New CEO while Maintaining Critical Leadership Continuity in the Interim

  • Interim CEO Michael Kenyon will step down from the Board upon the earlier of a new CEO

being appointed or the next annual meeting of shareholders

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CHANGE THAT IS WORKING

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Detour Gold Has Created Significant Shareholder Value Over Time

Detour Gold has outperformed the gold price and GDX since Detour Lake’s first full year of production

21-Oct-15 1 Moz Produced 27-Jun-18 2018 LOM Plan News Release 30-Jun-17 2 Moz Produced

  • $6

$12 $18 $24 $30 $36 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Detour Gold Share Price (C$) Detour Gold Share Price (C$) GDX (Indexed) Gold Price (Indexed)

Total Return +159%

  • 10%

+0%

Source: Factset

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Strong Q3 2018 Operating Results Demonstrate Progress Towards LOM Plan

Mining Rate (000’s tonnes per day - ktpd) Mining Cost (C$/tonne mined) Milling Rate (tonnes per day - tpd) Milling + G&A Cost (C$/tonne milled) 294 250 289 304 Q4'17 Q1'18 Q2'18 Q3'18 $2.99 $3.75 $3.25 $3.01 Q4'17 Q1'18 Q2'18 Q3'18 54,144 50,860 55,825 59,219 Q4'17 Q1'18 Q2'18 Q3'18 $13.94 $16.21 $16.46 $13.22 Q4'17 Q1'18 Q2'18 Q3'18

Record mining rate above 300 ktpd since commencement of operations

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Analysts Have Acknowledged The Recent Operational Improvements At Detour Lake

Source: Street Research Note: Permission was neither sought nor denied for the inclusion of the quotes from research reports shown above.

“Production outperformed our expectation as throughput ticked up quarter-on-quarter and grade continued to track above annual guidance” Raymond James (25-Oct-18) “…Detour Gold appears on track with full year production guidance reaffirmed, mining and milling rates trending higher, and unit costs improving quarter-over-quarter.” RBC (24-Oct-18) “Overall, management have responded to shareholder concerns, and along with good execution in Q3/18 of the mine plan, have earned credibility. Our fundamental view is that execution of the revised mine plan is the best potential valuation of underlying asset value compared to the existing share price” Laurentian (25-Oct-18)

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▪ Detour Gold management and Board focused on LOM Plan execution ▪ Implementing operational improvement action plans ▪ Objective to achieve sustainable results in 12 to 24 months ▪ Solid balance sheet solidifies path to deliver value

1. Detour Lake 2018 LOM Plan NPV less balance sheet adjustments (as at September 30, 2018). 2. Share price as of November 9, 2018.

1

$10.62 $18.97 Detour Share Price (C$) 2018 LOM Plan NAVPS (C$)

Executing 2018 LOM Plan is Best Value- Maximizing Strategy Today

On the right track to ensure that Detour Lake becomes a consistently profitable operation

2

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Detour Gold’s Research Analysts have Endorsed the 2018 LOM Plan and See Upside Potential

Source: Street Research Note: Permission was neither sought nor denied for the inclusion of the quotes from research reports shown above.

“The plan estimates total site costs of between US$810 and US$850/oz produced. This long mine life should see a couple of commodity cycles, and has the potential to deliver significant free cash flow in a rising gold market” Haywood Securities (26-Oct-18) “We expect Detour Gold to trend toward a premium multiple, consistent with eventual upper mid-tier levels of gold production in Canada, should the company incrementally improve its operating results and deliver on its updated LOM plan” TD (25-Oct-18)

$10.62 $15.75 Detour Current Share Price (C$) Consensus Target Price (C$)

Analysts view the planned operating improvements as achievable

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NOW IS A BAD TIME TO PURSUE A SALE, ESPECIALLY THROUGH A PUBLIC PROCESS

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$10 $5 $5 $15 $22 $17 $14 $13 $34 $36 $10 $10 $13 $19 $12 $7 $4 15 9 18 42 51 42 45 56 56 40 37 36 41 35 37 22 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 YTD Total Transaction Value (US$B) # of Transactions

▪ During 2018 to date, there have been 22 gold M&A transactions announced globally with an aggregate transaction value of US$10B as compared to 56 transactions with an aggregate transaction value of US$36B in 2011 ▪ 2018 has seen the least number of gold M&A transactions since 2005 ▪ And the lowest transaction value since 2003 if Barrick / Randgold transaction is excluded

Source: Bloomberg Note: Includes gold transactions over US$50 mm globally.

2018 Gold M&A Activity Remains Light

Excluding Barrick- Randgold transaction, YTD total M&A transaction value of $4B

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Gold P/NAV Multiples are Well Below Their Historical Peaks

Source: Street Research Note: Detour Gold is not included in the Intermediate peer set. Gold Seniors include: Barrick, Newmont, Goldcorp, Agnico Eagle, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Newcrest, Kinross, and Randgold; Gold Intermediates include: Acacia, Alamos, B2Gold, Buenaventura, Centamin, Centerra, Detour Gold, Eldorado, Endeavour, Harmony, IAMGOLD, Kirkland Lake, New Gold, OceanaGold, Sibanye-Stillwater and Yamana; Gold Juniors include: Asanko, Argonaut, Alacer, Alio Gold, DPM, Golden Star, Guyana Goldfields, Mandalay, Pan African, Perseus, Premier, Pretium, Resolute, Roxgold, SEMAFO, Teranga, TMAC, and Torex. Note: Multiples represent the median of all available broker estimates.

1.42x 1.31x 1.83x 1.07x 1.32x 0.97x 1.43x 0.85x 0.89x 0.74x 1.16x 0.52x

  • Avg. Multiples Between

01-Jan-10 and 01-Jan-12 Average Multiples Since 01-Jan-16 Peak Multiples Since 01-Jan-16 Current P/NAV Multiples Senior Gold Company Median P/NAV Intermediate Gold Company Median P/NAV Junior Gold Company Median P/NAV

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16 1.57x 1.41x Gold Seniors & Intermediates Detour 0.90x 0.58x Gold Seniors & Intermediates Detour

Now is a Bad Time to Sell a Quality Asset Like Detour Lake

At Detour Gold’s Peak P/NAV Multiples P/NAV Multiples Today

Source: Street Research Note: Peak Detour Gold P/NAV multiple occurred in 2H 2016. Median Senior and Intermediate P/NAV excludes Detour Gold. Note: Multiples represent the median of all available broker estimates. Note: Gold Seniors include: Barrick, Newmont, Goldcorp, Agnico Eagle, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Newcrest, Kinross, and Randgold; Gold Intermediates include: Acacia, Alamos, B2Gold, Buenaventura, Centamin, Centerra,, Eldorado, Endeavour, Harmony, IAMGOLD, Kirkland Lake, New Gold, OceanaGold, Sibanye-Stillwater and Yamana.

Implied share price upside

  • f +39% if the discount to

senior & intermediate gold producers were the same now as at Detour Gold’s peak P/NAV multiple (10%) Discount (35%) Discount

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Weak Gold M&A Environment Has Been Highlighted by Several Research Analysts

“Global gold M&A activity has been stagnant over the last few years as companies have been focused on improving balance sheet strength, increasing margins and divesting non-core assets with free cash flow being allocated to debt reduction or share buyback

  • programs. In an attempt to maintain capital discipline, producers are

taking a cautious approach to M&A with the majority of recent acquisitions in the development and/or exploration stage.” Macquarie (03-Jul-18) “[T]he senior gold miners are likely to remain fairly conservative amid a US$1,200/oz gold price environment and the recent history poorly conceived deals at high premiums. We expect any new deals to continue the trend of no/low premiums.” Credit Suisse (01-Oct-18) “[G]old equity index against gold shows, equities outperformed from 2000 to 2011. This characteristic encouraged gold miners to get

  • bigger. Unfortunately, deals that made sense when gold was at $1,600

were loss makers and required intensive balance sheet care when gold fell to $1,100. Now investors are wary of gold miner M&A.” JPMorgan (09-Jul-18)

Source: Street Research Note: Permission was neither sought nor denied for the inclusion of the quotes from research reports shown above.

“The industry does not have a great track record in terms of M&A, as evidenced during the 2007-2011 and 2012-2017 periods and this is firmly in the minds of current leadership, in our view. Investors will be wary of a change in strategy and are likely to respond, potentially with their feet.” HSBC (21-Jun-18) “While a number of companies are successfully advancing projects and valuations for the junior companies are attractive (36% discount to the 2017 average), we expect the producers to remain selective with M&A.” RBC (23-Aug-18) “[There] is a lack of interest in paying an equity premium in a hostile bid for a listed company. The key preference would be to undertake M&A at an asset level” J.P. Morgan (11-Sep-18)

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Pursuing a Broad, Public Sale Process Now is Not a Value-Maximizing Strategy

▪ While the Company believes that the execution of the 2018 LOM Plan is the best path to deliver value to shareholders, it has long had in place a Special Committee to responsibly evaluate potential value-creating opportunities ▪ Whenever the Company has been approached by potential acquirers or partners, the Special Committee was tasked with approving confidentiality agreements and considering strategic alternatives ▪ During those periods, no offers of any kind to acquire the Company emerged ▪ Detour Gold’s Board has extensive M&A experience and its Recommended Board has collectively facilitated numerous major M&A transactions ▪ If any bona fide strategic alternative becomes available that competes with the value delivered by the 2018 LOM Plan, the Recommended Board would carefully evaluate it and pursue the best course of action to maximize shareholder value

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CHANGE THAT YOU CAN TRUST

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Detour Gold Has Consistently Listened and Responded to The Feedback of Shareholders

▪ Paulson’s self-serving agenda is not in the best interest of shareholders ▪ Our Recommended Board provides the continuity and stability required to protect shareholders’ investments while executing the 2018 LOM Plan ▪ Our Recommended Board will continue to responsibly evaluate any potential value- creating opportunities

What Our Shareholders Are Telling Us How We Are Responding

  • This is not a right time for a fire sale

✓ Board and management is committed to executing

the 2018 LOM Plan, the best value-maximizing strategy today

  • Board needs refreshment

✓ Two-thirds of the Board will have been refreshed by

May 2019

  • Marcelo Kim should not be on the board and

Paulson's slate was weak and/or inexperienced

✓ We are recommending Paulson's two most qualified

nominees who have the support of one of our largest shareholders in writing

  • This costly and distracting proxy fight needs to

be ended now

✓ We have made several reasonable attempts to settle

with Paulson to end this proxy fight but Paulson has refused to do so on a reasonable basis

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Detour Gold is Committed to Board Refreshment

Since the Company's May 2018 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, Detour Gold has

added three highly qualified, experienced and independent directors recommending shareholders add 2 of the most qualified dissident nominees

James K. Gowans, P. Eng.

  • Over 30 years of mineral exploration

and mining operation experience

  • Extensive mining knowledge with CSR

and HR experience

  • Currently a Director of Cameco and

Gedex, and Chairman of the Board of Dominion Diamond

Judy M. Kirk

  • One of Canada's leading strategic

communications, public consultation and engagement specialists

  • Provided expert advice on policy,

planning, infrastructure and natural resource projects for nearly 30 years

  • Strong expertise in social license

Alan R. Edwards

  • 35 years of mining executive and

director experience

  • Extensive management, operations and

technical experience, including large

  • pen pit operations
  • Chairman of the Board of Mason

Resources Christopher Robison (Paulson Nominee)

  • 39 years of progressive experience in the

mining industry

  • Former Executive Vice President and

Chief Operating Officer of Newmont Mining (2013-2016)

Steven Feldman (Paulson Nominee)

  • Co-founder, board member and the Chief

Executive Officer of Gold Bullion International, LLC, a leading physical precious metals asset management company

  • Former partner at Goldman Sachs & Co.

Add to this the departure of 4 long-term directors and the planned departure of Michael Kenyon upon the earlier of appointing a new CEO and the 2019 AGM, 2/3 of the Board will have been refreshed by May 2019

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APPENDIX

  • A. Why Shareholders Should Not Support Paulson
  • B. Detour Lake – Exceptionally Long Mine Life
  • C. Detour Lake Provides Significant Leverage to

the Gold Price and Operating Costs

  • D. International Tower Hill – Paulson History
  • E. Corporate G&A Cost Analysis – 3 Yr Average
  • F. Proxy Voting Mechanics
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  • A. WHY SHAREHOLDERS

SHOULD NOT SUPPORT PAULSON

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3 2

Paulson’s Superficial Plan Shows Its Lack of

Understanding of Detour Gold’s Business

1 5 4

Embark on a Global, External CEO Search

  • Our Recommended Board already has a clear and sensible path to appoint a new CEO

Look at the Corporate Structure

  • Paulson has indicated it would add $300M of value, without providing any detail on how this

may be achieved Improve Mining Costs

  • Again, Paulson’s claim on the “$600 million value uplift” has no reasonable support and has

no concrete solutions and/or timelines Explore All Strategic Alternatives

  • In other words, Paulson would pursue a sale of the company, including a fire sale that serves

its own agenda William Williams to Assume the Interim CEO Role

  • Williams is inexperienced and unqualified in overseeing a ~$1.8 billion market cap gold mining

company like Detour Gold as an Interim CEO: he has only served on <$25M market cap boards and generated negative TSR as a CEO/COO; he has no large open pit gold mine

  • perational experience; he has recently assumed the Interim CEO role at Zinc One Resources
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Paulson’s Flip-flop Campaign is About Facilitating a Fire Sale, Not Board Refreshment

▪ Paulson initially asked for the Company to commit to a public process, suggesting it was aware of potential suitors ▪ When that attempt failed, Paulson quickly flip-flopped and critiqued incumbent directors that it had a long history of supporting, arguing that Paulson could run the Company better than the current Board and management team ▪ The Board has made several attempts to settle with Paulson. However, Paulson will not settle until its self-serving demands are fully satisfied ▪ Paulson ignores the need for any continuity to ensure successful execution of the 2018 LOM Plan ▪ Paulson’s demands ignore the substantial Board refreshment that has recently taken place ▪ All Paulson wants is a wholesale board change with new inexperienced directors who will pursue Paulson’s self-serving fire sale agenda

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Detour Gold Vs. International Tower Hill

Source: Factset, Company Filings.

▪ Since Detour Gold’s first full year of production, the Company’s share price has increased by 159% ▪ Since Paulson first invested in International Tower Hill (“ITH”), its share price has declined by 91% ▪ Since Marcelo Kim became Chairman of ITH in 2016, ITH’s share price has declined by 19%

159%

  • 19%
  • 91%

0% 6%

  • 8%
  • 125%
  • 75%
  • 25%

25% 75% 125% 175% DGC Total Return Since First Full Year

  • f Production

(Dec 31, 2013) ITH Total Return Since Marcelo Kim Appointed as Chairman (Dec 28, 2016) ITH Total Return Since Paulson's First Reported Investment (Sep 30, 2010)

Detour Gold vs. International Tower Hill (Total Return to Nov 9, 2018)

Detour Gold International Tower Hill Gold Price

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Paulson’s Troubling Track Record Demonstrates It is Not Qualified to Control Detour Gold

Paulson’s AUM has declined 72% over the past few years

$30.8 $8.7 20 16 2014 2018 Q2 AUM (US$B) # of Accounts

▪ Paulson has held a position in Detour Gold for nine years; however, its focus has recently become short-term in nature ▪ Recent fund underperformance and investor redemptions seem to have impacted Paulson’s timeframe for a return on its investment ▪ John Paulson reportedly owes $1B in federal and state taxes this year(1) ▪ As a result, Paulson’s interests may no longer align with those of other Detour Gold shareholders

Source: Paulson Investment Adviser Public Disclosure (“Form ADV”)

  • 1. Wall Street Journal 11-Apr-18.

“The firm has made a series of ill-fated investments, such as on healthcare stocks, banks and gold and by betting against German bonds” – Financial Times (March 2018) “Losing capital may make it harder for the firm to

  • perate and pay staff” – Bloomberg (March 2018)
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28 5 10 15 20 25

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Holdings (mm shares)

25.5 mm 9.9 mm Commercial Production Begins

Paulson’s Troubling Track Record Demonstrates It is Not Qualified to Control Detour Gold

Paulson’s Detour Gold holdings have significantly declined since 2014

Source: Detour Gold Management Information Circular, Paulson Alternative Month Report, Paulson Press Releases. Note: Does not include shares from convertible securities.

Paulson’s share position in Detour Gold has declined by 61% since peaking in 2014 After being a net seller since 2014, Paulson has recently purchased Detour Gold shares at depressed share price levels, opportunistically looking to make a quick profit

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Paulson’s Non-recommended Nominees Have Little Relevant Experience or Track Record

Marcelo Kim

  • Has NO executive experience in the mining

industry

  • Has LESS THAN 10 years of working

experience

  • His time at Paulson has been marred with

NEGATIVE investment returns

  • Boards he sits on face MULTIPLE
  • perational and governance issues
  • Most shareholders have communicated with

us that they DO NOT want him to be on the Board

  • Has NO formal education in mining or

geology

  • Serving on only two <$150M market cap

boards, Midas Gold and International Tower Hill Mines; INEXPERIENCED in overseeing a ~$1.8 billion market cap gold mining company like Detour Gold

  • International Tower Hill Mines performance

has DETERIORATED since he was appointed chairman in 2016

  • Midas Gold has experienced OBSTRUCTIVE

PERMITTING ISSUES escalated with the formal adoption of a resolution to oppose the project by one of the local indigenous tribes being consulted by permitting authorities William C. Williams

  • Has NO large open pit gold mine
  • perational experience
  • Generated NEGATIVE annualized TSR
  • f -28.5% and 6.37% respectively as a

named executive officer and director

  • Has only served on <$25M market cap

boards, INEXPERIENCED in

  • verseeing a ~$1.8 billion market cap

gold mining company like Detour Gold

  • UNQUALIFIED to assume the Interim

CEO role at Detour Gold given his poor track record as a CEO or COO

  • Has already recently committed to the

Interim CEO role at another public company, Zinc One Resources

Paulson’s nominees will only impair Detour Gold’s continuity and take the Company backwards

Source: Company filings, Bloomberg.

Company Zinc One Resources Forrester Metals Orvana Minerals Market Cap ~$10M ~$14M ~$20M Role former COO, now Interim CEO CEO CEO and President Tenure May 2017 - Present

  • Aug. 2016 -
  • Jun. 2017
  • Mar. 2008 -
  • Apr. 2013

AN TSR

  • 73.86%
  • 16.88%
  • 10.58%
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Paulson’s Non-recommended Nominees Have Little Relevant Experience or Track Record – Cont.

Dawn P. Whittaker

  • Has NO public named executive officer

experience

  • Has NO mining operational experience
  • Has ONLY served on one public board
  • Possesses NON-COMPLEMENTARY

skills to Detour Gold’s Board Michael D. Woollcombe

  • Has NO board experience in the mining

industry

  • Has NO named executive officer

experience in the mining industry

  • Has NO mining operational experience
  • Possesses NON-COMPLEMENTARY

skills to Detour Gold’s Board

Paulson’s nominees will only impair Detour Gold’s continuity and take the Company backwards

Maria S. Jelescu Dreyfus

  • LACKS gold mining industry expertise
  • Has NO public board or named

executive officer experience

  • Previous financial experience focused
  • n energy, industrial, chemical,

transportation and infrastructure

  • Possesses NON-COMPLEMENTARY

skills to Detour Gold’s Board Ronald S. Simkus

  • Has NEVER served on the board of a

pure gold producer

  • Was associated with MULTIPLE mining

companies having legal issues

  • Former director of Baffinland Iron Mines

that was affiliated with OSC allegations

  • f insider trading and a $6.2M lawsuit

for unpaid services during his tenure

  • Possesses NON-COMPLEMENTARY

skills to Detour Gold’s Board

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Experience, industry knowledge, and expertise to build value Actively executing the 2018 Life of Mine Plan that is producing results and providing significant upside Responsible stewards aligned with shareholders and committed to change: New Board members, a new 2018 Life

  • f Mine Plan, and a new management

team at Detour Lake Inexperienced, unqualified individuals who add nothing to the refreshed Board No plan other than what Paulson wants

  • an ill-timed fire sale agenda

A reckless, flip-flopping approach to achieve self-serving change. Simply no plan

DETOUR GOLD’S RECOMMENDED & REFRESHED BOARD PAULSON’S POORLY QUALIFIED ACTIVIST NOMINEES

NOW YOU MUST CHOOSE

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  • B. Detour Lake – Exceptionally Long Mine Life

Detour Lake reserve life

2X industry average

Largest gold mining operation in Canada and among the largest gold reserve endowments in the world

1 1 1 5 1 7 2 12 1 4 4 2 10 4 4 3 7 2 9 4 5 1 5 7 5 2 2

  • 5

10 15 20 25 30 DGC TMR PVG ELD GUY GG TGZ NEM ASR CG AGI DPM ABX OGC IMG NGD AUY SSRM AEM THO EDV TXG BTO KGC KL ALO PG Reserve Life (Years)

Implied Mine Life # of Assets

Average: 11.4 years

Source: Company filings, FactSet, Street Consensus. Note: Mine life calculated based on gold reserves divided by average gold production over the next 5 years; includes only assets in production and in construction; number of assets exclude non primary gold assets. Barrick asset count excludes assets from proposed merger with Randgold.

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  • C. Detour Lake Provides Significant Leverage

to the Gold Price and Operating Costs

After-Tax NPV5% (C$B) Exchange Rate (US$/C$)

1.20 1.25 1.30

Gold Price (US$/oz)

US$1,200/oz

$2.4 $2.7 $3.0

US$1,300/oz

$3.1 $3.4 $3.8

US$1,400/oz

$3.9 $4.2 $4.5

Gold Price Operating Costs Capital Expenditure

  • 10%

C$2.4B +10% C$2.9B +10% C$3.2B +10% C$4.4B

  • 10%

C$4.0B

  • 10%

C$3.7B Base Case C$3.4B

Source: 2018 LOM Plan

10% increase in the gold price results in an incremental ~C$5.70 per Detour Gold share

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  • D. International Tower Hill – Paulson History

Source: Bloomberg, Company filings, FactSet, SNL, Street Research Note: Priced as of 09-Nov-18; ownership based on most recent filings as of 30-Sep-18. 1. Shown as Q4 filings except for 2018. 2. Based on basic shares outstanding.

  • 20%

40% 60% 80%

  • 20

40 60 80 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Paulson & Co. Holdings (mm shares) Ownership (%)

(1)

▪ Since Paulson first invested in International Tower Hill (“ITH”), its share price has declined by 91% ▪ In 2016, Marcelo Kim was inserted as Chairman of ITH and since his involvement, the performance

  • f the company has deteriorated

▪ Based on public information, Paulson’s shareholdings in ITH have decreased in value by 54% with an estimated cost base of $1.20 per share and current share price of $0.55

30-Sep-10 Paulson reports a stake of ~7% in ITH 28-Dec-16 Marcelo Kim, Partner at Paulson, appointed Chairman and Director at ITH 23-Jul-13 Feability Study for Livengood with an estimated NPV of (US$440) mm and 1.7% IRR 08-Sep-16 Optimization study for the Livengood with a revised NPV

  • f (US$552) mm and 0.5% IRR
  • $5

$9 $14 $18 Jun-10 Feb-12 Oct-13 Jun-15 Mar-17 Nov-18

Share Price (C$)

Share Price (C$)

22-Mar-18 Damola Adamolekun, an Associate at Paulson, is appointed to the Board following departure of Victor Flores

(1)(2)

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35

E-1. Corporate G&A Cost Analysis – 3 Yr Average (2015- 17) (SBC excluded from G&A costs)

Detour Gold vs Peers¹

* For Agnico and Hecla, SBC not excluded from G&A costs as SBC amount is not disclosed in their audited annual financial statements and therefore not included in the median calculation.

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12%

G&A/Revenue (%)

Median = 4%

20 40 60 80 100 120 140

G&A/Gold Production (US$/oz)²

Median = US$62/oz

1. Peer group companies as per MIC for year 2017. 2. Excluding non gold producers: Hecla, HudBay and Lundin.

Ranking 3/14 Ranking 1/11 * * *

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36

20 40 60 80 100 120

G&A Cost (US$M)

(SBC excluded)

Median² = US$26 M

E-2. Corporate G&A Cost Analysis – 3 Yr Average (2015-17)

Data for Detour Gold and Peers¹

SBC included but amount undisclosed 1. Peer group companies as per MIC for year 2017. 2. Median does not include Agnico Eagle or Hecla.

Company Name 3 yr avg SBC (US$M) SBC included in G&A Alacer Gold 4.0 N IAMGOLD 4.6 Y Lundin Mining 4.9 Y SSR Mining 6.3 Y Tahoe Resources 6.3 Y New Gold 6.9 N HudBay Minerals 6.9 Y Alamos Gold 7.2 N Centerra Gold 7.4 Y Detour Gold 7.8 Y Eldorado Gold 12.6 N B2Gold 15.7 N Agnico Eagle * Y Hecla Mining * Y

For comparison purposes, we have excluded SBC because some peer companies report G&A cost without SBC (audited annual financial statements).

* SBC amount undisclosed.

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37

E-3. Corporate G&A Cost Analysis – 3 Yr Average (2015-17)

Data for Detour Gold and Peers¹

500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500

Revenue (US$M)

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Gold Production (M oz)²

1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000

Total Assets (US$M)

1. Peer group companies as per MIC for year 2017. 2. Excluding non gold producers: Hecla, HudBay and Lundin.

Median = US$634 M Median = US$2,737 M Median = 0.4 M oz

All figures are as reported in companies’ audited annual financial statements.

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38

  • F. Proxy Voting Mechanics

✓ ✓

FOR the Removal of Lisa Colnett & Jonathan Rubenstein AGAINST the removal of the other six (6) Detour Gold incumbent directors AGAINST fixing the number of directors at eight (8) FOR the election of Steven Feldman & Christopher Robison WITHHOLD on the other six (6) unqualified Paulson Dissident Nominees

Vote your BLUE proxy or Voting Information Form well in advance

  • f the deadline on Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. (EST):

If you have questions or need help voting, contact Kingsdale Advisors at 1.877.659.1823

  • r at contactus@kingsdaleadvisors.com