Interaction-Based Privacy Threat Elicitation Laurens Sion , Kim - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Interaction-Based Privacy Threat Elicitation Laurens Sion , Kim - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Interaction-Based Privacy Threat Elicitation Laurens Sion , Kim Wuyts, Koen Yskout, Dimitri Van Landuyt, Wouter Joosen 27 th April 2018 IWPE2018 London, United Kingdom Importance of Considering Privacy by Design Number of Data Breaches


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SLIDE 1

Interaction-Based Privacy Threat Elicitation

Laurens Sion, Kim Wuyts, Koen Yskout, Dimitri Van Landuyt, Wouter Joosen 27th April 2018 – IWPE2018 – London, United Kingdom

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SLIDE 2

Importance of Considering Privacy by Design

› Data breaches

2 10 20 30 40

Number of Data Breaches

5 (full bank account details) 4 (E.g., health records) 3 (E.g., creditcard info) 2 (SSN, personal details) 1 (E.g., email, online info) Data: Information is beautiful: World's Biggest Data Breaches

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Importance of Considering Privacy by Design

› Data breaches

3 Data: Information is beautiful: World's Biggest Data Breaches 10 100 1000 10000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Millions

Number of records lost

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Importance of Considering Privacy by Design

› Data breaches › Users’ view inconsistent with collection/usage

4

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SLIDE 5

Importance of Considering Privacy by Design

› Data breaches › Users’ view inconsistent with collection/usage › Increasingly legislated

GDPR mandates privacy by design

5

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SLIDE 6

Realizing Privacy by Design

› GDPR mentions risk ≫ 70 times

6

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SLIDE 7

Realizing Privacy by Design

› GDPR mentions risk ≫ 70 times › Appropriate technical measures

Identify issues

7

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SLIDE 8

Realizing Privacy by Design

› GDPR mentions risk ≫ 70 times › Appropriate technical measures

Identify issues

› Accountability

Demonstrate compliance

8

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SLIDE 9

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

9

Model

Model the system

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

Elicit and Document

Elicit and document privacy threats

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SLIDE 10

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Model

› DFD model of the system

10

  • 1. User

2. Portal 3. Service

  • 4. Social

network data

Model

Model the system

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SLIDE 11

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

11

Model the system

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

Elicit and Document

Elicit and document privacy threats

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SLIDE 12

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Map

12

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

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SLIDE 13

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Map

13

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

  • 1. User

2. Portal 3. Service

  • 4. Social

network data

L I N D D U N Data store X X X X X X Data flow X X X X X X Process X X X X X X Entity X X X

MAPPING TEMPLATE Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

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SLIDE 14

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Map

14

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

  • 1. User

2. Portal 3. Service

  • 4. Social

network data

L I N D D U N Data store X X X X X X Data flow X X X X X X Process X X X X X X Entity X X X

MAPPING TEMPLATE Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

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SLIDE 15

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Map

15

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

  • 1. User

2. Portal 3. Service

  • 4. Social

network data

L I N D D U N Data store X X X X X X Data flow X X X X X X Process X X X X X X Entity X X X

MAPPING TEMPLATE Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

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SLIDE 16

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Map

16

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

  • 1. User

2. Portal 3. Service

  • 4. Social

network data

L I N D D U N Data store X X X X X X Data flow X X X X X X Process X X X X X X Entity X X X

MAPPING TEMPLATE Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

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SLIDE 17

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Map

17

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

  • 1. User

2. Portal 3. Service

  • 4. Social

network data

L I N D D U N Data store X X X X X X Data flow X X X X X X Process X X X X X X Entity X X X

MAPPING TEMPLATE Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

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SLIDE 18

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

18

Model the system Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

Elicit and Document

Elicit and document privacy threats

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SLIDE 19

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Elicit

19 Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

Elicit and Document

Elicit and document privacy threats

MITIGATION TAXONOMY MITIGATION TAXONOMY THREAT TREE CATALOG

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SLIDE 20

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

Elicit

20 Threat target L I N D D U N Data store

Social network db X X x x X X*

Data flow User data stream (user- portal)

...

Elicit and Document

Elicit and document privacy threats

MITIGATION TAXONOMY MITIGATION TAXONOMY THREAT TREE CATALOG

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SLIDE 21

Privacy Threat Modeling Steps

21

Model

Model the system

Map

Map the LINDDUN threat types to the model

Elicit and Document

Elicit and document privacy threats

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The LINDDUN Privacy Framework

› Linkability › Identifiability › Non-repudiation › Detectability › Disclosure of Information › Unawareness › Non-compliance

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats

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Process B A

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats

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Process B A

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats

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Process B A

Single Threat?

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats

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Process B A

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats

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Process B A

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats

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Client Server

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats

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Client Server

Detectability threats on processes

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats

31

Client Server

Detectability threats on processes

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SLIDE 32

Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats

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Client Server

Detectability threats on processes

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SLIDE 33

Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats

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Client Server

Detectability threats on processes

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Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats › Redundant threats

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SLIDE 35

Issues with Element-Based Elicitation

› Undiscovered threats › Inapplicable threats › Redundant threats

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Client Server

Detectability threats on processes

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SLIDE 36

Element- vs. Interaction-based Elicitation

› Take local context into account

More explicit and precise

› Threats not caused by elements but through interactions › # 𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑓𝑠𝑏𝑑𝑢𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑡 < #{𝑓𝑚𝑓𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑡} › Less or more threats? › Lack of consensus on the most appropriate approach

36

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Interaction-based LINDDUN

Client Server

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Interaction-based LINDDUN

Client Server

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Interaction-based LINDDUN

Client Server

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Interaction-based LINDDUN

Client Server

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SLIDE 41
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LINDDUN Examples

› Full LINDDUN table of threats

45

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LINDDUN Examples

› Full LINDDUN table of threats › Concrete examples

46

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LINDDUN Examples

47 Website (S) showing incorrect password error reveals account existence.

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Qualities

› Expressivity

48

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Qualities

› Expressivity › Elimination of inapplicable threat types

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Qualities

› Expressivity › Elimination of inapplicable threat types › Finding undiscovered threats

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Qualities

› Expressivity › Elimination of inapplicable threat types › Finding undiscovered threats › Effort-precision trade-off

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Discussion

› Semantics and ambiguities of privacy threats

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Discussion

› Semantics and ambiguities of privacy threats › Threat trees

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Discussion

› Semantics and ambiguities of privacy threats › Threat trees › Usage & tool support

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Discussion

› Semantics and ambiguities of privacy threats › Threat trees › Usage & tool support › Granularity for threat elicitation

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Conclusion

› Element-based elicitation is sub-optimal

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Conclusion

› Element-based elicitation is sub-optimal › Interaction-based LINDDUN extension

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Conclusion

› Element-based elicitation is sub-optimal › Interaction-based LINDDUN extension › Provide detailed LINDDUN interaction examples

58

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Conclusion

› Element-based elicitation is sub-optimal › Interaction-based LINDDUN extension › Provide detailed LINDDUN interaction examples › Beyond interaction-based: to DFD patterns

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Conclusion

› Element-based elicitation is sub-optimal › Interaction-based LINDDUN extension › Provide detailed LINDDUN interaction examples › Beyond interaction-based: to DFD patterns

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Questions?

Thank you!

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Interaction-Based Privacy Threat Elicitation

Laurens Sion, Kim Wuyts, Koen Yskout, Dimitri Van Landuyt, Wouter Joosen