- Prof. Strassmann, GMU March 27, 2007 Lecture, REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION ONLY
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Information Assurance Information Assurance for Defense Security for Defense Security
- Prof. Paul A. Strassmann
George Mason University, March 27, 2007
Information Assurance Information Assurance for Defense Security - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Information Assurance Information Assurance for Defense Security for Defense Security Prof. Paul A. Strassmann George Mason University, March 27, 2007 1 Prof. Strassmann, GMU March 27, 2007 Lecture, REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION ONLY Elements of
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George Mason University, March 27, 2007
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Radio Frequency Antenna Heavy Duty Password Electronic Wallet Digital Identify Certificate Encryption Key Digital Photo One-Time Password Physical Access Control Biometrics
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$3.15 $2.31 $5.46 $1.38 10.3% $3.31 $2.45 $5.76 $1.43 10.5% Defense Department All O thers Total I.T. Security Spending Total IT Spending on Training and Reporting DoD IA Spending/Total I.T. Spending FY 06 FY 07 Federal Information Assurance Spending ($B) $3.15 $2.31 $5.46 $1.38 10.3% $3.31 $2.45 $5.76 $1.43 10.5% Defense Department All O thers Total I.T. Security Spending Total IT Spending on Training and Reporting DoD IA Spending/Total I.T. Spending FY 06 FY 07 Federal Information Assurance Spending ($B)
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packet,
(QoS),
fragments,
not,
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practically unlimited number of unverifiable points of access;
Layer authenticates destination servers, but not the sending sources);
10% of network traffic;
between ISP (Information Service Providers), each providing network capacity and router switching capacity ;
performance determined by routers that may not have sufficient capacity to handle traffic spikes.
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forwarding packets from one network link to another. BGP is unreliable if router tables are in error;
well over 0.5 seconds, if message “packet” traverses several “hops”;
convey destructive software such as “worms”, “rootkits” or parasitic “malware” such as “Trojans” for finding “backdoors” into computers.
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External Attacks (31%) Internal Foul-Ups (61%) All other (8%)
SOURCE: Study of 550 security breaches, University of Washington, Computerworld 3/19/07
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Electronic attack Electronic warfare support Electronic protection Computer network attack Computer network defense Computer network exploitation Psychological operations Military deception Operations security Information assurance Physical security Physical attack Counterintelligence Combat camera Destroy, disrupt, delay Identify and locate threats Identify and locate threats Protect the use of electromagnetic spectrum Destroy, disrupt, delay Protect computer networks Gain information about computer networks Influence Mislead Deny Protect information and information systems Secure information and information infrastructure Destroy, disrupt Mislead Inform, document Electronic warfare Computer network operations Psychological operations Military deception Operations security Supporting capabilities Source: Joint Pub 3-13, Information Operations ACTIVITIES OBJECTIVES INFORMATION OPERATIONS
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1900 1940 1980 2000 Million O ne 1/1,000,000 MIPS per $1000
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1 300 100,000 2,000,000 60,000,000 3 Billion 100 Billion 0.001 1 100 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 100,000,00 1975 1990 1996 2000 2005 - 2010 2010 - 2020 2020 - Beyond 0.001 1 1,000 10,000 100,000 Million Billion $1,000 $1,000 $100 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $100 Bacterium W orm Guppy Lizard Mouse Monkey Human N umber of N eurons Equivalent MIPS Computer Processing Available MIPS/ $1000 Computing Costs O rganism
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