Guaranteeing High Prices by Guaranteeing the Lowest Price M ATTHEW C. C ORCORAN * Many businesses in a wide variety of fields have instituted low price guarantees as a competitive tactic. A low price guarantee is a promise by a business to match the prices of its competitors. This Note explores the competitive effect of low price guarantees and determines that their effect is ambiguous. The author then argues that even if the low price guarantees are anti-competitive, the antitrust laws do not prohibit their use. Finally, it discusses possible legislative solutions to the potential problems caused by low price guarantees. I. I NTRODUCTION Most Americans are familiar with low price guarantees. 1 Contrary to conventional wisdom, 2 however, low price guarantees actually may result in * B.A., University of Michigan, 2000; J.D., The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law, 2004 (expected). 1 Circuit City, an electronics retailer, makes the following guarantee: “If you’ve seen a lower advertised price from a local store with the same item in stock, we want to know about it. Bring it to our attention, and we’ll gladly beat their price by 10% of the difference.” Price Match Guarantee , at http://www.circuitcity.com/cs_contentdisplay.jsp?c=1&b=g&incat= 52608#match (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). Circuit City further guarantees “[e]ven after your Circuit City purchase, if you see a lower advertised price (including our own sale prices) within 30 days, we’ll refund 110 % of the difference.” Id. ; see also Low Price Guarantee , at http://www.thegoodguys.com/price_pop.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). The Good Guys, another electronics retailer, guarantees: “If you find a lower verifiable delivered price from bestbuy.com , circuitcity.com , or crutchfield.com , on an available product of the same brand and model, we’ll gladly match that price.” Id. The Good Guys also guarantee their low prices for up to thirty days after a purchase. Id. 2 Consumers often equate low price guarantees with competition and low prices. See Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, Hassle Costs: The Achilles’ Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees , 8 J. E CON . & M GMT . S TRATEGY 489, 490 (1999); Maria Arbatskaya et al., Promises to Match or Beat the Competition: Evidence From Retail Tire Prices , in 8 A DVANCES IN A PPLIED M ICROECONOMICS 123, 124 (Michael R. Baye ed., 1999); Kenneth S. Corts, On the Competitive Effects of Price-Matching Policies , 15 I NT ’ L J. I NDUS . O RG . 283, 284 (1997); James D. Hess & Eitan Gerstner, Price-Matching Policies: An Empirical Case , 12 M ANAGERIAL & D ECISION E CON . 305, 305 (1991). “On its face, a price-matching policy seems the epitome of cutthroat competition: what could be more competitive than sellers’ guaranteeing their low prices by promising to match the prices of any competitor?” Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge? , 111 H ARV . L. R EV . 528, 531 (1997).
1428 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1427 higher prices and welfare losses. 3 Low price guarantees have become prevalent and are used in a wide variety of industries. 4 In response to their widespread use, some have argued that resort to the antitrust laws is the appropriate method to curtail the use of low price guarantees. 5 However, in this Note it will be argued that resort to the antitrust laws is inappropriate for two reasons: first, the effects of low price guarantees are not clearly anti-competitive and the courts are not the appropriate place to make that determination; and second, even if low price guarantees are anti-competitive, they do not in all cases violate the antitrust laws. Part II of this Note will discuss the social harms caused by a monopoly. In Part III, the arguments suggesting that low price guarantees are anti-competitive, the arguments suggesting that low price guarantees are not anti-competitive, and those arguments suggesting that low price guarantees will actually have a positive 3 See Zhiqi Chen, How Low is a Guaranteed-Lowest-Price? , 28 C AN . J. E CON . 683 (1995); Edlin, supra note 2; Aaron S. Edlin & Eric R. Emch, The Welfare Losses from Price- Matching Policies , 47 J. I NDUS . E CON . 145 (1999); Hess & Gerstner, supra note 2. Welfare losses are a measure of the loss of value to society as a whole. See M ARK S EIDENFELD , M ICROECONOMIC P REDICATES TO L AW AND E CONOMICS 40–41 (1996). Market transactions create economic surplus. For example, imagine a person selling a car. If that person values the car at $5,000 and a buyer values the car at $7,000, a sale will create $2,000 in surplus. This surplus exists regardless of how it is distributed to each person. If the car is sold for $5,000, the buyer is $2,000 richer and the seller stays the same. On the other hand, if the car is sold for $7,000, the seller is $2,000 richer and the buyer is indifferent. If the car is not sold at all, that $2,000 of surplus is lost. This $2,000 loss is a welfare loss. It may be easier to see the loss if the aggregate positions of the people before the transaction are compared to their aggregate positions after the transaction. Assume for simplicity’s sake, that the seller only has a car and the buyer only has $7,000. Because the seller values the car at $5,000, the total value society has is $12,000 ($7,000 [cash buyer has] + $5,000 [value of car to seller]). If the car is sold for $6,000, then the total value society has is $14,000 ($6,000 [cash seller has] + $1,000 [cash buyer has] + $7,000 [value of car to buyer]). Therefore, if the car is not sold the society loses $2,000 ($14,000 [value of society if car is sold] – $12,000 [value of society if car is not sold]). It is important to note that the loss of money itself is not the welfare loss. Money only serves as a metric for utility (utility is a measure of the overall “happiness” in society), and it is the loss of utility which is the welfare loss. See D AVID W. B ARNES & L YNN A. S TOUT , C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON L AW AND E CONOMICS 6 (1992). 4 Corts, supra note 2, at 283 (noting use in many retailers, consumer electronics, office supplies, and automobile tires); Hess & Gerstner, supra note 2, at 305 (noting use in appliance stores, hardware stores, and supermarkets); Hviid & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 489–90 (noting use in “sporting goods, books, housewares, cellular phones, office products, consumer electronics, luggage and travel accessories, furniture, tires, toys, petrol, eyewear, and prescription drugs”). 5 Edlin, supra note 2, at 532; Mark T.L. Sargent, Comment, Economics Upside-Down: Low-Price Guarantees as Mechanisms for Facilitating Tacit Collusion , 141 U. P A . L. R EV . 2055, 2118 (1993); cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses , 64 A NTITRUST L.J. 517, 534 (1996).
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