Economics and Computation Lirong Xia 1 This Course Economics: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

economics and computation
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Economics and Computation Lirong Xia 1 This Course Economics: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Economics and Computation Lirong Xia 1 This Course Economics: decision making by multiple actors, each with individual preferences, capabilities, and information, and motivated to act in regard to these preferences. Computer science:


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Lirong Xia

Economics and Computation

1

slide-2
SLIDE 2

ØEconomics: decision making by multiple actors, each with individual preferences, capabilities, and information, and motivated to act in regard to these preferences. ØComputer science: study of representation and processing of information for the purpose

  • f specific calculation tasks.

ØBreadth over depth

2

This Course

slide-3
SLIDE 3

3

Mostly a math course

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Ø No electronics in class

  • Unless explicitly told
  • You may printout slides, but please make sure you

download the latest version. They are useful in exams anyway.

Ø Take notes if possible ØQuestions are very welcome

  • If you don’t ask me, I may ask you (random quiz)

Ø 10 min break for each (sub) topic

  • Q&A, feel free to speak Chinese

4

Rules and Suggestions

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Ø2000 travelers from 1 to 4 ØCentralized goal: minimize max delay

  • 1000 1à 2à4; 1000 1à 3à4;
  • minimaxdelay: 35min

ØNo one wants to deviate

5

Tragedy of the commons: Braess’ Paradox

1 2 3 4 25min 25min 𝑦 100 𝑦 100

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Ø2000 travelers from 1 to 4 ØCentralized goal: minimize max delay

  • 1000 1à 2à4; 1000 1à 3à4;
  • minimax delay: 35min

6

Tragedy of the commons: Braess’ Paradox

1 2 3 4 25min 25min 𝑦 100 𝑦 100 0min

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Ø 2000 travelers from 1 to 4 Ø No one wants 1à 3à4

  • 1à 2à3à4 is always better

Ø No one wants 1à 2à4

  • 1à 2à3à4 is always better

Ø Everyone goes 1à 2à3à4, delay is 40min each Ø Paradox: worse than the system without 2à3 Ø More in the “game theory” class

7

Tragedy of the commons: Braess’ Paradox

1 2 3 4 25min 25min 𝑦 100 𝑦 100 0min

slide-8
SLIDE 8

ØHow to analyze the outcome?

  • Social choice, game theory

ØHow to incentivize people?

  • Mechanism design

ØEconomics + Computation

  • Incentives + computational thinking

8

Goal of the course

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Ø (Algorithmic) Game theory

  • 3 days

Ø Auctions

  • 1 day

Ø Mechanism design

  • 1 day

Ø (Computational) Social choice

  • 2 days

Ø Wisdom of the crowd

  • 1 day

Ø Preference modeling

  • 1 day

Ø Bitcoin and blockchain

  • 1 day

9

Brief schedule

Von Neumann Nash Selten Aumann Harsanyi Myerson Vickrey Arrow Roth Shapley Kahneman McFadden Hansen

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Ø2nd price auction

  • highest bid wins
  • charged the 2nd highest price
  • more in the “auctions” and “mechanism design” class10

Example: Auctions

slide-11
SLIDE 11

11

Example: School choice

> > > > > >

Kyle Stan Eric

> > > > > >

slide-12
SLIDE 12

> > > > >

12

Example: Resource allocation

> > > > > > > > > >

slide-13
SLIDE 13

13

Sequential allocation

> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

O = > >

Kyle Stan Eric Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6

slide-14
SLIDE 14

ØSounds good

  • Efficient: if we have different preferences,

then we will all (almost) get what we want

  • Fair: (1st pick, last pick), (2nd pick, 2nd to last

pick)…

ØHow can we formalize these ideas?

  • more in “matching and resource alloation”

14

Is it a good mechanism?

slide-15
SLIDE 15

15

Example 3: Political elections

> > > > > >

Carol Bob Alice

slide-16
SLIDE 16

ØInput: profile of rankings over alternatives ØOutput: a single winner

  • For each vote R, the alternative ranked in

the i-th position gets m-i points

  • The alternative with most total points is the

winner

  • Use some tie-breaking mechanism whenever

there is a tie

16

The Borda voting rule

BORDA LULL

slide-17
SLIDE 17

17

Example of Borda

> > > > > >

Carol Bob Alice

Borda

: 2+2+0=4 : 1+1+1=3 : 0+0+2=2

Total scores

slide-18
SLIDE 18

ØMany other voting rules beyond Borda will be discussed in the next class ØWhich one is the best?

  • Hard to compare.
  • Criteria will be discussed in the social choice

class

18

Other voting rules?

slide-19
SLIDE 19

19

Example2: Crowdsourcing

a b a b c Turker 1 Turker 2 Turker n

> > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > a b > b c >

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Ø How can we make an optimal decision by aggregating noisy answers from strategic agents?

  • more in “Wisdom of the crowd”

20

Optimal way to make a decision

slide-21
SLIDE 21

ØFinal grades:

  • Option1: Participation 10%; 3 Exams 90%
  • Option2: Participation 40%; 3 Exams 60%
  • Option3: Participation 70%; 3 Exams 30%
  • https://opra.cs.rpi.edu/polls/204/

21

Grading, let’s vote

slide-22
SLIDE 22

ØSign up on piazza ØSign up on OPRA and vote ØPrint the slides if you want ØRemember to bring computer/smart phone for in-class voting (but don’t use it in class otherwise)

22

Before tomorrow