Denial of Service Attacks Types, Causes, Motives & Remedies By - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Denial of Service Attacks Types, Causes, Motives & Remedies By - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Denial of Service Attacks Types, Causes, Motives & Remedies By M. Raza ur Rehman NUST PAKCON 2004 Denial of Service Attacks Attempts to prevent or disturb legitimate access to co mputer resources Resources like bandwidth, services


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Denial of Service Attacks Types, Causes, Motives & Remedies

By

  • M. Raza ur Rehman

NUST PAKCON 2004

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Denial of Service Attacks

  • Attempts to prevent or disturb legitimate access to co

mputer resources

  • Resources like bandwidth, services etc.
  • The most common way:Network Flooding
  • Alter the Configurations so that configurations

have to be fetched again and again

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Distributed DoS Attacks

R e a l a tta c k e r N e tw o rk M a s te r S la v e S la v e S la v e S la v e V ic tim

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Common DoS Attacks

  • Smurf Ping of Death Attack
  • SYN Flooding
  • UDP Flooding (Fraggle)

Etc…

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Smurf (Ping of Death Attack)

Internet Perpetrator Victim ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address ICMP echo reply

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SYN Flooding

Source Destination Listen

SYN_RECVDD CONNECTED

SYNn

SYNm, ACKn+1

SYNm+1 Attacker Victim Listen

SYN_RECVDD SYNn SYNm, ACKn+1 SYNn+1 Port flooding occurs

Normal TCP Connection Establishment SYN Flooding

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UDP Flooding (Fraggle)

  • Similar to SMURF Attacks
  • UDP Echo Request expects UDP Reply

messages

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Causes of DoS Attacks

  • Flaws in the core Internet Protocols.
  • Lack of Security Concerns amongst masses
  • Distributed nature of Attacks
  • Nature of Internet
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Motives

Political Reasons

  • India Pakistan Cyber Warfare (YAHA Worm) 2002

http://www.vnunet.com/News/1133119

  • Attacks on Brazil Government sites 2000

http://www.computeruser.com/newstoday/00/03/18/news1.html

  • DDoS Attacks on Aljazeera 2003

http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/03/26/HNjazeera_1.html

  • SCO Website down by DDoS

http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/08/25/HNscoweb_1.html

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Motives Economic Reasons

  • British Telecom (2000)

“This is my payback to BT for ripping this country off.” http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/1/12097.html CNN, Yahoo, E-Bay Down by Ddos Attacks (2000)

  • Cloud Nine ( A British ISP )doomed by Dos Attacks (2002)

http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,50171,00.html

  • Attack on Microsoft.com (2003)

http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=12808118

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Motives Other Reasons

  • Attack on Gibson Research—Revenge by Script Kiddies (2002)
  • DoS Attacks on DALNet IRC Servers..
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Other Developments

  • DDoS Vulnerabilities in IPv6 protocols

http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/

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Detection and Prevention Difficulties Associated

  • Harder to Detect
  • Easier to Commit and easier to perpetrate
  • Difficult to Isolate from Normal Traffic
  • Difficult to track the origins
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Prevention Techniques

Some general measures

  • Software patches
  • Secure host computer from hacking, trojan horse, virus, back door,

  • Configure router to deny spoofed source address
  • Reduce time-out of half-open connections
  • Increase resources for half-open connections (backlog)
  • Close unused TCP/UDP port
  • Firewall
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Prevention Techniques SYN Cache

  • Replaces the per-socket linear chain of incomplete queued connections

with a global hash table.

  • Hash Table provides two forms of protection against choking up of server resou

rces

  • Total no of entries in the hash table provides an upper bound on the

memory Syn Cache can take

  • The latter limit bounds the amount of time that the machine needs to

spend searching for a matching entry, as well as limiting replacement of the cache entries to a subset of the entire cache

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Prevention Techniques SYN Cookies

Source Destination Listen

SYN_RECVDD CONNECTED

SYNn

SYNm, ACKn+1

SYNm+1

  • Does not allocate Resources on SYN Re

quest

  • Send back its initial sequence no (m )as

a function of client properties

  • Client has to send back

Sequence no as (m+1)

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Conclusions

  • Present State of Affairs in the Control of DoS Attacks.
  • Network Bandwidth congestion still unavoidable problem
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Q & A