DDoS Last Class Fault tolerance Concurrency Naming This Class - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

ddos last class
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

DDoS Last Class Fault tolerance Concurrency Naming This Class - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

DDoS Last Class Fault tolerance Concurrency Naming This Class Networking How DDoS works UDP Data Client Server Response TCP DDoS Distributed denial-of-service attack Attacker targets a victim from a number of


slide-1
SLIDE 1

DDoS

slide-2
SLIDE 2
slide-3
SLIDE 3

Last Class

  • Fault tolerance
  • Concurrency
  • Naming
slide-4
SLIDE 4

This Class

  • Networking
  • How DDoS works
slide-5
SLIDE 5
slide-6
SLIDE 6

UDP

Client Server

Data Response

slide-7
SLIDE 7

TCP

slide-8
SLIDE 8

DDoS

  • Distributed denial-of-service attack
  • Attacker targets a victim from a number of different

IP addresses

  • Purpose is to overwhelm victim’s resources so that

legitimate users can’t use them

slide-9
SLIDE 9
slide-10
SLIDE 10

Mirai Botnet

https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical- sessions/presentation/antonakakis

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Victim Population

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Compromised Devices

slide-13
SLIDE 13

DDoS over time

slide-14
SLIDE 14
slide-15
SLIDE 15

SYN Flood

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Protecting against SYN flood

  • Filtering
  • Increasing Backlog
  • Reducing SYN-RECEIVED Timer
  • Recycling the Oldest Half-Open TCB
  • SYN Cache
  • SYN Cookies
  • Firewalls and Proxies

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4987

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Smurf Attack

  • Send ping message “from” victim to broadcast IP

address

  • Every computer on that network will helpfully reply

to the victim.

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Ping Flood

  • Send a bunch of ping messages to a server
  • ping: ICMP "echo request"
slide-19
SLIDE 19

DNS amplification

  • Forge a DNS query to an open DNS resolver with

victim’s IP address as return address

  • Victim gets overwhelmed with DNS queries they

didn’t ask for

  • Queries for a DNSSEC-signed zone if victim is a

DNS server

slide-20
SLIDE 20

DNS amplification

  • dig +trace cr.yp.to any

cr.yp.to. 600 IN MX 0 a.mx.cr.yp.to. cr.yp.to. 600 IN MX 10 b.mx.cr.yp.to. cr.yp.to. 600 IN A 80.101.159.118 yp.to. 259200 IN NS a.ns.yp.to. yp.to. 259200 IN NS uz5uu2c7j228ujjccp3ustnfmr4pgcg5ylvt16kmd0qzw7bbjgd5xq.ns.yp.to. yp.to. 259200 IN NS b.ns.yp.to. yp.to. 259200 IN NS f.ns.yp.to. yp.to. 259200 IN NS uz5ftd8vckduy37du64bptk56gb8fg91mm33746r7hfwms2b58zrbv.ns.yp.t

  • .

;; Received 414 bytes from 131.193.36.24#53(f.ns.yp.to) in 32 ms

https://dankaminsky.com/2011/01/05/djb-ccc/#dnsamp

slide-21
SLIDE 21

DNS amplification

  • http://www.pir.org. 300 IN A 173.201.238.128

pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.sea1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.mia1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.ams1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.yyz1.afilias-nst.info. ;; Received 329 bytes from 199.19.50.79#53(ns1.sea1.afilias-nst.info) in 90 ms

  • http://www.pir.org. 300 IN A 173.201.238.128

http://www.pir.org. 300 IN RRSIG A 5 3 300 20110118085021 20110104085021 61847 pir.org. n5cv0V0GeWDPfrz4K/CzH9uzMGoPnzEr7MuxPuLUxwrek+922xiS3BJG NfcM9nlbM5GZ5+UPGv668NJ1dx6oKxH8SlR+x3d8gvw2DHdA51Ke3Rjn z +P595ZPB67D9Gh6l61itZOJexwsVNX4CYt6CXTSOhX/1nKzU80PVjiM wg0= pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.mia1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.yyz1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.ams1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN NS ns1.sea1.afilias-nst.info. pir.org. 300 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 300 20110118085021 20110104085021 61847 pir.org. IIn3FUnmotgv6ygxBM8R3IsVv4jShN71j6DLEGxWJzVWQ6xbs5SIS0oL OA1ym3aQ4Y7wWZZIXpFK +/Z+Jnd8OXFsFyLo1yacjTylD94/54h11Irb fydAyESbEqxUBzKILMOhvoAtTJy1gi8ZGezMp1+M4L +RvqfGze+XFAHN N/U= ;; Received 674 bytes from 199.19.49.79#53(ns1.yyz1.afilias-nst.info) in 26 ms

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Exercise

https://github.com/ctfs/write-ups-2013/blob/master/pico- ctf-2013/ddos-detection/syn_attack.pcap It appears a SYN-flood style DDoS has been carried out on this system. Send us a list of the IP addresses of the attackers (in any order, separated by spaces), so we can track them down and stop them. https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ ChapterWork.html