current human illness surveillance systems
play

Current Human Illness Surveillance Systems Apps and Gaps Patricia - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Current Human Illness Surveillance Systems Apps and Gaps Patricia M. Griffin, MD Chief, Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and Environmental Diseases National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious


  1. Current Human Illness Surveillance Systems Apps and Gaps Patricia M. Griffin, MD Chief, Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and Environmental Diseases National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Collaborative Food Safety Forum November 3, 2011 National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and Environmental Diseases

  2. Our Overarching Goal To gather information from ill persons and their pathogens, and to analyze that information to create knowledge that can be used to prevent suffering and death

  3. Why conduct surveillance for foodborne illness?  Detect outbreaks  Count illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths  Determine foods and settings causing illness  Track trends to determine if control measures are working  Provide physicians with information for patient care

  4. Cycle of Foodborne Disease Control and Prevention Surveillance Prevention Epidemiologic Measures Investigation Applied Research

  5. Estimates of Foodborne Illness

  6. 31 Pathogens Transmitted Through Food Scallan et al, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2011 BACTERIAL Vibrio cholerae Bacillus cereus Vibrio vulnificus Brucella spp. Vibrio parahaemolyticus Campylobacter spp. Vibrio spp., other Clostridium botulinum Yersinia enterocolitica Clostridium perfringens PARASITIC E. coli O157, Shiga toxin-producing Cryptosporidium parvum E. coli non-O157 STEC Cyclospora cayetanensis E. coli, enterotoxigenic Giardia intestinalis E. coli, diarrheagenic other Toxoplasma gondii Listeria monocytogenes Trichinella spp. VIRAL Mycobacterium bovis Salmonella, non-typhoidal Astrovirus Salmonella serotype Typhi Hepatitis A Shigella spp. Norovirus Rotavirus Staphylococcus aureus Streptococcus spp., Group A Sapovirus

  7. 31 Pathogens Transmitted Through Foo d Scallan et al, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2011 BACTERIAL Vibrio cholerae Bacillus cereus Vibrio vulnificus Brucella spp. Vibrio parahaemolyticus Campylobacter spp. Vibrio spp., other Clostridium botulinum Yersinia enterocolitica Clostridium perfringens PARASITIC E. coli O157, Shiga toxin-producing Cryptosporidium parvum E. coli non-O157 STEC Cyclospora cayetanensis E. coli, enterotoxigenic Giardia intestinalis E. coli, diarrheagenic other Toxoplasma gondii Listeria monocytogenes Trichinella spp. VIRAL Mycobacterium bovis Salmonella, non-typhoidal Astrovirus Salmonella serotype Typhi Hepatitis A Shigella spp. Norovirus Rotavirus Staphylococcus aureus Streptococcus spp., Group A Sapovirus

  8. The U.S. has a Comprehensive System for Foodborne Disease Surveillance  Composed of many interrelated surveillance systems  Each system has a different purpose  Reporting starts locally and goes through the states

  9. Key Role of State Health Departments in Surveillance  States pass laws requiring doctors and laboratories to notify the health department about certain infections  purpose is to detect outbreaks and assess health of their residents  States build relationships with hospital labs, clinicians, public  so they often hear about outbreaks even before data gets into surveillance systems  States voluntarily provide data to CDC they provide most data for case surveillance  they investigate and report most outbreaks 

  10. State and Local Health Departments Have Competing Priorities  You want us to subtype all those strains ?”  You want us to find those 2 ill people and ask where they bought their cantaloupe?  What do you want us to stop doing?

  11. CDC Interactions with State Surveillance Systems  CDC has no legal authority to mandate any aspect of surveillance  CDC must collect data from >50 health departments  Data vary by state in  quality and quantity  IT systems  Cooperative agreements ($) between CDC and States can facilitate coordination and data transfer to CDC  e.g., FoodNet • Corollary: FoodNet surveillance sites are usually in the forefront of identifying and investigating outbreaks

  12. CDC Surveillance Systems rely on connections with state and local health departments… FoodNet FDOSS NARMS NNDSS NVEAIS CaliciNet LEDS COVIS PulseNet

  13. …and connections Foodborne Disease Outbreak Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System Surveillance System between systems Cholera and Other Vibrio Illness Cholera and Other Vibrio Illness Surveillance System Surveillance System FoodNet National Antimicrobial Resistance National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System for Enteric Bacteria Monitoring System for Enteric Bacteria PulseNet National Molecular Subtyping Network National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Surveillance NARMS National Voluntary Environmental National Voluntary Environmental NNDSS Assessment Information System Assessment Information System FDOSS Laboratory-based Enteric Disease Laboratory-based Enteric Disease Surveillance Surveillance LEDS Foodborne Diseases Active Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network Surveillance Network CaliciNet National Notifiable Diseases National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System Surveillance System NVEAIS National Electronic Norovirus National Electronic Norovirus COVIS Outbreak Network Outbreak Network

  14. Connecting Systems “That’s been one of my mantras — focus and simplicity. Simple can be harder than complex…once you get there, you can move mountains.” -Steve Jobs

  15. A Sma A mart t ph phone ne Analog ogy Surveillance systems are like “apps” – each has a different purpose NARMS Listeria Initiative PulseNet NNDSS-LEDS NVEAIS FDOSS FoodNet CaliciNet http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/surveillance-systems.html

  16. Major Foodborne Illness Surveillance Systems Main Categories National case I. surveillance PulseNet FoodNet II. Sentinel site case NNDSS-LEDS FDOSS surveillance III. Outbreak NARMS CaliciNet surveillance Listeria Initiative NVEAIS

  17. Major Foodborne Illness Surveillance Systems Main Categories National case I. surveillance PulseNet FoodNet (reports from all states) II. Sentinel site case NNDSS-LEDS FDOSS surveillance NARMS CaliciNet III. Outbreaks Listeria Initiative NVEAIS

  18. Major Foodborne Illness Surveillance Systems I. National Case Surveillance Basic case surveillance National Molecular Subtyping  Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance (PulseNet) PulseNet National Notifiable Disease  Surveillance System (NNDSS) Laboratory-based Enteric Disease  NNDSS-LEDS Surveillance (LEDS) National Antimicrobial Resistance  Monitoring System (NARMS) Detailed case surveillance NARMS Listeria Initiative  Botulism  Cholera and other Vibrio Surveillance Listeria Initiative  System (COVIS)

  19. Major Foodborne Illness Surveillance Systems National Case Surveillance Basic case surveillance National Molecular Subtyping  Network for Foodborne Disease PulseNet Surveillance (PulseNet) National Notifiable Disease  Surveillance System (NNDSS) NNDSS-LEDS Laboratory-based Enteric Disease  Surveillance (LEDS) National Antimicrobial Resistance  NARMS Monitoring System (NARMS) Detailed case surveillance Listeria Initiative

  20. A large outbreak in one place may be obvious

  21. An outbreak with persons in many places may be difficult to detect, unless we test the bacteria from many persons, and  find that they are infected with the same strain 

  22. PulseNet and Molecular Subtyping: the Hubble Telescope of Foodborne Disease Prevention In 1995, the Hubble Space Telescope found distant galaxies and star clusters never seen before. In 1996, PulseNet was launched.

  23. National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance PulseNet Connects cases of illness nationwide to quickly identify outbreaks, including many that would otherwise not be detected Developed: 1996 Because: After the 1993 E. coli O157 outbreak from hamburgers made 726 people sick and killed 4 children, more clinical labs began testing ill people for E. coli , and finding plenty . Health departments did not have subtype data to help determine which illnesses were linked by a common food source. Congress provided funds to improve surveillance. Now: National network of public health and food regulatory agency laboratories that perform standardized molecular subtyping (“fingerprinting”) of foodborne disease -causing bacteria.

  24. 87 labs in the PulseNet USA network

  25. Electronic Data Transmission Public health PFGE laboratories patterns National database at CDC

  26. PulseNet Data Analysis Involves Searching for Clusters  PulseNet teams at CDC and in states search for similar patterns  When a cluster is identified, they report it to epidemiologists Cluster of same pattern

  27. Human Specimen Isolates Uploaded to PulseNet USA 1996-2010 Number of Human Specimens Number of Clusters 60000 250 50000 200 40000 150 30000 100 20000 50 10000 0 0 1996*1997*1998*1999*2000* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Most patterns are from Salmonella, then E. coli, then Listeria. PFGE is pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; some data are preliminary

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend