Assisted Generation of Attack Trees : the ATSyRAprototype
Sophie Pinchinat
joint work with Mathieu Acher and Didier Vojtisek
Universit´ e de Rennes 1
Assisted Generation of Attack Trees : the ATSyRAprototype Sophie - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Assisted Generation of Attack Trees : the ATSyRAprototype Sophie Pinchinat joint work with Mathieu Acher and Didier Vojtisek Universit e de Rennes 1 GraMSec, 13 July 2015 Outline Introductory example 1 Goal decomposition High-level
joint work with Mathieu Acher and Didier Vojtisek
Universit´ e de Rennes 1
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example
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Introductory example Goal decomposition
Goal Outside
Outside
notDetected
Outside
FF SupervisingPC direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected Subgoal 2 FF SupervisingPC direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected ↓ Outside
notDetected
Introductory example Goal decomposition
Outside
direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected 11
Introductory example Goal decomposition
Outside
direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected 12
Introductory example Goal decomposition
Outside
direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected
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Introductory example Goal decomposition
FF SupervisingPC direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected → Outside
notDetected
Introductory example Goal decomposition
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Introductory example Goal decomposition
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Introductory example High-level actions
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Introductory example High-level actions
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Introductory example High-level actions
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Introductory example High-level actions
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Introductory example High-level actions
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Introductory example High-level actions
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Experimenting ATSyRA
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Experimenting ATSyRA
FF SupervisingPC direction access card staff access card supervisiongPC key notDetected → Outside
notDetected
The ATSyRA prototype
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The ATSyRA prototype
System description (DSL) start (1) Reachability analysis Model-checking (a) Set of attack scenarios (2) HLA description (DSL) start (3) Synthesis Attack tree (4) (b) Attack tree analysis tool (ADTool) ➀ ➁ ➂ ➃
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The ATSyRA prototype
Improve both specification languages
Easy ways to select a subgoal, a sub-building, etc. Connect subgoals For subgoal: exploit temporal logic from the Model-checker (e.g. (¬staff access card.pos=attacker)U(reach goal).) Select/suggest a virtual node to generate an HLA
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The ATSyRA prototype
Improve both specification languages
Easy ways to select a subgoal, a sub-building, etc. Connect subgoals For subgoal: exploit temporal logic from the Model-checker (e.g. (¬staff access card.pos=attacker)U(reach goal).) Select/suggest a virtual node to generate an HLA
Good tools for editing trees, choose abstract level for display
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The ATSyRA prototype
Improve both specification languages
Easy ways to select a subgoal, a sub-building, etc. Connect subgoals For subgoal: exploit temporal logic from the Model-checker (e.g. (¬staff access card.pos=attacker)U(reach goal).) Select/suggest a virtual node to generate an HLA
Good tools for editing trees, choose abstract level for display Parsing scenorios with HLA
Very combinatorial, currently the rules are not complete enough Need heuristics and backtracking to synthesize even more succinct trees Mathematical characterization of the optimal solutions we want to generate
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The ATSyRA prototype
Improve both specification languages
Easy ways to select a subgoal, a sub-building, etc. Connect subgoals For subgoal: exploit temporal logic from the Model-checker (e.g. (¬staff access card.pos=attacker)U(reach goal).) Select/suggest a virtual node to generate an HLA
Good tools for editing trees, choose abstract level for display Parsing scenorios with HLA
Very combinatorial, currently the rules are not complete enough Need heuristics and backtracking to synthesize even more succinct trees Mathematical characterization of the optimal solutions we want to generate
Long term
Towards other kinds of systems, typically cyber intrusions Guards, Defense (counter-measures)
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The ATSyRA prototype
LogicA DiversE EMSEC
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