Approaching a Formal Definition of Fairness in Electronic Commerce - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Approaching a Formal Definition of Fairness in Electronic Commerce - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 Approaching a Formal Definition of Fairness in Electronic Commerce Felix G artner Henning Pagnia Holger Vogt Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany 2 Overview What is fair exchange and how does it relate to e-commerce? 2


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Approaching a Formal Definition of Fairness in Electronic Commerce Felix G¨ artner Henning Pagnia Holger Vogt Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany

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Overview

  • What is fair exchange and how does it relate to e-commerce?
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Overview

  • What is fair exchange and how does it relate to e-commerce?
  • What are the problems with the usual definition of fair exchange?
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Overview

  • What is fair exchange and how does it relate to e-commerce?
  • What are the problems with the usual definition of fair exchange?
  • How can theory help improve the definitions?
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Overview

  • What is fair exchange and how does it relate to e-commerce?
  • What are the problems with the usual definition of fair exchange?
  • How can theory help improve the definitions?
  • What are the benefits of the refined definitions in practice?
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What is fair exchange?

  • Orders, goods and payment will be shipped electronically.
  • The exchange of such items must be fair.
  • fair exchange problem = How exchange two items between parties

A and B over an electronic network without either party suffering a disadvantage?

  • Assumption: items can be fully validated.
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Strong and Weak Fairness [Asokan 1998]

  • strong fairness: “When the protocol has completed, A has B’s

item, or B has gained no additional information about A’s item, and vice versa.

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Strong and Weak Fairness [Asokan 1998]

  • strong fairness: “When the protocol has completed, A has B’s

item, or B has gained no additional information about A’s item, and vice versa.

  • weak fairness: “Either strong fairness is achieved, or a correctly

behaving node can prove to an arbiter that an unfair situation has

  • ccured.”
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Strong and Weak Fairness [Asokan 1998]

  • strong fairness: “When the protocol has completed, A has B’s

item, or B has gained no additional information about A’s item, and vice versa.

  • weak fairness: “Either strong fairness is achieved, or a correctly

behaving node can prove to an arbiter that an unfair situation has

  • ccured.”

Distinction: inside/outside the exchange system

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Some Theory. . .

  • Properties of systems are sets of traces.
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Some Theory. . .

  • Properties of systems are sets of traces.
  • Two main classes of properties [Lamport 1977]:
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Some Theory. . .

  • Properties of systems are sets of traces.
  • Two main classes of properties [Lamport 1977]:

⋆ safety: “something bad will never happen”

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Some Theory. . .

  • Properties of systems are sets of traces.
  • Two main classes of properties [Lamport 1977]:

⋆ safety: “something bad will never happen” ⋆ liveness: “something good will eventually happen”

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Some Theory. . .

  • Properties of systems are sets of traces.
  • Two main classes of properties [Lamport 1977]:

⋆ safety: “something bad will never happen” ⋆ liveness: “something good will eventually happen”

  • Rule of thumb: finitely refutable ⇒ safety.
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Revisiting fairness

  • Strong fairness is a safety property [Pagnia and G¨

artner 1999; Shmatikov and Mitchell 1999].

  • What about weak fairness?
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Revisiting fairness

  • Strong fairness is a safety property [Pagnia and G¨

artner 1999; Shmatikov and Mitchell 1999].

  • What about weak fairness?

Is there a point in time where

  • 1. strong fairness is violated, and
  • 2. a party loses its ability to prove that it has been treated unfair?
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Revisiting fairness

  • Strong fairness is a safety property [Pagnia and G¨

artner 1999; Shmatikov and Mitchell 1999].

  • What about weak fairness?

Is there a point in time where

  • 1. strong fairness is violated, and
  • 2. a party loses its ability to prove that it has been treated unfair?
  • Answer “No” ⇒ weak fairness is liveness
  • Answer “Yes” ⇒ weak fairness is safety
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Eventually Strong Fairness

  • Asokan’s “weak fairness” as a liveness property.
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Eventually Strong Fairness

  • Asokan’s “weak fairness” as a liveness property.
  • Eventually an unfair situation is resolved within the system.
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Eventually Strong Fairness

  • Asokan’s “weak fairness” as a liveness property.
  • Eventually an unfair situation is resolved within the system.
  • Necessary: additional assumptions about the parties.
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Eventually Strong Fairness

  • Asokan’s “weak fairness” as a liveness property.
  • Eventually an unfair situation is resolved within the system.
  • Necessary: additional assumptions about the parties.
  • In general: “eventual cooperation”, achievable e.g. by

⋆ Trusted Computing Environment [Wilhelm 1997], ⋆ Security Kernel [Schneider 1998], ⋆ Smartcards, . . .

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New Fairness Definitions

Fairness property resolvable remark strong safety automatically eventually strong liveness automatically additional as- sumptions weak fairness safety

  • utside of the

System

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Consequences in Practice

  • Use standard formal methods to verify fair exchange protocols.
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Consequences in Practice

  • Use standard formal methods to verify fair exchange protocols.

⋆ E.g., strong fairness ⇒ safety property ⇒ invariance argument.

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Consequences in Practice

  • Use standard formal methods to verify fair exchange protocols.

⋆ E.g., strong fairness ⇒ safety property ⇒ invariance argument.

  • Strong fairness sometimes impossible:

⋆ Identify additional assumptions and prove eventually strong fairness.

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Consequences in Practice

  • Use standard formal methods to verify fair exchange protocols.

⋆ E.g., strong fairness ⇒ safety property ⇒ invariance argument.

  • Strong fairness sometimes impossible:

⋆ Identify additional assumptions and prove eventually strong fairness.

  • Weak fairness: identify “sufficient evidence”
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Consequences in Practice

  • Use standard formal methods to verify fair exchange protocols.

⋆ E.g., strong fairness ⇒ safety property ⇒ invariance argument.

  • Strong fairness sometimes impossible:

⋆ Identify additional assumptions and prove eventually strong fairness.

  • Weak fairness: identify “sufficient evidence”
  • Better: stay inside the system!
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Conclusions

  • Fair exchange plays an important role in e-commerce.
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Conclusions

  • Fair exchange plays an important role in e-commerce.
  • Need formal definition of fairness to reach assurance on fair ex-

change protocols.

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Conclusions

  • Fair exchange plays an important role in e-commerce.
  • Need formal definition of fairness to reach assurance on fair ex-

change protocols.

  • New formal variants of Asokan’s strong and weak fairness definiti-
  • ns.
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Conclusions

  • Fair exchange plays an important role in e-commerce.
  • Need formal definition of fairness to reach assurance on fair ex-

change protocols.

  • New formal variants of Asokan’s strong and weak fairness definiti-
  • ns.
  • Use theory to help clarify concepts in practice.
  • Can use new definitions and standard formal methods to reach

assurance on correctness of fair exchange protocols.

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Acknowledgements

Slides produced using L

A

T EX and Klaus Guntermann’s PPower4: http://www-sp.iti.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/software/ppower4/ References Asokan, N. 1998. Fairness in electronic commerce. Ph. D. thesis, University of Waterloo. Lamport, L. 1977. Proving the correctness

  • f

multiprocess programs. IEEE

  • Trans. Softw. Eng. 3, 2 (March), 125–143.

Pagnia, H. and G¨ artner, F. C. 1999. On the impossibility of fair exchange without a trusted third party. Tech. Rep. TUD-BS-1999-02 (March), Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Computer Science, Darmstadt, Germany. Schneider, F. B. 1998. Enforceable security policies. Technical Report TR98-1664 (Jan.), Cornell University, Department of Computer Science, Ithaca, New York. Shmatikov, V. and Mitchell, J. C. 1999. Analysis of a fair exchange protocol. In

  • Proc. FLoC Workshop on Formal Methods and Sec. Protocols (Italy, July 1999).

Wilhelm, U. G. 1997. Cryptographically protected objects. A french version appeared in the Proceedings of RenPar’9, Lausanne, Switzerland, http://lsewww.epfl.ch/~wilhelm/ CryPO.html.